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ABSTRACT
FACULTY PERCEPTONS OF THE EFFECTS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENTS ON THEIR PROFESIONAL ROLES:
THE NEW ENGLAND PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION EXPERIENCE
By
Nancy J. S. Hamer
University of New Hampshire, December, 2005

This study, a combination of quantitative and artifact analysis, examined how
New England public college and university faculty perceived their professional concerns
were affected by working under a collective bargaining agreement. The professional
concerns, derived from the pertinent literature, included the following: the ability of the
faculty to effectively influence who joined the faculty ranks; their powers to determine
the curriculum, with their related instructional practices/delivery systems, and the setting
of degree requirements; determining their teaching, scholarship, and service
requirements; assuring the exercise of academic freedom, and reasonable shared
governance.
Coupled with these professional concerns were three research questions that also
were the study’s focus:
(1)

Does collective bargaining facilitate or inhibit faculty professional autonomy?

(2)

Is it important to their sense of professionalism?

(3)

Do collective bargaining agreements support professional autonomy?

xii
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For the survey phase, 650 faculty, drawn from thirteen four-year public
institutions within New England, were surveyed to ascertain their perceptions on how
their contracts affected their professional concerns. For the artifact phase, the collective
bargaining contracts of the thirteen institutions were examined to see if the contracts’
language might impinge on the professional concerns of the faculty.
The 141 total surveys received after an initial and a follow-up mailing, were
analyzed using factor analysis and ANOVAs. The results showed that the respondents
perceived that their professional concerns were adequately addressed by their collective
bargaining agreements. Also faculty felt that their shared governance role was more
secure.
There were differences among the survey responses based on union membership
with regard to the agreements working as a balance on administrative powers, with
significant differences found between those not in a union, and members of AAUP, AFT,
and NEA. However, what faculty sought in their contracts to ensure a faculty role in
shared governance was in fact very limited in the actual contracts’ language.
Information gained from this study may inform the collective bargaining process
for both sides of the table and lend an understanding of the impact of these agreements
upon their respective institutions.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
In the landmark 1980 U.S. Supreme Court case dealing with collective bargaining
and higher education faculty within private institutions, National Labor Relations Board
v. Yeshiva University, Justice Brennan in delivering the dissenting opinion wrote,
The Court’s conclusion that the faculty’s professional interests are
indistinguishable from those of the administration is bottomed on an
idealized model of collegial decisionmaking that is a vestige of the great
medieval university. But the university of today bears little resemblance
to the “community of scholars” of yesteryear. Education has become
“big business” and the task of operating the university enterprise has been
transferred from the faculty to an autonomous administration, which faces the
same pressures to cut costs and increase efficiencies that confront any large
industrial organization. The past decade of budgetary cutbacks, declining
enrollments, reductions in faculty appointments, curtailment of academic
programs, and increasing calls for accountability to alumni and other special
interest groups has only added to the erosion of the faculty’s role in the
institution’s decisionmaking process (pp. 702-703).
The opinion, rendered over twenty years ago, was written at a time in which
higher education may have had a more collegial environment rather than a more
corporate environment of today in which students become consumers and research
produces immediate applications. However, current scholars of higher education such as
Christopher Lucas (1994; 1996) argue that the true collegial organization in American
higher education never truly existed but is rather the product of rose-colored hindsight.
But few today would dispute Justice Brennan’s viewpoint that higher education has in
large part digressed from the concept of being a faculty centered, collegial organization
with shared authority between faculty and administration to one in fact with
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characteristics more akin to a corporate entity. These include a hierarchical decision
making structure with specialized occupational classifications and categories with
advanced stages of bureaucratization and an organizational emphasis on “orderliness,
efficiency, accountability and quantification” (Lucas, 1994, p. 192).
As higher education in the United States in the twentieth century was challenged
to broaden the base of its student population to include women, minorities, and older
learners it saw its mission expand and diversify (Lucas, 1994). Then again, through its
research partnerships with government and industry, it found its mission base expand
even further along with its funding sources (Lucas, 1994). One of the related features of
this expansion is that the new constituencies of students and funding sources demanded
more input into the formulation of the mission of the institution and in how the institution
would be run (Lucas, 1994). New demands on the institution’s mission led to new
staffing patterns that demanded specialized skills, both professional and technical, and
resulted in new organizational structures such as statewide systems of higher education
that excluded the faculty from many functions and decision making paths within their
institutions (Kemerer & Baldridge, 1975; Johnstone, 1981). New funding sources
demanded increased accountability and so more new functions with positions assigned to
them within institutions sprang up solely for that purpose. Over time faculty were
restricted to mainly academic matters and in seeking to maintain an outlet for their voices
to be heard in the decision making process, they attempted to rely on traditional
structures of shared governance such as faculty senates (Cunningham, 1984). However,
faculty whose voice was diminished by the din of so many other voices which attempted
to influence decisions affecting them and their institution, turned to other means to
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reassert their influence, one of which was collective bargaining (Kemerer & Baldridge;
Schuster, 1974; Johnstone, 1981). Ironically, faculty who sought relief from the
bureaucratization of their academic institution, and a stronger voice in the decision
making process beyond academic matters alone and on issues that affected their
professional lives, turned to tools of the industrialized sector and its bureaucracies,
collective bargaining and the labor union.
According to past research, in most instances the outbreak of collective
bargaining activity on campuses can be traced to the faculty’s wish to counterbalance
what is perceived to be an increase in administrative power and an erosion of the
faculty’s influence (Schuster, 1974; Johnstone, 1981). In related studies it was found that
collective bargaining can also be viewed as an attempt to at least maintain the status quo
and retain certain academic traditions and values in the face of internal and external
threats on faculty rather than introduce reform of the profession (Schuster 1974; Kemerer
& Baldridge, 1975). Kemerer and Baldridge (1975) explained the thrust to unionize on
the part of faculty as being driven by two types of faculty with differing motives: those
who sought to preserve what they had earned (tenure, rank and stature), and those who
felt deprived (in terms of salary, rank, and privileges). In the latter case, this sense of
deprivation derived from a perception by newer faculty that due to changes in
institutional administration, funding and oversight, they would never receive the working
conditions that the senior faculty enjoyed, such as tenure, better salaries and job security
(Kemerer & Baldridge, 1975). While newer faculty felt threatened by not being able to
attain what had been promised, the senior faculty were anxious about losing what they
had already earned (Kemerer & Baldridge, 1975). Based on studies of institutions
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undergoing changes in their governance structures, and another study on institutions
engaging in collective bargaining, Kemerer and Baldridge (1975) found that the motive
of alleviating perceived ‘deprivation’ on the part of faculty underlies the faculty incentive
to unionize. This underlying motive of deprivation, coupled with the sense that academic
traditions needed to be secured for the future, may explain in part why the unionization of
faculty came first to institutions where faculty felt their influence to be weak on the
institutional decisions that affected their professional life and working conditions.
However, the advent of unions as a mechanism to protect, preserve and negotiate
for improved faculty working conditions posed and still poses a dilemma for some
faculty. The dilemma is how to reconcile the needs of a profession with unionization and
collective bargaining. For many, the terms unionization and professionalization are not
an easy fit. The term ‘professor’ associated with engagement in the ‘academic
profession.’ Indeed while the academic profession is not one of the three historic
professions of medicine, law, or the church, it has through the evolution of time acquired
that ranking (Bennett, 1998). As a profession it can, to varying degrees, fit the general
description that, according to Rich (1984), includes: the attainment of specialized and
societal valued knowledge over a prolonged period of time, a significant degree of
autonomy to practice and apply specialized knowledge, an altruistic sense to serve the
interests of related constituencies (service above self), a commitment to serving the
public interest, and an associated code of ethics with self-regulatory mechanisms for its
members.
The academic profession also possesses other characteristics that unite its
members under one customary rubric and uniquely highlight its stature as the seedbed for
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the other professions of medicine, law and the church. These characteristics include
periods of apprenticeship (graduate training, research and teaching assistantships), a
novitiate or residency (the pre-tenure years), generally accepted codes of conduct
(academic freedom, research ethics), and for most of its members a shared commitment
to a common calling (teaching, research and public service).
Utilizing a union model based on traditional industrial labor relations to represent
a professional group characterized by individual autonomy in which personal merit is
recognized through both the salary structure and tenure process challenges the
applicability of the model for both sides of the issue, faculty and institutional
administration (Rabban, 1991). This questionable fit opens the question of whether
faculty can have their professional interests served by a model devised for workers whose
productivity could be measured easily in quantifiable output. Some faculty may
reconcile this problem by taking a dualistic approach. They consider union membership
and collective bargaining as necessary to attaining desired working conditions, but they
look to other venues to influence academic and professional concerns such as a faculty
senate or through committee work (Rabban, 1991).
Union representation and the traditional industrial collective bargaining model
for faculty also challenges the administration to attempt to deal with the faculty on two
different levels: on one level as “employees” during the contract negotiation phases and
when enforcing a contract, and as valued professionals when seeking input on curricular
and student matters, thereby creating the potential of a two-silo approach to institutional
management overall (Rabban, 1991).
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But this then raises some interesting issues. If each faculty member within higher
education is considered a member of a ‘profession,’ what role has a union, and more
specifically a collective bargaining agreement, playing in defining the rights and
privileges of the group as professionals in matters outside salaries and benefits? In
considering this question it must be assumed that a faculty union either devises a way to
be successful in representing the professional aspects of the faculty role, or it remains
constrained to deal only with traditional bread and butter issues. Another issue is if
faculty unions, through collective bargaining, venture into the professional aspects of
faculty life, is it, from the viewpoint of the faculty, an appropriate and effective means of
preserving the rights and roles associated with their place and rank within an institution?
On this point, the literature appears to be mixed to date. For example, some studies have
reported that collective bargaining has strengthened the peer review process (Lee 1992).
However, another example in this realm indicated that professional roles were weakened
when the advent of collective bargaining created an adversarial climate between faculty
who were in the bargaining unit and department chairpersons who were not in the unit
(Cunningham, 1984).
And finally, if collective bargaining agreements can both encapsulate
management’s prerogatives as well as define faculty rights, is it possible that the
agreements could work more to enhance management’s discretional power to manage the
faculty’s role and participation in governance than to insure the faculty’s rights as
professionals? Considering this question for a bit, could it be that institutional
administrations have found a way to use the collective bargaining process to reconstruct
the faculty role into a new category of employee, that of the “managed professional” as
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defined by Rhoades (1998) rather than that of the autonomous professional? While
educational institutions did not introduce collective bargaining for faculty, over time it is
likely that management has made attempts to utilize collective bargaining to support its
objectives. And conversely, it would also be probable that faculty attempted to use

-

collective bargaining agreements to make inroads into management’s prerogatives.
Purpose of this Study
The purpose of this study is an examination of the relationship between the
professional concerns of faculty and collective bargaining. The driving questions
centered on whether unionization was fundamentally compatible with the traditional
definition of a “professional,” as perceived by the faculty surveyed, and what faculty
perceived about their collective bargaining agreements as being agents of hindrance or
facilitation when it came to examining their professional concerns. Those professional
concerns identified for the purposes of this study are identified below.
Faculty Professional Concerns
(A)

The ability of the faculty to effectively influence who will join and continue on
the faculty.

(B)

The ability of the faculty to determine the curriculum.

(C)

The ability of the faculty to determine what instructional practices/delivery
systems will be used their classrooms.

(D)

The ability of the faculty to set the requirements for granting of a degree.

(E)

The ability of the faculty to determine their teaching scholarship and service
requirements.

(F)

The right of the faculty to exercise their academic freedom.
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(G)

The ability of the faculty to exercise reasonable shared governance, (exercising a
wider role in institutional governance beyond the classroom and the department
level).
To accomplish this work, the study relied on a combination of survey research

and contract analysis. For the survey phase, 650 faculty drawn from 13 four year public
institutions within New England were surveyed to ascertain their perceptions on how
their contracts may be affecting their professional concerns, as defined above. For the
contract analysis phase of the research, the collective bargaining contracts of the
institutions that employed the surveyed faculty were examined to ascertain if there was
language in the contracts that might impinge on the professional concerns of the faculty
or aid, facilitate, or hinder them.
Research Questions
(1)

Do faculty perceive that collective bargaining facilitates or inhibits
their professional autonomy?

(2)

Do faculty perceive that collective bargaining in general is important
to their sense of professionalism?

(3)

Do the collective bargaining agreements support professional autonomy?
Information gained from this study may assist unions in understanding the impact

that their management of the collective bargaining process might have on faculty’s
professional concerns. It may also aid faculty in understanding more about the
perceptions of their colleagues with regard to the role collective bargaining plays in
influencing specific aspects of their professional lives. In addition, administrations
engaged in collective bargaining might find the information gained from this study of
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possible use in understanding more about the collective bargaining process and its impact
on faculty and administration relations.
Definition of Terms
Academic Freedom: This definition is based on the American Association of
University Professors 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure
that was updated by that organization in 1970 (AAUP, 1999). In summary, it states that
faculty should be entitled to the freedom to pursue their research and the publication of
such results, with companion freedom in the classroom to engage in conversations about
their subject. In addition, it affirms the rights of faculty as citizens, entitled to protection
of their free speech rights as such under the First Amendment of the Constitution, without
institutional censure when exercising those rights.
Alternative Delivery Systems: As a term, for the purposes of this study, this label
is used to encompass the new array of technology in the classroom currently being
employed by higher education institutions to deliver instruction both on campus and off.
It includes distance-learning technology through closed circuit television and cable
systems, as well as videotaped courses and Internet based instruction.
Intellectual Property: This term refers to the general protections provided by the
Copyright Act of the United States that grants authors and other creative occupations the
exclusive rights to the recognized ownership of their work and with the sole rights to
authorize the reproduction their work, or to use it as a foundation from which to create
other works. Once authors, or other creative occupations, are awarded this formal
recognition of ownership, no replication of their works can be made without their express
permission (or that of their legal designees). The term is meant to encompass all creative
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works from course materials to software, the written word, and oral and performed works
in addition to music compositions, and inventions of chemical, mechanical and other
physical natures. It may even at times include ideas and concepts.
Managed Professionals: As opposed to the concept of “independent
professional,” the “managed professional” works within a formal bureaucratic and
structured organization, unlike the former, and is treated more as an employee than as an
independent contractor. According to Rhoades (1998), managed professionals are valued
for their technical knowledge and expertise, but they do not constitute the primary
influence on the management decisions of the organization. Instead, the use of managed
professionals within a formal organization reinforces the expanded use of managerial
discretion to direct the work of such managed professionals.
Post-tenure Review: This term refers to a system of planned evaluation of faculty
who have already been awarded tenure. The distinguishing characteristics of this process
include such items as annual reports to judge productivity in research and teaching as
well as public service on and off campus, coupled with peer review mechanisms,
teaching evaluations by students, and prescribed reviews as part of overall accreditation
and programmatic reviews.
Reward Mechanisms: This term encompasses the traditional promotion and
tenure systems in place within most traditional, four-year higher education institutions
based upon the three-pronged work of research, teaching and public service.
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Stratification: The byproduct of faculty collective bargaining agreements which
contain an uneven treatment of salary issues and other matters related to faculty rank,
tenure, and hiring conditions. Essentially, it is a byproduct that results in a situation
where there are multi-layered systems of faculty appointments which function under a
variety o f salary scales and other related working conditions.
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CHAPTER2
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Introduction
The literature that informs this study begins with a discussion of what constitutes
a profession. From that beginning point, the role and work of faculty is discussed within
the context of what constitutes a profession. Once the foundation of the professoriate as a
profession has been laid in this discussion as noted above, the work of unions will be
explored to further inform the background for the study. Next, collective bargaining in
higher education and the pertinent court cases that shape the legal contours of collective
bargaining will be reviewed. The last section, Related Studies, will discuss the research
of Rhoades (1998) on the impact of collective bargaining agreements on faculty’s
professional roles.
What Constitutes a Profession?
According to Webster’s New Universal Unabridged Dictionary, the third level
definition under “professional” is “a vocation or occupation requiring advanced training
in some liberal art or science, and usually involving mental rather than manual work, as
teaching, engineering, writing, etc.; especially, medicine, law or theology (formerly
called the learned professions)” {Webster’s New Universal Unabridged Dictionary, 1983,
p. 1437).
But intrinsically, what sets apart work that is considered ‘professional’ from
other categories of occupations? Why does one occupation that is more mental labor that
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physical, to refer to the definition in Webster’s, achieve the status of “professional,”
while another with the same balance of mental versus physical labor does not?
Pavalko (1971) posited that there are eight central characteristics that set
professional work apart from other occupations. Using these eight characteristics as a
base, the degree to which a type of work embodies them leads to a determination of
whether the work could be considered traditionally professional or not. These
characteristics as described by Pavalko (1971) are:
(1)

Theory or Intellectual Technique. This aspect refers to the level on which the
work relies on a systematic body of theory and esoteric, abstract knowledge. In
many cases such knowledge may be the result of scientific research or be
comprised of a set of normative rules or customs. Adherence to, and a mastery of,
the theory and technique associated with the field are the foundation upon which a
professional’s expertise resides.

(2)

Relevance to Basic Social Values. While it may often be difficult to fully define
what a society’s social values are, work that is considered “professional” lays
claim to the notion that it is centered on the goal of furthering or sustaining basic
social values. An example would be the effort of legal professionals to support
justice as a value of the society, or the work of doctors to pursue the goal of better
health for the populace. Essentially, whether the work is intrinsically beneficial to
alleviating in some way the woes of the society becomes another measurement as
to whether the work is “professional” in nature or not.

(3)

Training, Presumably Long, and Based on Complex Ideas. Professional work is
characteristically marked by a long period of training leading up to its practice.
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The longer the training usually, the more “professional” the type of work
involved. Additionally, the training is marked by its distinct effort to infuse into
the novice, “professional in training,” a body of knowledge that is significantly
developed and specialized in content with a high degree of reliance on abstract,
esoteric knowledge. This training further involves understanding a knowledge
base that is highly reliant on the manipulation of ideas and symbols rather than
simply the manipulation of physical objects. But distinct to this type of training is
the degree to which the novice professional is indoctrinated into a distinct set of
values and norms, oriented in fact into a specific subculture with distinct role
conceptions of behavior.
(4)

Motivation. The coupling of service and self-interest as motivational platforms
for why the work is done helps to determine if work is professional or not. If a
group considers itself as embodying the characteristics of a professional calling,
then its members adhere to the principle that service to the public and their clients
is the ideal. In this ideal, the work is motivated by a desire to serve the best
interests of the public welfare and the individual client, rather than for personal
monetary gain. It is an ideology embraced not only by its members but one
publicly acknowledged and with an expectation that it will be adhered to by the
members of the profession. For example, patients may not be capable of
ascertaining (at least, not in all circumstances) whether the advice they receive
from doctors is accurate. They usually have to trust in the physicians’ training
and their adherence to a code of ethics, which is supposed to put the patients’ best
interests at the core of their motivation. In a similar vein, students place their
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trust in faculty to be instructed in manner that places the students’ interests first.
While the precise individual motivations of distinct professionals in practice may
vary, collectively, as a “profession,” the motivation of that group has to be one of
altruistic service, or the occupation group really does not qualify for the label of
“profession.”
(5)

Autonomy. It is the expectation of the members of a profession that they have
high degrees of self-regulation and self-control. As a collective, they usually
control to a large extent who may enter into the profession, and they serve as the
only adequate judges of what constitutes effective performance by members of
their profession. To complement this collective autonomy, there is also the
expectation that there is a significant degree of autonomy for the individual
practitioner. “This concern is expressed, for example, in resistance to
supervision, especially if supervision is by someone outside the profession”
(Pavalko, 1971, p. 22).

(6)

Sense of Commitment. A long-term commitment to the practice of the work and
its ideals is a commonly accepted tenet of a professional life. At the extremes of
this would be a sense of “calling” to the work, indicative of the clerical life. But,
such attractions can also be found in examples of teaching, medicine, and the law,
where practitioners often indicate they were drawn to the field by a sense of
higher purpose and a commitment to a set of professional ideals.

(7)

Sense of Community. The professions are further marked by the shared sense of
identity felt among it members founded on a common set of norms and values.
While these norms may in part work to control professional behavior, they also
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provide a context on which other activity may be based, such as how leisure is
spent or how interpersonal relationships are conducted. Most important, these
shared sets o f norms and values are inculcated into the training of novice
professionals, making the acceptance of them part of the orientation and
socialization of new members into the group.
(8)

Codes of Ethics. Codes of ethics in professional groups not only serve to
reinforce normative behavior among its members but work to further substantiate
a professional group’s commitments to an ideal of service and a high standard of
delivered expertise to the public. The existence of a set of ethics assures the
clients served by a professional group that there are standards of practice for the
service they are receiving and helps to regulate the profession internally. This
internal regulation is important, for if only members of professions can be
adequate judges of their peers because only they know if the service is being
performed correctly, the existence of a code of ethics allows a standard for
internal measurement. These codes of ethics therefore act somewhat as a
safeguard from intrusive regulation by those outside the profession by providing
evidence that the profession has a means of policing their own conduct.
To add further depth to the above criteria, it is helpful to consider that professions

characteristically have been portrayed in sociological terms as mechanisms devised to
contain, disseminate, and control the flow of expertise (Rhoades, 1998). The key is the
autonomous control of the various terms, conditions, and domains of work that are the
hallmarks of a profession, along with the control over who shall have the expertise
(Rhoades). But intrinsically, a profession is a way to organize work in a way that adds to
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the values of society. Frequently, throughout history the boundaries of professional
groups have clashed with one another to alter the boundaries of each and renegotiate new
terms and territories of operation for each (Abbott, 1988). For example, the realms of
medicine and law had to disassociate themselves from the boundaries of the church in
Western society to become their own professions.
Additionally professions themselves exhibit internal struggles as they adapt to
changes from without demanded by society and internally created by factional
differences over how the profession should develop and be regulated (Abbott, 1988).
According to Abbott (1988), negotiations take place on an informal basis to determine the
roles each profession will play in society. He perceived professions as “systems” that
have renegotiated boundaries after interacting with other professional “systems” based on
each group’s self-analysis of the objective and subjective qualities of their work. At the
basis of this “systems” concept is the control of tasks for each professional system.
Brint (1994) added to this picture of a profession as a “system” depicted by Abbot
(1988) by offering the analysis that professions are also internally stratified based on their
professional and political beliefs, as well as influenced by market forces and their
location within certain organizations. He further postulated that professions are changing
from styles of “social trustee professionalism” which is aligned with the moral
dimensions of work and views professionals as the guardians of societal valued
knowledge, to a style of “expert professionalism” where the technical advice of
professionals is what is valued. Brint suggested that the professions are no longer rising
above the excesses of the marketplace, as once theorized, but are now inexorably drawn
into it and influenced by it.
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However, professions face a rapidly growing dilemma when placed in the reality
of the workplace and the marketplace at the beginning of the millennium. Increasingly,
members of the traditional professions are no longer lone agents acting as autonomous
practitioners of their learned work. In order to do what professionals do, they must often
do it in the context of a larger, often very bureaucratic organization. This is consistent
with the work of professionals.
Doctors now usually work within hospital settings, or as members of a practice,
and both settings are increasingly governed by the dictates of health management
organizations and federal agencies with their regulations. Increased regulations generally
lead to even more bureaucracy in order to insure compliance with standards, mandated
rules, procedures, and legislated guidelines, so as the medical profession finds itself ever
more governed by outside organizations, and federal and state mandates, the need for
bureaucracy grows (Freidson, 1994). Another need for the increased bureaucracy has
been the rise in the use of technology and the delegation of work into new specialties
controlled by new professions or emerging, semi-professions especially throughout the
later half of this century (Pavalko, 1971; Abbott, 1988).
Lawyers, generally considered members of a profession traditionally
characterized by individual practitioners, now find themselves more and more working
within larger organizations. This has resulted as the market in this country for the
autonomous practitioner has dwindled, and the benefits of working within a large practice
have been found so economically appealing both to the individuals in them and to the
complex corporations in which many serve (Abbott, 1988). And while the clergy have
historically been tied to a larger entity in most cases, they collectively have been
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impacted by the creation of bureaucracies established by relatively new professions.
These new professions, particularly those related to psychiatry, counseling, and social
work, and the rise of their related bureaucracies, have altered the scope of the clergy and
redefined their profession (Abbott, 1988).
Teaching, like the clergy, has historically been rooted in a collective work group
with varying degrees of bureaucracy at least since medieval times, and indeed, the roots
of teaching, especially those in what could be deemed in higher education extend from
their origins in the clergy (Freidson 1994; Lucas, 1994). However, teaching as a
profession at all levels has been transformed, similar to the practice of medicine, law, and
the clergy, by the encroachment of new, emerging professional groups, by technology,
and by a focus on specialization within the field of education (Abbott, 1988; Lucas,
1994). It has further felt the impact of ever growing bureaucracies as it has been
delegated an increasing number of responsibilities by society and its various players of
government, corporations, and citizens (Lucas, 1994; 1996). And ironically, at the
university level, teaching has been affected significantly by other professions that have
looked to higher education to help define their own professional standards and as the
place to settle issues arising from inter-professional jurisdictional disputes over forms of
work and ownership of subject matter (Abbott, 1988).
The point becomes then that if autonomy is prized as a key element of
professional work, how is it threatened when professionals find their work setting to be
increasingly characterized as one that is predominately performed within a bureaucratic
organization? How do professionals reconcile their autonomous role with their role as
part of a larger organization?
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Two contrary points of view exist regarding the relationship between
professionals and the bureaucracies in which they may work. The first view is based on
one of conflict due to the possible, inherent, antithetical relationship of professional
characteristics and those of a bureaucracy. In a bureaucracy, adherence to a defined set
of organizational rules, standards, regulations, policies and procedures with the impetus
for work founded on a common set of goals is the expectation for its members (Pavalko,
1971). For the professions, autonomy, independent action and decision-making are most
prized, with the rationale for the work done being grounded in an internalized desire to be
of service (Pavalko).
In examining the differences between bureaucratic and professional styles of work
Fichter (1961) noted other areas in which the two are antithetical. Chief among them is
the placement of authority. In bureaucratic organizations authority is centralized, and
dependent on anointed leadership positions, while competency and the demonstration of
expertise is the foundation upon which leadership in the professions is grounded
(Fichter). Also noted are the tensions between the bureaucratic nature to emphasize
standardization of procedures and adherence to a defined united goal and the professional
nature to address the uniqueness of each case and formulate individual solutions with
loyalty to the client and to their professional community (Fichter).
Max Weber, one of the most influential writers of the twentieth century on the
subject of bureaucracy, ascribed characteristics to it that do not seem to allow for
professional behavior. The elements of Weberian bureaucracy “impersonality, hierarchy,
specified duties, contracts, professional qualifications, salary, full-time careers,
separation of office from ownership, and centralized control” seem to steer wide of the
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tenets of professional behavior except at the juncture of “qualifications” (Riggs, 1979, p.
569). However, Weber may have left open the possibility that there might be flexibility
in his model of an ideal bureaucracy when he wrote, “no exercise of authority can be
purely bureaucratic, i.e., purely through contractually engaged and appointed officials”
(Weber, p. 552, from Albrow, 1970, p. 42). This hinted at new exercise of individualized
authority based on professional norms within a bureaucracy is akin to what Parsons
(1971) put forth when referring to “line authority” with a “professional complex” in a sort
of post-Weberian approach (Parsons, 1969, pp. 505, 508). In this situation, professional
norms could come in conflict with bureaucratic norms and bring about a conflict as well
between professionals and non-professionals in the same work system and lead to
“disaffection on the part of the professionals” (Waters, 1989, p. 947). However, Sciulli
(1986), argued that while the norms that professional members of an organization are
committed to may be in conflict with their bureaucracy’s norms, the professionals’ strong
need to place an emphasis on maintaining collegiality in the group overrides arbitrary
exercises of power, but as an unintended result of the desire for collegiality among the
professionals, not from a shared system of intended belief applications.
Similarly, Scott (1966) emphasized that the chief source of tension between
professionals and their bureaucratic organization was authority, most especially the
tension between the bureaucracy’s positional based, executive authority structure, and the
professionals’ expertise and competency based authority structure. He cited two main
areas of conflict: the resistance of the professional to bureaucratic rules, standards,
supervision and the professionals’ tendency to give only conditional loyalty to the
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bureaucracy because their fundamental loyalty was owed to their professional tenets and
colleague group.
Related studies that illustrate the tensions between professionals and the
bureaucracy in which they practice highlight the ways in which professionals adapt and
the form in which the conflicts may be manifested. Reissman (1949) conducted one of
the first studies in this area and examined what he termed the “professional” and
“bureaucratic” orientations of forty civil service workers. From this study he developed a
typology that looked upon the orientations of the pure professional and the pure
bureaucrat as being at opposite ends of a continuum. A professional who operated within
the bureaucracy but felt his/her allegiance was primarily to his/her own, outside
professional group was labeled a “functional bureaucrat” and placed at the professional
end of the continuum. A professional who was completely oriented towards the
organization and totally immersed in it, and derived his/her sense of recognition from it,
was labeled a “job bureaucrat” and held the place at the end of the continuum marked by
the wholly bureaucratic orientation (Reissman). Between the two extremes, functional
and job, were the “specialist” and the “service” orientations as described by Reissman
(1949). The “specialist” was near the “functional” level but derived a greater sense of
identification from the bureaucracy, and the “service” orientation approached the “job
level” but derived some sense of recognition from its outside professional group
(Reissman).
Another landmark study by Gouldner (1957; 1958) on the faculty of a small
liberal arts college focused on their levels of professional commitment and organizational
loyalty. This work found that “there seems to be some tension between an organization’s
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bureaucratic need for expertise, and its social-systems needs for loyalty” (Gouldner,
1958, p. 466). As Reissman had done, Gouldner also distinguished a faculty’s
orientation, whether more tied to the organization or to their professional interests, by
how markedly they attributed their loyalties to either one or the other. For Gouldner, his
“cosmopolitans” as he termed them (akin to Reissman’s “functionals”), were
characterized by low loyalty to the organization but with high commitment to their
specialized role skills, and an allegiance to an outside group that represented their
professional specialty (Gouldner, 1957; 1958). Those with an orientation to the
organization were deemed “locals” (comparable to Reissman’s “job bureaucrats”), and
they were shown to have strong loyalty to the organization, a low commitment to role
skills, and a significant degree of orientation to a reference group within the organization
(Gouldner). Those found to be “cosmopolitans” were less likely to accept organizational
rules than “locals” and were concerned mainly with their own research and the work of
their own professional field, while “locals” main concerns and involvement focused on
the institution (Gouldner).
Another early study on professionals who belonged to a labor union also
developed a typology to characterize the attitudinal orientation of professionals
(Wilensky, 1959). In this study, the professionals were found to be in an array of
orientations similar to those identified in the studies of Reissman and Gouldner. For
example, some were found to be oriented to “professional service,” which meant they
exhibited little loyalty to the union and identified primarily with their professional field
(economist, etc.). Others were “careerists” interested in a career in the union with a
strong loyalty to it, and another group were “missionaries” who identified mainly with
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the abstract, theoretical notion of a labor union and its ideals. Yet another group found in
the study was labeled “politicos” for their identification with the union but with a goal to
obtain power in the organization as an end in itself. Overall, this study sought to
illustrate that professionals adapted to bureaucratic organizations by either making the
organizations’ expectations of them more compatible with their professional ideals, or
they reoriented their focus to one where the organization assumed the primary focus
rather than their affiliated, external professional group.
Of related interest to the Wilensky study is the work of Blau and Scott (1962)
who found that orientation inclined towards, or from, a focus on the organization on the
part of professionals influenced how strictly they enforced the rules of their organization.
In this work, which examined professionals engaged in social work, Blau and Scott found
that professionals who identified with social work as a profession were more likely to
break, or deviate from, the rules of the organization if it served the best interests of their
clients (Blau & Scott, 1962). The study also concluded that, conversely, professionals
who identified more with the organization than the profession of social work were more
likely to adhere to, and enforce, the rules of the organization (Blau & Scott).
A related finding can be found in Corwin’s study of nurses done in 1961. In this
work degree nurses, those trained at the collegiate level, were found to remain more
professionally oriented and more likely to question hospital rules once they entered
employment than diploma nurses, those trained in a hospital setting (Corwin, 1961). It
also found that diploma nurses were more likely to decrease their professional allegiance
the further they moved from graduation while degree nurses retained their professional
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loyalty even as they became more identified with the organizational dictates of the
hospital.
These early studies basically point to two things. First, there are divergent
orientations within the same professions, with varying degrees of loyalty to the
profession and the home bureaucracy. And second, the studies point out that the stronger
the orientation is to the profession, the more likely there will be conflict between the
professional and the organization.
As noted earlier, there are two contrary points of view regarding the relationship
between professionals and the bureaucracies in which they may work. The first point of
view representing the possible antithetical relationship between professionals and their
home organizations due to the differing characteristics and objectives of the professions
and bureaucracies has been discussed above with a review of early studies examining the
relationship. Other and more recent work, however, points to a contrary view that calls
into question the organizational nature of bureaucracies that are composed of significant
numbers of professionals and considers whether they are truly ordered and controlled by
pure, traditional bureaucratic means.
A number of studies have attempted to demonstrate that not all organizations
where professionals work exhibit all the characteristics of a bureaucracy; thus, the
hypothetical tensions between the objectives of the organization and those of the
professionals may be lessened. Work on the nature of law firms, accounting firms, health
care institutions, educational systems, and social agencies has yielded new ways to
conceive of seemingly bureaucratic organizations because they have altered their
traditional scheme of managing to accommodate the characteristics of professionals
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(Freidson, 1994). These changes have led to new terms to describe such altered models
of bureaucracies such as “advisory bureaucracy” (Goss, 1961), “professional
bureaucracy” (Smigel, 1964), and “professional organization” (Scott, 1965; Montagna,
1968). These studies question the premise that organizations that employ professionals
are stereotypically bureaucratic enough that they can order and control the work of the
professionals by traditional bureaucratic methods. Cohen and March’s (1972) study of the
governance o f universities which found them modeling an “organized anarchy,” further
challenges the concept that organizations which employ professionals are, and can be,
traditional bureaucracies with structured abilities to control their membership. Weick’s
study (1976) on school districts, where he equated them as “loosely coupled systems”
rather than tight bureaucracies, lends further evidence to the notion that organizations
consisting o f large numbers of professionals are not likely to be strict models of
bureaucratic control and authoritative hierarchy.
Related work (Freidson, 1994) noted that the key in these altered bureaucratic
models is that the supervision of the professionals in them is done by professionals in the
same field as required by law, or to maintain an accreditation, or by historical precedent.
More often than not, in those organizations, or units within organizations, that employ
predominately professionals, the supervisory, managerial and usually executive positions
are filled by employees with similar credentials to the rank and file professionals but with
more training or experience in administration (Schriesham, von Glinow & Kerr, 1977).
Freidson (1994) concluded that in these situations where professionals are supervising
similar professionals that while an individual professional might lose some autonomy
over his/her work in that organization, overall the profession itself did not lose its
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autonomy over its field of work. It did not because supervision and management was
conducted by professionals in the same field with presumably the same professional
concerns, ethics, and standards. Abbott (1988), however, purported that professionals
have lost autonomy in their work for other reasons as a result of functioning within
bureaucracies.
According to Abbott (1988) some professions have lost their exclusive rights to
do certain kinds of work to other professions due to competition from other professions
or from the challenges presented to that exclusivity by new, emerging professions. While
large bureaucratic organizations have enabled administrative work to be taken away from
some professional groups in them, giving it to others, thus freeing the professionals to
concentrate on their most relevant duties, it has also served to isolate them from certain
roles within the bureaucracy. In addition, because of the requirement of, and the need
for, physical capital to practice (such as the technology now required to practice modern
medicine or do research in a university), the professions have had to partner with, or
delegate to, other professions to accomplish their work. In particular, Abbott makes the
point that professions have grown more dependent on bureaucracies to enable them to
function in their professional role as a result of this need for the physical capital that only
a large, well-funded organization can supply. The effect of this symbiotic relationship
between bureaucracies and the professions is to create a challenge for the professions to
sustain a full sense of control over all aspects of their work.
The Faculty as a Profession
Given this background on the professions, it is important to address how the
situation of faculty as professionals working in the unique bureaucracies of higher
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education may perceive that their professional role is altered by their interaction with the
bureaucratic structure and its requirements for its own norms.
In a report sponsored by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of
Teaching, the author, Burton R. Clark, writes by way of an introductory conclusion about
the study, “We cannot help but be struck by the virtual right so many academics seem to
possess to go their own way simply by assuming they can do largely as they please a
good share of the time, all in the name of rational behavior” (Clark, 1987, p. 148). He
asserted that this behavior is the result of a situation where the “scientific estate” built by
the faculty thus with the means of the production of the institution in their own hands,
gave rise to a situation where trustees and administrators may desire and work to arrange
a situation of institutional control from the top, while faculty exert a push for
determination from their own ranks about the direction of their work and that of the
institution. Also echoing some o f the work that would come later from Rhoades (1998)
on the stratification of the faculty profession within itself, Clark’s report also found that
the abilities of faculty to successfully determine the direction of the institution appeared
to change dramatically as they moved from the “entrepreneurial professionalism” of
research universities to other higher educational entities, the more they found
environments that “restrict professional status and privilege, leading inexorably, where
state law permits to unionization” (p. 149).
Adding to this mix as well, Clark posits that the dispersion of authority in a
university or college environment amongst faculty, departments, colleges, divisions, and
the like, further yields to situations that can be politically charged in nature, driven by
distinct individual personalities, and thus ones that change dramatically from one “center
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of authority” to another within an institution just as much as between institutions (Clark,
1987).
Some of these aspects of the faculty profession may be corroborated by a 1995
study on faculty, and their work satisfaction by Blackburn and Lawrence (1995). In this
study of 120 faculty in four different types of institutions, they found that regardless of
this institutional type faculty believed that they had less influence in their departmental
matters o f determining the curriculum, selecting departmental chairs, selecting new
faculty hires than what their institutions’ administrators believe faculty members have for
authority (Blackburn & Lawrence, 1995).
The perception by faculty that their traditional roles of influence on campus had
been eroded has been the subject of numerous works citing that changes in faculty roles
harkens back to the post-World War II days of the late 1940s and early 1950s, peaking in
the 1970s amidst changes in the academy that resulted from new student audiences, not
from privileged families, entering institutions both as students and faculty, and new
sources of private and government funding coming into the picture. (Altbach, 1980;
Driver, 1972; Lucas, 1994; Ross; 1976; and Wolff, 1969). New lines of funding that
demanded new accountability and assessments, and which created a rise in the use of
non-faculty professionals to manage the enterprise (Altbach, 1980; Driver, 1972; Lucas,
1994; Ross, 1976; Wolff, 1969).
More recent work may suggest that faculty are right in their perceptions of eroded
professional authority. Clark, Boyer, and Corcoran point out in their 1985 work that
“higher education seems to be undergoing a paradigm shift, termed variously from
faculty hegemony, to student consumerism, and from education community to economic
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industry” (p. 23). With this point in mind, Bowen and Schuster (1986) concluded this
state of affairs had led to a situation among faculty in the United States where they
viewed such changes with “resigned disappointment [or] discontent” and as a source of
“poor morale” and thus used these conclusions as a basis for their own study (p. 128).
Their study involved 3 8 college campuses and 542 interviewed faculty and
administrators. It sought to find whether or not faculty thought their professional lives
had changed, improving or declining in quality and in morale, and they also sought
evidence of changes in collegiality [for the authors’ purposes this was defined as
relationships among faculty within and without their departments] along with “whether
their faculty autonomy had been compromised” over the previous fifteen years (Bowen &
Schuster, 1986, p. 137). The study found that the professorial life “on balance is still
attractive to its practitioners,” and concluded on the question of morale “. . . that faculty
at two-thirds of the campuses—twenty five of the thirty eight—ranged from fair to
excellent.. the condition of the American faculty [was] neither bleak nor bountiful...
but few unreservedly enthusiastic,” and “a few profoundly troubled” (pp. 160-162). In its
findings about collegiality the authors concluded that it has suffered least but may have
been strengthened “through sharing a common enemy” meaning establishing bonds
against perceived administrative power threats and encroachments (pp. 143-144). In the
area of autonomy, this study found that faculty did not feel any loss of autonomy on their
academic freedom but did feel deeply that they had lost ground in terms of power to
influence campus governing decisions, and held deep resentment of state interference in
campus affairs in the case of state institutions. A single quote from a respondent in the
study perhaps sums up the majority of responses in his regard, “Its not that being a
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faculty member is not prestigious. It’s still that. But it’s only that. We’ve lost control
over the kind of students we encounter in our classrooms and over the direction of our
campus” (p. 146).
A study done on the “new faculty demographic” (younger faculty with more
minorities and women and international faculty being represented) done in 1998, but
based on the 1993 National Study of the Postsecondary Faculty database, concluded that
the shape of the faculty in terms of gender and ethnicity may be changing with the core of
full-time faculty shrinking but in many ways some key characteristics were not changing
(Finkelstein, Seal and Schuster, 1998). One overarching point was found binding the old
and the new faculty among the tenure track or tenured faculty, that while they differed
more in what they were than what they did; the “new entrants despite some significant
differences in their background characteristics, were well socialized by their mentors in
the ‘old ways’” (p. 103). In their respective attitudes about their various aspects of work
including satisfaction with their jobs and careers, the similarities between the two cohorts
are more obvious than the dissimilarities that separate them (Ibid).
This conclusion would appear to be substantiated by The American Faculty Poll
conducted in 2000 by the National Opinion Research Center under the auspices of the
TIAA-CREF (Sanderson, Phua, & Herda, 2000). This study, based on a telephone survey
in 1999 of over 1,500 faculty members found the following: 90% were satisfied with
their choice of career, but bureaucratic politics on campus and low compensation often
had them considering an alternative path, and they were concerned about the future of
higher education and the lack of their students’ pre-college preparation. But surprisingly,
45% of the respondents strongly agreed, and another 34% somewhat agreed that
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“intrusions into their academic freedom by the administration were relatively rare” (p.
31). However, there was a finding that a “strong sentiment of ‘them vs. us’ feeling when
it came to their own college administrators specifically especially for being “out of touch,
and insistent on accountability by relying on numerical measures of performance, and for
determining reward (or punishment) more on the basis of quantity rather than
quality”(pp. 40-41). This is also a feeling which is likely to be intensified, according to
case studies (Kerlin & Dunlap 1993), when campus austerity measures further impose
restraints on fiscal resources and strains on salary increases, and salary structures across
the disciplines, if there is already resentment toward the administration.
Unions and the Professions: What is the Role of Unions?
Simply put, one way to explain what unions do is that they seek to gain bilateral
power to increase wages, and they also function as a “collective voice,” one associated
with their representation of workers to advocate for better conditions and participation in
the decisions affecting them and the organization (Freeman & Medoff, 1984). Freeman
and Medoff indicated that unions are faced with the conundrum that if they raise wages
too high the employers may employ fewer worker. But if they keep them too low, and
the membership may be dissatisfied and vote out the union, or seek an alternative
representative. However, the success of unions in raising wages also works best in an
atmosphere where the market power of the organization is in a non-competitive
environment, where new firms have difficulty entering and/or where some enterprises
have cost advantages over this competition.
Unions, as Freeman and Medoff (1994) have pointed out, give a voice to
employees who hold professional positions within an organization, but that voice is
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restricted to the bread and butter issues of wages, benefits, and terms and conditions of
employment. Employees gain a collective voice that dilutes management authority, but
does that dilution result in enhanced professional decision making? To curtail the power
of another does not easily translate into increased power to set a separate agenda. The
bilateral decision making of collective bargaining may do little to enhance the individual
decision making associated with professional practice.
Unions would seem to be less necessary for professionals than for the traditional
labor/production based wage earner, except that many professions, such as actors,
musicians, teachers, professors, air traffic controllers, doctors, lawyers, and engineers,
joined unions in the twentieth century (Murolo & Chitty, 2001). Bain (1970)
hypothesized that what drew these professionals to join unions was the need more for the
collective voice than perhaps wage protections, though the latter was important. The part
that they share with their union members in industry is that these professionals cannot
practice their particular style of profession without being in a bureaucratic, organized
work atmosphere. Hence they share with traditional “blue-collar union labor” the
necessity to deal with a management structure making decisions about their work lives
and a situation in which they, the workers,” seek a strong collective participation.
In one very real sense the idea of white collar professionals joining together for a
common purpose predates their unionization, the “professional society” was often a key
ingredient to their sense of professionalism, be it a learned society to advance common
knowledge, or a more contemporary professional society founded to share common
interests or bolster standards (Hoffman, 1976). However, changes over the years started
to blur the lines among learned societies and professional groups as well as unions as
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more professional societies took on the characteristics of both learned societies and
unions (Ibid.). Some examples of organizations that reformed themselves along these
lines include a number of engineering and scientific societies that today find their final
home in the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations
AFL-CIO, and the National Education Association (NEA) which began life as a
professional society in 1857 to “elevate the character and advance the interests of the
profession of teaching and to promote the cause of education in the United States (Ibid,
p. 54-55). Additionally, the transformation of the American Association of University
Professors (AAUP), from a organization whose goal in 1915 was to “protect the
professional interests of college faculties with respect to academic freedom and tenure
seemed an “unlikely society to engage in collective bargaining in 1972” (Hoffman, 1976,
p. 54).
However, for many researchers the concept that the traditional union model is
antithetical to the stance of a professional has driven some of their work, even despite the
evidence of the transformation of some professional societies into union movements. For
example, Straus (1954), pointed out that for a professional to join a union meant a certain
loss of status, it “means abandoning hope; it means showing hostility to the boss (whom
they may dream of as a close associate and personal friend); it also means throwing away
all opportunity to forge ahead on merit” (pp. 74-75). Another example of research on the
issue of professionals unionizing is Prandy, Sykes and Burns (1946) who portrayed
unionization as based on a “status ideology,” (possessing it meant you did not seek
collective action but preferred individual merit and a desire to act independently), as
opposed to “class ideology” which disposed one more to collective action and
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representation (Bain, Coates, & Ellis 1973). As Burns stated, white-collar workers are
“suspicious of unions. . . [they] focus attention on the welfare of the group and tend to
forget the individual in the group” (Bums, 1946, p. 71). But there was also evidence that
when professionals did join unions they did not necessarily reject their status ideology
but “because they see unionism as a better way of obtaining them.” In other words they
look on a union as a means of obtaining dignity, prestige, and control over environment,
things which are denied them by an increasingly bureaucratic organization” (Straus,
1954, p. 81). Similarly, Mills found that professionals felt that unions were, “something
to be used, rather than something in which to believe. They are understood as having to
do strictly with the job and are valued for their help on the j o b . ... Acceptance of them
does not seem to lead to new identifications in other areas of living” (Mills, 1951, pp
308-309).
Faculty Collective Bargaining in Higher Education
The existing labor laws in the United States, most particularly the National Labor
Relations Act, were not designed to effectively govern situations where
distinctions between employers and employees is unclear, such as those
characterizing colleges and universities where faculty members contribute
significantly to the managerial decision-making process on the one hand and seek
to exert power as members of a union on the other hand. The National Labor
Relations Board and our Federal Courts have adopted a fiction about the nature of
governance in higher education, which has questionable relevance to reality in
today’s educational world (Kuechle, 1992, p. 81).
The above quote from Professor David Kuechle of Harvard’s Graduate School of
Education (now retired), illustrates the two main ways in which the adoption of the
industrial labor model has affected employer-employee relations in higher education,
particular those between higher education institutions and their faculties. The first centers
on the actual application of the industrial labor model to the internal mechanics of
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institutions of higher education and the impact it has on the structure, governance, and
management of these organizations through the use of collective bargaining and its
related accoutrements. The second focuses on the consideration of relevant court rulings,
which are based on the National Labor Relations Act of 1935. In addition such court
rulings were often followed by significant changes in law allowing public employees to
unionize. So, in just two sentences Professor Kuechle has additionally illustrated the
possible difficulties that may strike at the heart of attempting to apply the industrial labor
relations’ model to higher education. Can such a model, and public laws that rely on
highly distinct definitions of what is management and what is labor, find relevant
applications in the setting of higher education where the roles of administrators and
faculties respectively are often blurred in the name of creating a condition of shared
governance?
The Law Changes and Public Employees Unionize
The original legislation, National Labor Relations Act (NCRA) of 1935, protected
and structured private sector bargaining. Public employees, including professors at
public institutes of higher education, however were not covered by the 1935 Act.
Consequently, each state, in order to allow their employees to bargain collectively had to
pass enabling legislation. While each state could theoretically have created legislation
anew, most states instead borrowed liberally from the NLRA.
In 1959, only Wisconsin specifically permitted its state employees to unionize
(Arnold, 2000). By 1962 however, this situation was beginning to change after the
signing of Executive Order 10988 by President John F. Kennedy allowing for the
unionization of federal employees in the executive branch of the United States
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government. President Kennedy’s bold step offered the states a role model stating that
allowing public employees to bargain can further the public interest. For example, New
Hampshire passed RSA 273-a which borrowed liberally from the NLRA. While most
states eventually adopted legislation allowing their pubic employees to collective bargain
for wages, benefits, and terms and conditions of employment, not all states followed
Wisconsin and President Kennedy.
The states which passed legislation allowing for public sector collective
bargaining used much of the language of the 1935 NLRA including the concept of an
exclusive representative to bargain for a group of employees deemed to have a
community of interest. Furthermore, the states established a National Labor Relations
style governing board to oversee public sector collective bargaining (Harrison, 1993).
While public sector collective bargaining grew during the 1970’s so also did an
interest in collective bargaining by some faculty of public higher education institutions,
and though few states wrote any clauses to deal exclusively with this situation, or set of
employees, neither were they specifically, as an employee class, excluded from such
activity, and the lack of ambiguity of some state’s laws clearly allowing all state
employees the same rights to self-organize for the purposes of collective bargaining (for
example, Massachusetts and Rhode Island) allowed for an opportunity for faculty at the
institutions of these states to unionize as early as 1971, as was the case in Rhode Island
(Arnold, 2000; Schuster, 1974). By 1993, forty states and the District of Columbia and
the US Virgin Islands had legislation that provided for legal frameworks for collective
bargaining by their employees but only slightly more than have (twenty-six) have specific
legislation that covers their public higher education faculty (Harrison, 1993).
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For the states that did have specific legislation covering the right of faculties to
unionize, it generally fell during its establishment ‘hay days’ of the 1970’s into two
specific categories, “meet and confer,” (with California’s public higher education system
the leader in this area), and collective bargaining laws (Duryea, Fisk & Associates, 1973).
By the end of the 1990’s whether the model was one of meet and confer, or collective
bargaining, as noted by Julius (1993),
with regard to industrial labor relations processes, the higher education sector is
different but not at all unique. While it may be difficult to identify a particular
model, many similarities exist between what unions do in academe, and what they
do in unionized sectors of the economy. Similar laws are applied and established
ways of handling disputes and administering agreements exist... (p. 3).
The Industrial Labor Model
The traditional industrial labor model underpinning the National Labor Relations
Act of 1935 emphasizes the separate roles of management and labor, assigning distinct
roles in the work environment to each group (Streshly & DeMitchell, 1994). Essentially
without these distinctions there is no industrial labor model. This distinction, and thus
the defined relationship between the two roles forms the crux of the model along with an
added participant in it, and one key to its operation, the union. Under this model,
university administrators become the distinct “managers” of the organization, while
faculties are regarded as “labor.” The union becomes the third party assigned with the
task of protecting labor “from the whims of management through a collectively
bargained, legally enforceable contract that defines the terms and conditions of
employment in addition to the wages and benefits associated with the job” (Streshly &
DeMitchell, 1994, p. 61). Thus, the model is imbued with an adversarial tone; creating
seemingly “permanent adversaries” whereby labor is pitted against the goals of
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management, if the mutuality of interests defined within the labor group are threatened,
with the latter group bolstered in this regard by its defender, the union (Kerchner &
Caufman, 1993). In addition, collective bargaining becomes the principal mechanism for
the interaction amongst labor, union, and management, with signed collective bargaining
agreements becoming the documents that stipulate in large part how labor and
management will interact with each other, along with their expectations of each other in
the trade of labor for wages. According to a 1975 study of faculty unions on campus,
collective bargaining assumes there is a conflict between employees and the
employer, that a union supported by a legal framework will be the exclusive
representative of employees, that group representation will supplant traditional
individual negotiations, and that the terms of employment must be included in a
binding contract between employer and union (Kemerer & Baldridge, 1975, p. 3).
and it also assumes a community of interest among its membership.
Another viewpoint on the traditional industrial labor model is that it assumes that
work produced by labor can be assessed in easily identifiable and measured units, with
less emphasis on the collaborative, professional or even artistic elements of the work
(Streshly & DeMitchell, 1994). The set structures of the traditional industrial labor model
where the employee is governed by strict rules and sharply defined definitions of their
work, separated from other employees by the boundaries of union representation may
serve to limit the involvement of employees in certain realms of their work which would
be personally enhancing, or more prove beneficial to the productivity of their
organization (Kerchner & Mitchell, 1988). Therefore, the application of the traditional
labor model to that of the modem workplace, inhabited with professionals having a stake
in the decisions that both affect the quality and quantity of their work, as well as the
mission of the organization, becomes problematic because it de-emphasizes that role in
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favor of placing more emphasis on employee rights and working conditions. However, it
is natural that the traditional industrial labor model would ignore these characteristics for
the modem workplace, especially that of the public sector. When public sector labor
laws were passed, the predominant labor management model was that of the industrial
union existing within the private sector. At the time, given the knowledge and experience
legislators had acquired dealing with this model, public employee labor laws were written
with the industrial union in mind.
The industrial labor model not only separates employees into labor and
management, us and them, employees “relinquish control over the outcome of the
product of their work,” and pass it to management, often as a trade-off for the protection
to only bargain wages, benefits, terms and conditions of employment (Streshly &
DeMitchell, 1994, p. 63). It became management’s right to set the goals of the unit,
excluding labor from setting policy, and in some cases leading to the creation of
collective bargaining agreements exclusively reserving this right to management
(Streshly & DeMitchell). Therefore, a situation can be created whereby if something is
not spelled out in a contract, it must be reserved to management’s prerogative, and if it is
spelled out in the contract, it cannot be altered without further negotiation between the
contracted parties. This serves to limit the scope of labor relations then to what can be
bargained. While this creates a complicated picture in any arena of collective bargaining,
this situation can be made even more complicated in the public sector.
In the public sector a state statute may determine whether a public employer has
the right to bargain over, or the power to agree to, a given subject (Twomey, 1985). For
example, if by state statute, teacher evaluations in public schools have to be conducted
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twice a year, it is “impermissible for a school board to agree to only one evaluation a
year” as part of a collective bargaining agreement (Twomey, 1985, p. 500). However,
even if something is not forbidden by state statute does not mean it necessarily can be
bargained over. In the public sector by law some issues are “mandatory” subjects and
others are “permissive” subjects. “A mandatory subject of bargaining is one which the
parties are required to negotiate over, and a permissive subject of bargaining is one which
the parties may negotiate over but which neither can insist on to the point of impasse”
(Twomey, 1985, p. 501). The realm of mandatory subjects is presided over by the issues
of “wages hours, and other terms and conditions of employment,” while the area of
permissive subjects is often open to the interpretation of each particular state’s statutes
(Twomey, 1985, p. 501). To further narrow the scope of bargaining issues, these statutes
often contain language dictating broad management prerogatives that effectively exclude
certain subjects from negotiation because they relate to “matters of inherent managerial
policy” (Twomey, p. 501). The history of public sector collective bargaining to this point
has indicated a very conservative approach by public employment relation boards and the
courts when deciding what can be a mandatory or permissive subject for collective
bargaining. It has been approached more conservatively than in the private sector due to
the sensitivity shown by the courts, and labor relations boards to the issue of management
prerogatives, and with an eye to recognizing the fiscal realities often facing public
employers. Public sector unions are blocked from forcing employees to bargain over
permissive subjects. Thus, permissive subjects of bargaining cannot be elevated to
mandatory subjects by insisting on bargaining to the point of declaring impasse
(Twomey).
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Another limiting factor that the traditional industrial labor model has is that with
the selection of a union, an exclusive bargaining representative, the points of contact
become restricted. The union becomes the exclusive representative of labor, its voice and
it is through this voice that labor must communicate to a large extent with management.
Management may in turn have its exclusive representatives (labor lawyers, contract
administrators, personnel leaders) who are delegated the task of speaking with union
representatives; thus, the range of who can communicate and on what issues becomes a
potential limiting factor in fostering a collaborative working environment (Streshly &
DeMitchell, 1994).
Application of the Industrial Labor Model to Higher Education Labor Relations
In the industrial labor model the union is essentially a political organization with
its own goals and will to live and grow. The union provides a service, securing the best
wages, benefits, terms and conditions to its clientele. It does this by appealing to the
needs of its members and gaining them concessions in the workplace that its members
believe they could not have gained on their own. Mannis (1992) wrote:
Unions are complex political, social and economic organizations. A definition I
learned years ago stills rings true. A union is a political agency operating in an
economic environment. Unions, as organizations, have a central objective of
survival and growth. Union leaders want to remain in office. Organizational and
political goals can conflict with the needs and goals of rank and file union
members, in our case, college employees (p. 97).
Consequently, the organization’s goals may, and often do, conflict with the goals
of the union which may in turn conflict with the goals of its rank and file members. The
reconciliation of these competing or conflicting goals becomes part and parcel of the
industrial labor model and may further complicate attempts to develop collaborative
working environments expected in professional life. This, then, may become yet one
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more reason why a strict application of the traditional industrial labor model to higher
education, without accommodations for the uniqueness of that environment, where
collaborative and collegial working conditions are expected, would be problematic.
As noted in the introduction of this paper, use of the industrial labor model in
higher education labor relations presents two issues. The first relates to the application of
the almost wholesale importation of a model that was designed for a different work
setting and different workers. The second deals with relevant court rulings which have
their rationale in the National Labor Relations Act (and its physical embodiment in the
National Labor Relations Board, through its rulings), and how they have been applied to
higher education labor issues, especially those involving faculty. This section deals with
this first set of issues.
A number of issues are raised when attempting to apply the use of the industrial
labor model to higher education labor relations, most notably when it is applied to faculty
and faculty unions. For the purpose of discussion they can be characterized broadly as
those encompassing the following factors: governance, professionalism, peer review, and
policy. While there may be some overlap among them, the identified areas seek to
highlight the issues that are somewhat unique to higher education faculty and that overall
environment, given the history and traditions of Western higher education.
Institutional Governance: Shared Authority?
Governance of institutions of higher education is unique. It does not share the
top-down model found in private sector business like the automobile business or the
mining industry often associated with the industrial union labor model. Higher education
has long rested on the concept of “shared authority” among four components, the board
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of trustees, the president or administration, the faculty and the students, (and to some
extent the involvement of alumni and influential donors or contractors, such as the federal
government) (Cunningham, 1984; Lucas, 1994). However, regardless of how many
players are involved the concept is the same. It remains one whereby several groups, all
having a stake in the venture; share in some manner in the governance of the institution
and in defining its goals and directions.
This concept of shared authority is a conundrum in the industrial union model.
Some advocates of faculty participation in governance believe that collective bargaining
introduces an “unwelcome, adversarial aura into a relationship between faculty and
administration, and are concerned about the effect on the institution” (Cunningham, 1984,
p. 27). In this same light, for others it represents an ‘employer-employee relationship’
which may be repugnant to traditional universities, who would fear that under the
industrial model, educational policy would become the product of negotiation rather than
of deliberation (Cunningham, 1984). For other critics of unionization of faculty,
collective bargaining is seen as widening an already existing chasm in higher education
between faculty and administration. Lucas (1996), found that:
at the risk of oversimplification, it might be noted that in institutions where the
faculty are unionized or collective bargaining is the norm, the polarization
between administrators and faculty is apt to be even more pronounced. Faculty
prerogatives are possibly more secure, but the security is purchased at the cost of
reinforcing the “us” versus “them” mentality . . . the demonology on both sides is
well developed (Lucas, 1996, p. 26-27).
Many faculty however, have begun to question the validity of shared authority,
because after all, faculty may be limited in their power to make certain types of policy
decisions just as the administration is limited, by either trustee or state legislative dictate
depending on who has final authority (Cunningham, 1984). Many faculty in public
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higher education, who many be identifying with this concept, turn to collective
bargaining in an effort to have an impact on decisions that will affect their well being.
Proponents of faculty collective bargaining in higher education see collective bargaining
as a way to strengthen faculty roles and thus guarantee that shared authority does exist. In
fact, union advocates regard collective bargaining as a form of shared governance. To
them it is a system of shared authority, based on the process of bilateral decision-making
by two agents, the university and the faculty, which are equal under the law, thus seeking
to insure some sort of equity in advocating their viewpoints and having their voices heard
(Kadish, 1969).
While many faculty resist defining themselves as employees and thus resist
unionization on those grounds, others accepted it because they perceived they were
already being treated as such by administration. In addition they felt disenfranchised by
newly formed power structures being erected at many campuses since the 1960s and
1970s composed of management specialists and technical experts. For faculty in this
vanguard, unionization was perceived as the only way to stop an erosion of power and to
restore the equality necessary for faculty to remain part of the decision-making process
(Begin, 1974).
Professionalism in a Collective Bargaining Environment
Debate over the compatibility of unionization with professionalism has followed
hand in hand with the growth of collective bargaining on campuses. For some, the
selection of a union involves the jettisoning of key professional values such as collegial
participation in organizational decision-making, professional independence from
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hierarchical control, and expectations of performance and rewards based on individual
merit (Rabban, 1992).
By contrast, supporters of collective bargaining in higher education posit that it
may be the most effective method of achieving and maintaining those professional
values. They maintain this stance because many contracts can and have been written to
include professional standards such as: providing mechanisms for professional
participation in decision-making, regulating professional work, providing training and
professional development, committing organizational resources to professional goals and
elaborating the criteria for personnel decisions and the roles of professionals in making
them (Rabban, 1992). However, many organizations and unions agree that professional
values are best protected by keeping them outside the specific collective bargaining
agreement (Rabban).
Early contract analysis work by Johnstone (1982) on a field of 89 available
contracts, (that covered 253 campuses, or 98% of all four year unionized campuses as of
December 1979), concluded that “the agreements that have been reached indicate that
bargaining representatives at a majority of institutions of higher education that have
adopted collective bargaining have worked to shape a new model that plays down the
adversarial relationship and emphasizes the collegial one” (p. 178). His work depicted an
optimistic picture for collective bargaining or at least left open the possibility o f positive
outcomes for the future of collective bargaining. Certain professional issues raised in
Rhoades’s study were not even reported as issues back in the 1982 Johnstone study, such
as instructional technology and the extensive use of part-time faculty (though they were
certainly used at the time). Overall, what is most striking when comparing Johnstone’s
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study to Rhoades’s study is the sharp contrast in tone of the picture of collective
bargaining each paints. Rhoades (1998), whose work, eighteen years later, supported a
more dire viewpoint of the current status quo surrounding faculty collective bargaining
agreements, drew a more adversarial picture of the current state of affairs than Johnstone
did of his contemporary scene. This is especially evident in the concluding statement of
Rhoades’s book:
The challenge faculty and faculty unions now face is whether they can manage to
work in concert as a collectivity to more proactively redirect the academy and
whether they can reorganize themselves with other production workers who are
currently at the margins of the organization, before faculty themselves are
increasingly reorganized to the margins of the academic enterprise (1998, p. 288).
This seems in sharp contrast to Johnstone’s statement about agreements exhibiting
a model that “plays down the adversarial relationship and emphasizes the collegial one”
(1982, p. 178). In comparing the two statements, a question seems to arise, what has
transpired in the arena of faculty collective bargaining to cause such a change in outlook
regarding collective bargaining in the intervening eighteen years? One possible answer
might be that, as Rhoades has suggested, administrations at institutions engaging in
faculty collective bargaining have attempted to use the collective bargaining agreement to
manage aspects of the faculty’s work in ways not expected when collective bargaining
was introduced thirty years ago. Rather than being relegated to simply the expected areas
of working conditions, salaries and benefits, administrations may have sought to use the
contract to define further their managerial discretion in the use of technology,
retrenchment clauses, the use of part-time faculty, contracts instead of tenure, and
reorganization issues. Collective bargaining, which began as a tool for the faculty, may
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in fact have become useful for administrations in devising their strategies regarding the
management of faculty according to Rhoades’s study of 212 contracts.
Until recently, the study of whether faculty has, or whether faculty has perceived
that it has become part of this new category of “managed professionals,” (if this
designation is indeed correct), through the use of collective bargaining, (most
significantly through Rhoades’s study of contracts) has not been in the realm of available
research on faculty unions. In addition, how collective bargaining may have affected the
professional status and self-image of faculty has received little attention. Especially
absent in the current decade has been any inquiry of the faculty viewpoint on how they
feel their professional self-image and status may have altered as a result of unionization
and the new directions in the scope of faculty collective bargaining as noted by Rhoades.
In a review of doctoral dissertations available on UMI’s Dissertation Abstracts from 1983
to the present, as reviewed below, the foci of research were issues of collective
bargaining and governance, collective bargaining and the campus climate, faculty factors
that may have precipitated a pro-union vote, and attitudes of faculty toward collective
bargaining. Still while not directly dealing with how recent contract trends may have
altered the professional status of faculty, the dissertations of these recent two decades
provides some interesting and related findings.
For example, Decker (1984) found that the faculty at Illinois’ public community
colleges felt that their decision-making authority was enhanced in some areas by
collective bargaining such as personnel decisions, while diminished in other areas such as
organizational structure. Phalanus (1990) concluded, after a study of 21 four-year,
private and public institutions in the United States and their collective bargaining
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contracts, which the level of faculty involvement in governance had not increased above
the level acquired in the early days of their collective bargaining activity. A related
finding was that what control was attained was exercised through committee service.
And, further, in the area of governance and collective bargaining, Schaeffer (1991)
revealed, through a study of teachers’ colleges, that the power of academic senates may
be decreased by the presence of faculty collective bargaining, even while the scope and
number o f the senates’ committees may be expanded by it.
Dissertations of the past fifteen years under the general subject heading of
collective bargaining and campus climate for the most part yielded varying results.
Inman (1984) compared the results of campus climate surveys at 36 institutions done in
the 1960s and early 1970s with surveys of the same institutions done in 1980-81. Because
half the institutions in the study had undertaken faculty collective bargaining in the
intervening years, the goal was to look for changes in attitudes about campus climate.
The comparison indicated no significant change in attitudes, so the author concluded that
the threat of campus unrest expected to come with collective bargaining did not come to
fruition. Also examining campus climate and governance, a 1984 dissertation (Rich,
1984) on 107 California community colleges found that the morale of collective
bargaining faculty was reported to be slightly less than those not under a collective
bargaining agreement, but those under an agreement felt they were more involved in
campus governance. Another dissertation (McDowell, 1987), which centered on Illinois
community colleges revealed that senior, tenured faculty felt their campuses’
organizational climates were improved by the presence of collective bargaining while
new, non-tenured faculty had a less favorable attitude toward collective bargaining. But
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also in this study, all faculty were found to feel that if campuses had organizational
climates that fostered participation in organizational decisions, the faculty would less
welcome collective bargaining. A similar theme was found in Lipscomb’s work (1997)
based on California’s community colleges where institutions with poor organizational
climates and collective bargaining in place were shown to have improved feelings about
climate after non-adversarial collective bargaining styles were used in negotiations.
Interestingly this work also noted that faculty preferred the non-adversarial style, while
the administrations involved preferred the traditional, industrial labor model of the
adversarial bargaining style.
What precipitated the faculty to vote for unionization was also a frequent topic
among the dissertations of the last two decades. For example, Anderson (1985), again
looking at the California community colleges, found that faculty from from blue-collar
backgrounds with past union activity in the family were more likely to vote pro-union
than those from white collar families with no union experience in their immediate family.
Gisler (1985), examining the first eleven years of collective bargaining at Robert Morris
College, found that for this institution it was the perceived lack of collegiality on campus
between the faculty and the administration that led to the vote, with economics only a
secondary factor. Migden (1988) examined whether certain characteristics about an
institution’s organization enhanced the propensity of a campus faculty to vote for
collective bargaining. His finding was that faculty with higher opinions of their
organization’s characteristics in key areas such as communication and collegiality was
less favorably disposed to vote for unionization than faculty who found their institutions
wanting in organization style and substance.
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Overall, how faculty felt in general about collective bargaining and unions was
also a topic of inquiry for dissertations of the 1980s and 1990s. Moats (1983) revealed
that faculty at Kansas community colleges aligned along lines favorably disposed
towards faculty collective bargaining based on certain demographic characteristics..
Similar to the work of McDowell (1985), Moats’s research found that age and experience
factored into how faculty felt about collective bargaining. However, while McDowell
found older faculty with more teaching experience to be more supportive of collective
bargaining than younger, Moats found the opposite. Cornish’s (1986) work on Illinois
public community colleges found the faculty at this group of institutions to be very
favorably disposed toward collective bargaining and supportive of the perceived derived
benefits from it such as more professional autonomy, greater participation in governance,
and improved economic conditions. Concentrating on the faculty in one discipline,
Carbonu’s dissertation (1992) on nursing faculty in Canada examined their feelings
towards collective bargaining. This study ascertained that most were neutral on the
concept; with more senior faculty showing some inclination to be more favorably
disposed if they had some union experience themselves or a history of it in their families.
In an historical analysis, Doyle (1989) examined three public institutions in Delaware
that each had a minimum of ten years history in collective bargaining. In this study he
found that the majority of union faculty in them would vote again for collective
bargaining. Their reasons for doing so were the perceived advantages it earned them
economically, added means to affect governance, and the voice and vehicle it gave them
to communicate about their areas of concern on campus.
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It is surprising to note that the examination of the role of faculty unions and their
efforts towards the professional needs of their members beyond working conditions has
been somewhat absent in published studies of recent years. Especially notable for its
omission of the topic, even in general terms, is a 1998 study of the newest generation of
academics entering the profession (Finkelstein, Seal & Schuster, 1998) which makes no
mention of collective bargaining, or faculty unions, or the perception of new faculty
toward the concepts of each. The absence of examining unions and collective bargaining
is made even more surprising by the recent efforts of teaching assistants, from which
many new faculty spring, to unionize on campuses across the country (Leatherman,
1998). But this alone does not make it a ripe topic for study at this time. However, what
does perhaps highlight the need for further study of faculty collective bargaining
agreements and their influence on the professional role of faculty is the growing evidence
that lines are being crossed between faculty’s professional concerns and working
conditions by both faculty unions and institutional administrations. The evidence of these
lines being crossed and blurred by both sides of the negotiating table may be found in the
trends of language and clauses in the collective bargaining agreements, as well as in
recent activities by both sides.
In many cases, the faculty unions are attempting to address both the professional
concerns of their members and their working conditions, either within the formal scope of
negotiations, or by way of attempting to influence an institution’s policy externally.
Therefore, how faculty’s professional lives are affected by collective bargaining
agreements is based on the key factors of what issues are chosen by unions as bargaining
topics and why. By way of illustration, even a cursory scan of the Chronicle o f Higher
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Education on a monthly basis will yield numerous instances where faculty unions are
addressing issues that, on the one hand, could be considered working conditions yet on
the other, professional concerns. For example, the recent battle through funded studies
and then advertisements by the American Federation of Teachers, equating distance
education to the “five minute university” once used as a j oke on the American television
show, Saturday Night Live (Blumenstyk & McCollum, 1999). If distance education can
be considered a professional concern of academics, which as an alternative means of
delivering instruction it must, then this is just one example where addressing higher
education faculty’s professional concerns is appearing to fall within the scope of
appropriate activities for their unions. And, as pointed out in the Rhoades (1998) study,
distance education is showing up in collective bargaining agreements as an article for
negotiation because it affects a faculty’s teaching loads.
In some cases administrations bring to the bargaining table issues that might serve
to alter the professional status of faculty. A recent example is found in the Massachusetts
state system of higher education (Footnotes, 1999). In the spring of 1999, this large state
system composed of both two and four-year institutions, proposed to put on the
negotiating table the concept of multiyear contracts for faculty instead of tenure. The
plan was that faculty who accepted the multiyear contract would receive a negotiated
premium salary payment of a proposed five to ten percent in lieu of tenure.
However, the Rhoades (1998) summary study of 212 faculty collective bargaining
agreements may be one of the most compelling reasons to suggest that further study is
needed at this time to examine if faculty are in reality having their professional roles
redefined by collective bargaining agreements. This study introduced an intriguing new
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concept about the content and intent of faculty collective bargaining agreements, i.e., the
“managed professional,” a new concept, which, if accurate, deserves further examination
based on the challenges it poses for higher education. However, because the study was
based on a contract analysis without a survey of faculty, it does not address the question
of whether faculty perceive that collective bargaining has altered their professional
status. Consequently, further inquiry into the issue, assessing faculty attitudes to examine
the has value.
Union advocates and union officials often state that collective bargaining is a way
to gain the professional status that college faculty desire. They argue that faculty are
“employed professionals in a unique employer-employee relationship, and as such is
already in a struggle with the administration over many aspects of faculty and college
life” (Cunningham, 1984, p. 28). Thus, they can only gaining from the advocacy
provided by the union in this struggle.
Advancement of faculty is another issue associated with collective bargaining.
Cunningham (1984), found that,
Since the collective bargaining agreement binds all, individual advantages may be
sacrificed to the demands of the whole faculty. Merit promotions or rewards
made cede to seniority. Incremental advantages to the few may be lost in order to
better the economic state of many (p. 28).
Therefore, those who equate collective bargaining with a loss of professionalism
may fear as well some loss of individual recognition and rewards and, perhaps, of voice
as well. Electing a faculty union to be the exclusive bargaining agent for the faculty does
mean that to a large extent there is an “exclusivity” of voices communicating about
faculty work conditions. It becomes a matter between the union and the administration.
Those being represented by the union, if they do not support it and its goals, may argue
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that they have had their right to act and voice their concerns independently to
administration restricted (Cunningham, 1984).
Public institutions have the added problem of whether a whole state system
should be included or whether the faculty at each campus should negotiate its own
contract separately (Cunningham, 1984). And there are the related issues of whether
departmental chairpersons are excluded from the unit, and whether part-time faculty
should be included. Some notable cases where department chairpersons have played a
role include C.W. Post where they were excluded from the unit, while at Fordham the
department chairpersons were not (Cunningham). While the National Labor Relations
Board has refused to set general guidelines for defining units, preferring to decide cases
individually, it is interesting to note that what groups are included in a unit may affect the
outcome of who wins an election for bargaining agent. Finkin (1981) observed that an
employee organization would inevitably seek to control its membership, desiring to
engage only those who would support its selection ands subsequent election as the
exclusive agent. Thus, how the battle lines are drawn may not only determine how the
battle is fought but by whom.
Academic Policy
The role of faculty unions and collective bargaining in the formulation and
implementation of academic policy is one area that creates major controversy on
campuses. While negotiators of collective bargaining units are expected to bargain on
wages, hours and other items and conditions of employment, the issues of educational or
academic policy are not as clear as to whether bargaining over these policies is a
permissive or prohibited subject (Cunningham, 1984)
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Kemerer and Baldridge (1976) noted that while collective bargaining may not be
the appropriate arena for academic policy deliberations, it could coexist and even
promote separate governance structures such as faculty senates. In fact there is evidence
that faculty bargaining may have brought some improvement in faculty participation in
deciding academic policy issues through the creation of faculty senates or councils and
other governance mechanisms where they did not previously operate. Examples are
Rider College and Fairleigh Dickinson before its unions were decertified because of
Yeshiva (Begin, 1992). Indeed the topic of academic policy has been found to be a
permitted area of negotiation in some states, and prohibited in some states such as New
Jersey (Begin). In the case of Minnesota’s community colleges, as a result of the
Supreme Court case, Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges v Knight 465 U.S.
271 (1984), a state law mandating that “meet and confer” sessions be conducted only by
members of the union and the administration was upheld (Franke, 1992). The aspect of
this case was that it included discussions, not just about agency fees and other direct
union and administration matters, but also issues of academic policy as well. In this case,
the Supreme Court ruled that a state could, if it chose, give the union the enhanced voice
in formal institutional deliberations and that there did not exist a constitutional right for
faculty to participate in university governance (Franke).
However, even when shared governance structures are put in place through
collective bargaining to address academic policy, this does not mean that such a shared
system of decision-making authority between faculty and administration equates to a
situation where the latter delegates it to the former without a veto (Cunningham, 1984).
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Final authority is still vested with the administration and the board of trustees, and this is
a point not likely to be bargained away.
Court Rulings and Higher Education Faculty under Collective Bargaining
As noted in the introduction, the application of court rulings related to higher
education labor relations is also rooted in the industrial model as they are predicated on
law embodied in the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 which followed that model.
These rulings have significant impact on higher education labor relations. Most notably
of these decisions is the National Labor Relations Board v Yeshiva University (1980). As
stated previously, collective bargaining separates management and employees; what were
once educators in public education have become “us” and “them.” The United States
Supreme Court in Yeshiva held that the faculty of Yeshiva University were “managerial
employees” and therefore were not eligible to form a bargaining unit under the standards
determined by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB, 1980). The majority relied
on the facts presented by the Yeshiva University administration that faculty at that
institution performed critical functions in the setting of academic calendars, in curriculum
and personnel decisions, in the grading systems for students and in admission and
matriculation guidelines. It found that faculty recommendations were so generally
followed that they “effectively determined” important decisions for Yeshiva University in
these areas. This finding was dispositive in denying the faculty to bargain within the
guidelines of the NLRA.
In the Court’s dissenting opinion on the case, Justice Brennan accused the fivemember majority of predicating the decision on an idealized view of the university, one
that in Brennan’s view did not comport with reality. He stated in his dissent:
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The Court’s perception of the Yeshiva faculty’s status is distorted by the rosecolored lens through which it views the governance structure of the modern day
university. The Court’s conclusion that the faculty’s professional interests are
indistinguishable from those of the administration is bottomed on an idealized
model of collegial decision making that is a vestige of the great medieval
university. But the university of today bears little resemblance to the ‘community
of scholars’ of yesteryear. Education has become ‘big business’ and the task of
operating the university has been transferred from the faculty to an autonomous
administration . .. (NRLB v. Yeshiva, 1980, pp. 702-3).
Though arguably the NRLB v. Yeshiva decision was applicable only to those few
institutions whose faculties exerted absolute control over academic policy, it has in fact
been interpreted more broadly. The NLRB conferred managerial status on all faculties
that play a significant role in curriculum matters such as the determination of course
content, core curriculum requirements, and grading standards (Osbourne, 1992). Because
of the NRLB v Yeshiva decision and its broad application by the NRLB, faculty organizing
in the private sector came to an abrupt halt, and more than twenty faculty bargaining
representatives lost their rights (Osbourne, 1992).
While the Yeshiva case has mainly affected the faculty of private institutions’
ability to organize, it has also affected public institutions as their administrations have
periodically attempted to have bargaining agents rendered decertified under Yeshiva such
as the case of the University of Pittsburgh (Lee, 1992). However, more germane to the
discussion here is that under the review of the NRLB, based on its interpretations of
Yeshiva. faculty at some institutions can be considered more “managerial” than those at
other institutions. This strikes to the very heart of the industrial labor model that is
formulated on the separate camps of labor versus management. If there is only one party,
“management,” on a campus, then in the eyes of the NRLB there is no mutuality of
interests of a separate group to represent. The industrial labor model does not readily
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recognize a possible new category of professionals in the current internal configuration of
colleges and universities, nor does it allow for the new realities of the “big business” of
higher education. There can be no blurred lines between labor and management in the
traditional industrial labor model, and for this reason it is less applicable to American
higher education and its reality of blurred lines of responsibility and authority for running
an institution under the attempted rubric of “shared governance.”
Related Studies
According to Gary Rhoades (1988), the professional autonomy of faculty, i.e.,
their ability to control certain decisions governing their professional lives within an
institution, is affected by administration’s attempts to leverage greater managerial
discretion over these decisions. The result of this, according to Rhoades, is that the
management hierarchy of colleges and universities has gained greater flexibility to
reorganize their institutions, and redirect academic labor with a related result of
stratifying faculty into various levels with differing professional privileges and concerns.
Rhoades sought to examine how collective bargaining agreements embodied the
continuing negotiation between a faculty’s professional autonomy and the
administration’s managerial discretion over decisions that not only impacted an
institution but had an impact on the professional concerns of faculty as well.
Rhoades’s study (1998) examined 212 collective bargaining agreements for the
faculty of two-year and four year, public and private institutions in the 1990s, a body of
contracts estimated by the author to be 45 percent of all faculty contracts. He undertook
a “thematic and rhetorical analysis of contractual language regarding various terms of
faculty labor concentrating on contracts’ themes, rhetoric, specific terminology, and
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emphases . . . primarily a close reading and systematic content analysis of the contracts”
(Rhoades, 1998, p. 6). The author also noted that he conducted some statistical review of
the incidence of various provisions of the contracts by institutional type.
His hypothesis was that faculty in higher education are increasingly becoming
“managed professionals” with their professional role in institutional decision making
becoming limited, along with the available and viable constraints on the exercise of
managerial discretion in these decisions, Rhoades proposed that this imbalance resulted
in a stratification of the faculty profession. However, Rhoades also pointed out that
faculty are not powerless, that through the use of the collective bargaining agreements
faculty have been able to build in checks on managerial discretion over decisions
affecting faculties’ professional lives. In addition, Rhoades noted that faculty collective
bargaining agreements might work to allow faculty to determine the contractual
conditions of their work, which shore up their professional autonomy. However, per
Rhoades, “in the social relations of work between managers and faculty, the balance of
managerial discretion on the one hand, and of professional autonomy and involvement on
the other, is weighted in the former direction. But there is counterbalance; the relations
are not one-sided” (Rhoades, 1998, p. 6). To examine these relations in the context of the
contracts, Rhoades analyzed specific terms of faculty labor: salary adjustments for
faculty (merit, market and equity), the reorganization of academic programs coupled with
the retrenchment of faculty, the use of part-time faculty, the use of technology in the
curriculum, and ownership issues pertaining to the use of faculty’s time and intellectual
property.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

61

Briefly summarized, Rhoades concluded in his analysis of the contracts that in
regard to the salary issues studied (merit, market, and equity), “over two-thirds of the
contracts accord managers discretion to set initial salaries” (Rhoades, 1998, p. 259).
However, he also found that the labor market’s influence on salaries was considerable,
and while unions were not antithetical to the market driven nature of salaries (20% of the
212 contracts contained market provisions), unions usually promoted the collective
interests of the faculty through the use of set salary structures and across-the-boardpercentage raises. In addition, the study revealed evidence that merit also had a place in
contracts with 68 percent of four-year institutions, and 19 percent of two year, having
some form of merit, whether it was phrased in those terms or in items such as promotions
or other proxies for merit. Rhoades, however, concluded that
despite union efforts to constrain managerial flexibility in differentially setting
and shaping faculty salaries, and to restrain salary inequities among faculty, the
prevailing trend in salaries over two decades is increased salary dispersion, [with]
the gap between field at the top and the bottom of the salary hierarchy has
increased over time, as has the gap between men and women” (Rhoades, p. 260).
Furthermore, he concluded that salaries, and thus resources, have been used by
management to restructure the faculty workforce by “differentially investing and
allocating their monies across academic fields, restricting growth in some areas even as
they accelerate growth in others” (Ibid).
In his review of the findings on the retrenchment of faculty, Rhoades wrote, “due
to the efforts of faculty unions it is more procedurally (and politically) difficult than most
managers would like [and the contracts’] provisions are filled with structures that lay out
the time and energy required to lay off faculty” (Rhoades, 1998, p. 261).

But Rhoades

found that managers retained most of the authority to make exceptions to established
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procedures such as the order of layoff, the reassignment of faculty, or they controlled the
definition of new academic units for which faculty laid off may or may not be reassigned.
For example, his study found that 178 of the 212 contracts had retrenchment clauses, and
94 percent of this group had some provision for managerial discretion in their exercise
including in 42 percent of the contracts (of the 178), no specific rationale given for the
retrenchment of faculty. Fundamentally, then Rhoades concluded that despite all the
consultation on layoffs as determined by collective bargaining agreements in that
included faculty, “it is managers who determine whether and where to retrench” (p. 261).
And, as he also noted, while faculty do play a role, it is mainly one that is reactive even if
there are provisions made in contracts for management and faculty to meet prior to the
determination that layoffs are needed.
Rhoades’ second thesis is that contract provisions that are weighted in favor of
managerial discretion result in stratification of the faculty profession. Faculty were
stratified as a work force in two ways. First, the contracts of four-year institutions, as
opposed to two year, were more likely to allow for faculty discussion with retrenchment
issues. This led to the situation where one class of benefits was provided to one type of
faculty and not another, thus sharpening the ‘professional divide,’ i.e., stratification,
between the faculty of two and four year institutions which already existed due to
institutional type. Second, most retrenchment clauses allowed for seniority rights in the
issue of layoffs, with allowances in many cases for the practice known as ‘bumping’
whereby senior faculty displaced junior in their positions instead of being laid off. While
this has the professional advantage of protecting senior faculty from being targeted for
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layoff by management, it also has the effect of stratifying, and accentuating the divisions
between types of faculty.
The next area Rhoades studied was the use of part-time faculty. He concluded
that this area of professional concern to faculty is inadequately addressed by the contracts
studied. For example, eighty percent of the 183 contracts that mentioned part-time
faculty, “do not define conditions of appointment/release for part-time faculty [and] they
do not have collective work-force provisions that limit managerial discretion in relation
to part-time faculty” (Rhoades, 1998, pp. 164-165). Since, according to Rhoades, the use
of part-time faculty is one way institutions can allocate (and reallocate) resources related
to faculty, he considered it somewhat “surprising, then that unions had not more actively
(or successfully) negotiated standard professional procedures that would make it more
complicated for managers to utilize part-time faculty thereby discouraging them from
utilizing as many as they increasingly do” (Rhoades, 1998, p. 263). The extensive use of
part-time faculty, coupled with their lack of status in the contract’s language, found to be
lending evidence that managerial discretion, was further stratifying the faculty ranks.
Instructional technology (especially delivery of courses over the Internet), the
fourth major area of the five Rhoades examined in the contracts was an area that yielded
a slim set of evidence. Per Rhoades, this may or may not be indicative that it is a focus of
contractual concern between faculty and institutional management. In reviewing the
findings he stated “it is often in managers’ best interest to keep matters out of the
contract—that generally increases their discretion.. .absence from a large number of
contracts does not necessarily mean lack of managerial interest in the issue. Indeed
managerial interest is strong” (Rhoades, 1998, p. 175). While he found that the national
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faculty unions pressured local unions to include it in contracts, only about 78, or one third
of the 212 contracts examined, had provisions related to instructional technology. Only
twelve of these refer to instructional technology in some way, and eight of these gave
managers the rights to determine the utilization of technology in the classroom. Not
surprisingly, most of these provisions were found in the contracts of two-year institutions.
In his opinion after examining the contracts, Rhoades stated that
new technology offers new opportunities for establishing faculty control of
instructional delivery . . . if faculty do not take advantage of this opportunity
other groups will step in to fill the void . . . new categories of nonfaculty,
nonbargaining-unit members to support and Oversee . . . . (Rhoades, 1998,
p. 266).
Based on his research of the contracts, Rhoades felt this might be another way in which
faculty could be separated from the design and offering of a curriculum, as the delivery of
Internet courses opened up another pathway for institutions to utilize part-time faculty.
Concerning the last of the five major areas of examinations in Rhoades’ study of
the contracts, outside employment and intellectual property rights, his findings proved to
be “counterintuitive in terms of academic hierarchy” (Rhoades, 1998, p. 266). By this he
meant that faculty in two year institutions appeared to have greater latitude in their
outside employment and on intellectual property rights than their colleagues in four year
institutions. In addition, unionized faculty seemed to have greater protections in regard
to outside employment and intellectual property rights than their counterparts in nonunionized research institutions. With regard to outside employment, when mentioned in
62 percent of contract provisions found in the study of 212 contracts, most provisions
were related to conflict of interest concerns, with references to the institutions having first
claim on a faculty member’s time. And, when it came to who decided on what was a
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conflict of interest, in the case of 33 percent of those provisions, it was an institution’s
administration that determined it.
Intellectual property rights were mentioned in 71 of the 212 contracts with some
clearly defined issues for example, 60 percent of this group of contracts spelled out terms
of ownership, according to Rhoades. In addition, he found that these clauses were no
more likely to appear in four-year institutional contracts than two year. However, if 71 of
the 212 contracts had these provisions, he pointed out, that meant 141 had no provisions
at all referring to the matter.
Thus, Rhoades concluded in his study that faculty unions had advanced and
protected their members’ interests in wages and benefits. However, they “ have been less
successful in negotiating provisions regarding the distribution and configuration of the
work-force, that effectively restrict managerial discretion and promote faculty
involvement in reorganizing the work-force and in utilizing part-time faculty and
instructional technology” (1998, p. 275).
Several things stand out in reviewing the study by Rhoades. •First, the study was
limited to five broad types of contractual provisions: the salary issues of merit, market
and equity; faculty retrenchment; the use of part-time faculty; instructional technology;
and controls on faculty’s time and intellectual property. The study did not include other
pertinent types of provisions which may or may not support Rhoades’s theory of the
faculty as managed professionals, such as training stipulations, grievance procedures,
management’s rights, performance reviews, or appointment/reappointment and tenure
issues to name just a few alternate possibilities for focus.
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Second, it is hard to determine how many of the contracts of the 212 studied
belong to four year, and how many belong to two year institutions, and what level of each
(doctoral, baccalaureate, or community, technical, etc.). Although Rhoades does break
down some specific contract findings by type of institution, two year or four, it is hard to
gauge overall how his summary conclusions apply by type and level of institution. For
example, which group had more ‘managed professionals,’ four-year faculty or two? Also
which type of institution had a greater propensity to manage their professionals?
Finally, did union affiliation (AAUP, AFT, or NEA) impact the balance between the
professional autonomy of faculty and the use managerial discretion?
Finally, the study does not address how contracts’ limitations and required scope
are understood, interpreted, and complied with, in practical terms, by both administration
and faculty. As observed in one classic study on the effect of unions on management,
“the gap between the results and the language can be large and significant” (Slichter,
Healy, & Livermash, 1960, 710). At the very least, it would seem to indicate that the
areas of study explored by Rhoades are ripe for further examination and perhaps different
approaches.
A Need for Further Study
The preceding review of the literature culminates in one overarching point—that
the inclusion of professionals in a unionized workforce, particularly higher education
faculty, has not been one of unquestioned acceptance. A key concern is that faculty are
members of a learned profession that not only has enjoyed but may require working
conditions that are antithetical to the industrial labor environment of a unionized
workforce.
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It is important to note that there have been few reported recent studies of
collective bargaining in higher education. While faculty members engage in new and
healthy debate over unionization and collective bargaining in both public and private
school sectors, and graduate student unions gain in numbers, there is still inadequate
study o f how the professoriate and higher education in general is faring with these new
labor relationships. It is hoped that the study presented in the following pages adds, with
pertinence and timeliness, to the body of research in this field and intrigues others to use
any of its omissions as a stepping-stone to further inquiry.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY

Research Design
The purpose of this study was to examine how college and university faculty
perceived that their professional concerns were affected by working under a collective
bargaining agreement. The review of the literature identified the following faculty
professional concerns:
Faculty Professional Concerns
A.

The ability of the faculty to effectively influence who will join and continue on
the faculty.

B.

The ability of the faculty to determine the curriculum.

C.

The ability of the faculty to determine what instructional practices/delivery
systems will be used their classrooms.

D.

The ability of the faculty toset the requirements for granting of a degree.

E.

The ability of the faculty to determine their teaching, scholarship, and service
requirements.

F.

The right of the faculty to exercise their academic freedom.

G.

The ability of the faculty to exercise reasonable shared governance, (exercising a
wider role in institutional governance beyond the classroom and the department
level).
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The seven professional concerns informed the formulation of the research
questions below.
Research Questions
1.

Do faculty perceive that collective bargaining facilitates or inhibits their
professional autonomy?

2.

Do faculty perceive that collective bargaining in general is important to their
sense of professionalism?

3.

Do the collective bargaining agreements support professional autonomy?
The study relied on a combination of survey research and contract analysis. For

the contract analysis phase of the research, the associated collective bargaining contracts
of the institutions that employed the surveyed faculty were examined for language in the
contracts that might impinge on the professional concerns of the faculty, aid them, or
hinder them.
For the survey phase, 650 randomly selected faculty members covered by the
contracts were surveyed to ascertain their perceptions on how the contracts may be
affecting their professional status. A list of the institutions whose contracts were
examined is presented below:
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Table 1
New England Institutions:
4 Year Public Institutions with Faculty Collective Bargaining Agreements

State
Connecticut

Maine

Massachusetts

Bargaining
Unit
Connecticut State
University System

Agent
AAUP

Institutions
Central Connecticut State
Eastern Connecticut State
Southern Connecticut State
Western Connecticut State

University o f
Connecticut

AAUP

University o f Maine
System

NEA/M EA

University
University
University
University
University
University
University

NEA/M EA

Bridgewater State
Fitchburg State
Framingham State
Massachusetts C ollege o f Art
Massachusetts Maritime Academy
North Adams State (now Mass.
C ollege o f Liberal Arts)
Salem State
W estfield State
Worcester State

Massachusetts State
C ollege System

U
U
U
U
U
U

o f Connecticut-Hartford
o f Connecticut-Southeastern
o f Connecticut-Stamford
o f Connecticut-Storrs
o f Connecticut-Torrington
o f Connecticut-Waterbury
o f Maine
o f Maine-Augusta
o f Maine-Farmington
o f Maine-Fort Kent
o f Maine-Machias
o f Maine-Presque Isle
o f Southern Maine

UMass-Amherst
M SP-FSU
U o f Massachusetts-Amherst
(Currently the same contract with U o f M ass-Boston)
UM ass-Boston
MTA/NEA
U o f M ass-Boston

N ew Hampshire

UMass-Dartmouth

AFT

U o f Mass -Dartmouth

UM ass-Lowell

M SP/M ST/
NEA

U o f M ass-Lowell

Keene State

NEA

Keene State

University o f N ew
Hampshire

AAUP

University o f N ew Hampshire
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Table 1 (cont.)

State
Rhode Island

Vermont

Bargaining
Unit

Agent

Institutions

Rhode Island College

AFT

Rhode island C ollege

University o f Rhode
Island

AAUP

CCE Campus
Kingston Campus
Narragansett Bay
W. Alton Jones Campus

AFT

Castleton State
Johnston State
Lyndon State

Vermont State
Colleges

Population
The subjects for this study, the institutions above, were drawn from the January
1997 edition of the Directory o f Faculty Contracts and Bargaining Agents in Institutions
o f Higher Education (Hurd, Foerster & Johnson, 1997). For one phase of the research
work, the contract analysis, the 13 contracts listed in the directory for full-time tenure
track faculty at the four-year, public higher education institutions in the six New England
states (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode island and Vermont.)
formed the core of the population for the contracts analyzed. [Note: The service
academies of the Coast Guard, and Maine Maritime, while public institutions were
eliminated from the population for this study due to their unique missions and the
compositions of their faculty]. A representative from each institutional bargaining unit or
institutional general counsel’s office was contacted in writing for a copy of their faculty
collective bargaining agreement which was in effect in the year 2000, and in most cases
the contracts or excerpts of them were also available on-line at the institutions’ WEB
sites.
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Second, for the survey of faculty, one institution per contract [a total of thirteen
schools] formed the institutional population for the study from which the faculty sample
was drawn. In the cases where more than one institution is covered by a contract, only
one institution was chosen by way of random selection. Then to select faculty to receive
the survey, the faculty at each of the thirteen institutions with one of the three titles of
assistant professor, associate professor, or professor, were placed into a possible
population for sampling. Then in order to select the faculty sample that received the
survey, fifty faculty members from each of the thirteen institutions were randomly
selected, thus yielding a total sample size of 650 faculty members. (Note: if there were
more than one institution represented by a single contract as the case with a system, one
institution within that system’s contract was randomly selected to draw the fifty faculty to
be surveyed, this is further discussed in the review of the survey’s data in the next
chapter). The survey was sent out to this sample in September 2003, with follow-ups in
March 2004. (See Appendix B for a copy of this survey instrument).
Instrumentation
The survey instrument was a combination of Likert Scale questions and other
selected response questions. The survey also solicited demographic information regarding
the department of the faculty, their discipline, some personal characteristics such as
gender, age, academic rank, and the name of the union representing faculty on-campus,
as well as whether they are members of the union, and if, yes, how long. It also asked for
their terminal degree, the number of years since their terminal degree had been earned,
the number of years they had been in higher education, the size of their institution, their
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primary level of teaching assignments (undergraduate or graduate), and the highest level
of degree awarded at their institution.
To test the survey, it was piloted to a random sample of twenty-five
tenured/tenure track faculty at the Education Department of Sonoma State University
during the spring of 2003. It was explained in the cover letter that this was a pilot to test
the instrument. Responses derived from the pilot were used to test the questionnaire and
resulted in some changes made in the final survey instrument. These included changing
it to a “phrase version” and clarifying the wording of some of the questions.
In addition, a panel of seven experts drawn from researchers and practitioners in
the field of law and collective bargaining were contacted to review the survey for form
and content. Of the seven contacted four submitted both written and verbal comments
on the survey. The four who responded were the following:
Frank Annunziato, Ph.D., Director, AAUP Chapter, University of Rhode Island
James P. Begin, Ph.D., Professor Emeritus University of Texas Law School
Robert C. Cloud, Ph.D., Baylor University
John F. Schwaller, Ph.D., Provost, University of Minnesota, Morris
Their comments for changed wording, format alterations, and added content were also
incorporated into the final version of the actual survey distributed.
Data Collection: The Survey
The survey questionnaires, with an accompanying cover letter explaining the
survey and its purpose, were sent out in September 2003, requesting that respondents
return then within two weeks. A postage-paid, self-addressed envelope also accompanied
the survey to foster returns. In addition, a separate postage-paid return postcard to be
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mailed separate from the surveys was also provided so the returns could be tracked. To
increase response rates, a random drawing raffle of returned postcards was also used with
two recipients receiving a $125.00 gift certificate each to the on-line bookseller,
AMAZON.COM from a random drawing of the returned postcards.
The first wave of returns yielded 140 surveys. A second survey appeal was sent
out the first week of March 2004 in an attempt to increase the response rate. This
produced another forty surveys, with another eleven being returned for faculty who had
left their institutions, were since deceased or retired, plus another four with notes from
faculty that they did not believe they could answer the survey for reasons ranging from
“lack of knowledge” about their campus to feeling “unqualified” to know about collective
bargaining at their institution because they were not eligible to be a member of the
faculty union. Therefore by the time of analysis, of the original sample of 650, 180
usable surveys or 27.69 percent were returned.
The analysis of the survey questions’ responses associated with Research
Question #2 (Do faculty perceive that collective bargaining in general is important to
their sense of professionalism?), questions, 26, 28, and 30 on the Likert Scale section of
the survey also were reviewed, and in turn, those results analyzed for their variances
resulting from the respondents’ academic ranks, disciplinary affiliations and specific
union memberships.
Data Collection: The Contracts
Requests for the contracts of the thirteen institutions whose faculty were
surveyed were made during the fall/early winter of 2000, with follow-ups for missing
contracts made again in late 2003 and early 2004. The requests were made in writing
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with additional follow-up letters, telephone calls, and emails to those institutions that
failed to respond within three weeks. In most cases copies of the contracts needed were
available via the WEB for public viewing, (or at least sections of them were also
available as an institution’s WEB site), or by simply requesting them in writing through
an institution’s general counsel.
Limitations of the Study
One of the limitations of this study is that it deals only with unionized faculty in
New England, so caution has to be exercised if its findings are applied to other faculty
groups. Additionally, the response rate of 27.69 percent may lack the sufficient
percentage to fully represent the 650 faculty of the original sample.
A second limitation of this overall study is that with regard to the review of
contracts, it was just that, a review of the contracts and their contents as a group. No
attempt was undertaken to compare the perceptions of the faculty respondents against
their own actual contracts, nor was work endeavored to compare specific campus
practices with the content of each of the contracts, and also with the laws of the state, or
the associated handbooks and other regulations of the campuses on their related system
umbrella units. Thus, how past practices are relied upon when faculty and administrations
interact on a campus, and the associated other factors that influenced the perceptions of
the respondents, in addition to the contract language, was not involved in this study.
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CHAPTER 4

DATA ANALYSIS: SURVEY RESULTS AND FINDINGS

“Don’t join too many gangs. Join few if any.
Join the United States and join the family—But not much in between unless a college.”
Robert Frost, Build Soil (1932) (As cited by Bartlett, 1992)
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study was to examine how college and university faculty
perceived their professional concerns were affected by working under a collective
bargaining agreement. Those professional concerns identified for the purposes of the
study are delineated below.
Faculty Professional Concerns
A.

The ability of the faculty to effectively influence who will join and continue on
the faculty.

B.

The ability of the faculty to determine the curriculum.

C.

The ability of the faculty to determine what instructional practices/delivery
systems will be used their classrooms.

D.

The ability of the faculty to set the requirements for granting of a degree.

E.

The ability of the faculty to determines their teaching, scholarship, and service
requirements.

F.

The right of the faculty to exercise their academic freedom.
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G.

The ability of the faculty to exercise reasonable shared governance, (exercising a
wider role in institutional governance beyond the classroom and the department
level).
Coupled with these seven professional concerns were the three key research

questions that this study sought to answer. These are:
Research Questions
1. Do faculty perceive that collective bargaining facilitates or inhibits
their professional autonomy?
2. Do faculty perceive that collective bargaining in general is important
to their sense of professionalism?
3. Do the collective bargaining agreements support professional autonomy?
The two respondent groups (September 2003 and the follow-up mailing results of
March 2004) were compared against one another to ascertain if there were any significant
differences between the two waves of respondents which could affect the outcome of the
findings. Tables 2 through 4 (and their Chi-Square tests) below show the results of the
comparison between the first respondent group from September 2003 (N = 106) and the
second respondents group from March 2004 (N = 35) in the key demographic areas of
rank, tenure status, and union membership. Also depicted in Table 4 is how they are
compared on the basis of the results to one question on the survey #31. Based on these
findings both groups are similar enough to be combined as one group for analyzing the
survey results as the Chi Square tests for all indicated a p > .05.
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Table 2
Rank, Tenure, and Union Membership Comparisons
Time when respondent returned
survey
Rank

Professor
Associate
Assistant

Total
Tenure
,
Status

Sept. 2003
51
36
19
106

Totals

March 2004
18
9
8
35

69
45
27
141

„
,
tenured

86

27

113

Tenure
Track

20

8

28

106

35

141

11

nyj

11

7
28
27
31
111i

0
13
11
9
2

7
41
38
40
113'I

105

35

140

Total
Union
Not
Membership Eligible
Other
NEA
AAUP
AFT
Not a
Member
Total

Table 3
Chi-Square Tests Rank Comparisons: Rank, Tenure, and Union Membership.

Rank

Pearson Chi-Square
Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
.621

df
2

Tenure

.608

1

Union Membership

.448

5
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Table 4
Comparison Results:
Cross Tabulation of Question 31’s Results and Times of Returned Survey
Question 31. Comparison
Results:

Time when respondent
returned survey
Sept. 2003

As a professional, I
really cannot see
myself represented
by a union.

Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree
Neutral
Disagree
Agree
Total
Pearson
Chi-Square Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)

Total

March 2004

4S

16

61

6

1

7

15
29
11
106

6
11
1
35

21
40
12
141

.637

4

The resulting 141 survey respondents were also randomly arranged in terms of
their academic department, gender, other characteristics and titles, just as the 650 where,
and further as the list below illustrates, no single institution dominated in the group of
survey returns:
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Institution
Connecticut State University System
(Southern Connecticut State University
Keene State College
Massachusetts State Colleges
(Bridgewater State College)
Rhode Island College
University of Connecticut
University of New Hampshire
University of Maine System
(University of Maine-Orono)
University of Massachusetts (Amherst & Boston)
(University of Massachusetts-Amherst)
(University of Massachusetts-Boston)
University of Massachusetts at Dartmouth
University of Massachusetts at Lowell
University of Rhode Island
Vermont State Colleges
(Castleton State College)
Total

Number
Returned

Percent of
Return/(141)

8
9

5.67
6.38

8
16
10
12

5.67
11.35
7.09
8.51

14

9.93

9
10
15
10
10

5.67
7.09
10.64
7.09
7.09

10

7.09

141

100.00%

The Respondent Group and their Characteristics
In terms of characterizing the respondents by their answers to the demographic
questions of the survey, the following can be stated:
•
•
•
•

the mean age was 53 with a median age of 55;
68.8% or 97 were male, 44 or 31.2% female;
the mean number of years spent in higher education was 21
the mean number of years since they obtained their terminal degree was 21
years;
• the mean number of years that each had been a member of a faculty union
was 14 years, the median was 12.5 years;
• 66 or 46.8% taught only at the undergraduate level, 15 or 10.6% taught only
at the graduate level, and 60 or 42.6% taught at both the undergraduate and
graduate levels.
Table 5 describes the other characteristics of the respondents such as tenure
status, rank, their terminal degrees, college-departmental affiliations, and the associated
unions represented by the respondents, and reveals even more about their demographics.
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Table 5
Demographic Overview of Respondents (by percent)
Tenure
Tenure Track
Tenured
Assistant
Associate
Professor
Bachelors
Masters
Doctorate
Missing
Liberal Arts
Life Sciences
Physical Sciences
Engineering
Fine Arts
Health Sciences
Business and
Economics
Other
Missing

Rank

Terminal
Degree

Discipline

Union

19.9
80.1
19.1
31.9
48.99
.7
10.6
87.9
.7
34.8
5.0
16.3
5.0
8.5
12.1
7.8
2.1
8.5

Not a Member
AFT
AAUP
NEA
Other
Missing

9.2
28.4
27.0
29.1
5.7
.7

[Note*: To determine associated ‘academic department affiliations’ as asked with question # 6, in
Section I on the survey, the University o f N ew Hampshire’s organization o f colleges and their departments
was used as a framework. The category o f “N ot a Member” was used on the survey to distinguish those
who self-identified as not having joined by choice as opposed to being ineligible by status to join the
faculty union on their campus].
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The demographic data yielded from the surveys on the institutions of the
respondents included the size of their institutions and the highest level of degrees offered
at their institutions. The results below (Table 6) point to an institutional profile as
depicted by the respondents that was predominately made up of medium sized
institutions, (10,001 to 15,000 FTE), offering some doctorate level degrees, thus with an
associated level of research activity.
Table 6
Institutions’ Size as Reported by Respondents and Highest Degree Awarded by
Institution (by percent)
Student
Enrollment
0-5,500
5,501- 10,000
10,001 - 15,000
15,001 -20,000
20,001 -25,000
25,001 -30,000
Missing

16.3
29.1
41.8
5.0
5.7
.7
1.4

Highest Degree
Offered
Bachelors
Masters
Doctorate
Missing

1.4
21.3
76.6
.7

The three major unions, AFT AAUP, and NEA were almost equally represented
by the respondent group, with 28.4%, 27%, and 29.1% respectively it can be also stated
that the average respondent was a union member of one of the three major unions or of
their affiliates.
Research Questions
The plan for analysis for this first research question started with a descriptive
analysis of the 27 items aligned with the seven professional concerns. (Please see
Appendix C for a listing of the survey questions noted by professional concern with
results.) A Pearson product-moment correlation was conducted to ascertain the
relationship between the questions. Because the correlations were high among the 27

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

83

items, a factor analysis starting with a principal component analysis followed. The seven
professional concerns did not surface as separate factors. Five factors were revealed from
the factor analysis. Those factors will be discussed below in conjunction with specific
demographic variables (respondents’ rank, discipline and union membership).
The analysis will begin with a review of the seven professional concerns and their
corresponding items with mean scores. They are listed below.
A.

The ability of the faculty to effectively influence who will join and continue on
the faculty. (Questions 4, 5, 6, and 10). M = 3.21

B.

The ability of the faculty to determine curriculum. (Questions 8, 11, and 16).
M = 3.05

C.

The ability of the faculty to determine what instructional practices/delivery
systems will be used their classrooms. (Questions 14, 21, and 27). M = 3.14

D.

The ability of the faculty to set the requirements for granting of a degree.
(Questions 7, 15, 17, 23, and 29). M = 3.19

E.

The ability of the faculty to determines their teaching, scholarship, and service
requirements. (Questions 3, 9, 19, and 20). M = 3.19

(F)

The right of the faculty to exercise their academic freedom. (Questions 12,13, 22,
and 24). M -3 .5 2

(G)

The ability of the faculty to exercise reasonable shared governance, (exercising a
wider role in institutional governance beyond the classroom and the department
level). (Questions 1,2, 18, and 25). M = 3.55
In sum, a review of the responses to the questions associated with each of the

seven Professional Concerns addressed in the survey indicate a positive response to the
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concerns, thus the respondents perceived that these concerns were addressed in their
contracts. However as noted earlier, to more fully explore if these alone represent the
professional concerns of the faculty as embedded in the answers to the survey’s
questions, a second approach to the survey results for this research questions was also
undertaken, a data reduction through a principal component and factor analysis.
Data Reduction: Factor Analysis of the Professional Concerns’ Questions for Research
Question #
The seven professional concerns were formulated from a review of the literature
and then used as a basis for developing the 27 Likert Scale survey items. While the data
from the questions provided an overview of the professional concerns, they do not
validate the seven professional concerns. Therefore, a Pearson product-moment
correlation (Pearson r) was conducted for all the twenty-seven questions. (See Table 7,
pp. 85-87.) The analysis showed a large number of significantly correlated questions
meaning that relationships exist between and among the questions. This forms a basis for
the next step, conducting a component analysis followed by a factor analysis to ascertain
if the seven professional concerns manifested in the data. This analysis determined
whether the questions clustered into the seven professional concerns, or resulted in a new
set of factors.
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Table 8 illustrates the principal component matrix resulting from the factor
analysis of the twenty seven questions, with Varimax rotation applied, and which
converged in eight rotations.
Table 8
Rotated Component Matrix

question 1
question 2
question 3
question 4
question 5
question 6
question 7
question 8
question 9
question 10
question 11
question 12
question 13
question 14
question 15
question 16
question 17
question 18
question 19
question 20
question 21
question 22
question 23
question 24
question 25
question 27
question 29

1
.722
.768
.751
.507
.727
.551
-.065
.282
-.486
.334
.307
.622
.625
.161
-.135
.181
.638
.310
.396
-.475
.447
.478
.270
.679
.608
-.039
.321

2
.295
.105
.150
.400
.162
.339
-.376
.777
.137
.226
.484
.404
.467
.533
-.056
.149
.365
-.035
.083
-.287
.351
.417
.806
.361
.301
.467
.793

Component
3
-.159
.192
.273
.181
.210
.224
-.009
.014
.358
.134
.335
.305
.114
.469
.079
.088
.095
.761
.700
-.327
.383
.108
.111
.222
.373
.658
.130

4
.128
.000
-.002
.336
.279
.307
-.118
.085
-.235
.245
-.132
-.018
.236
.180
-.795
.809
.319
-.066
.072
-.198
.310
.310
.166
.178
.055
.060
.079

Note: Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
Rotation converged in 8 iterations.
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5
.194
.073
-.056
-.029
-.110
-.144
.759
-.074
.450
.605
.044
.016
-.004
.026
.262
.277
-.124
.157
-.064
.425
-.067
.288
-.102
.034
.118
.008
-.051

89

Table 8 makes clear that the 27 questions distilled into five factors that loaded at a
rounded .450 o r -.450 or higher. The Eigenvalues above 1.% explained 64.596 % of the
variance as illustrated in Table 9. As shown in this table, Factor 1 explained 23.946% of
the variance, Factor 2 16.294%, Factor 3 10.574%, Factor 4 8.317%, and Factor 5
6.365% of the variance.
Table 9
Total Variance Explained

Com
ponent

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

Initial Eigenvalues

Total
11.121
2.182
1.778
1.446
1.157
.918
.858
.715
.680
.631
.605
.580
.525
.465
.411
.397
.341
.336
.324
.293
.265
.234
.208
.167
.148
.121
.095

% of
Vari
ance
41.189
8.082
6.583
6.355
4.287
3.400
3.177.
2.648
2.517
2.336
2.240
2.150
1.943
1.722
1.522
1.471
1.263
1.243
1.199
1.084
.983
.867
.772
.619
.547
.499
.351

Extraction Sums o f
Squared Loadngs

Cumu
lative %
41.189
49.271
55.854
61.209
65.496
68.895
72.072
74.721
77.238
79.574
81.814
83.964
85.907
87.629
89.151
90.622
91.885
93.128
94.327
95.411
96.394
97.261
98.033
98.653
99.200
99.649
100.000

Total
11.121
2.182
1.778
1.446
1.157

% of
Vari
ance
41.189
8.082
6.483
6.355
4.287

Rotation Sums o f Squared
Loadings

Cumu
lative %
41.189
49.271
55.854
61.209
65.496

Total
6.465
4.399
2.855
2.462
1.718

Note: Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis
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% of
Vari
ance
23.406
16.294
10.574
8.317
6.365

Cumu
lative %
23.496
40.240
50.814
59.131
65.496
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In addition, the Scree plot below in Figure 1 associated with this factor analysis
indicated further the acceptability of the five factors as there is a clear break after the five
factors on this scale.
Figure 1.
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Table 10 (Factor Correlations) below provides further evidence that the five
factors are significantly correlated to one another with a range from weak to strong.
Factor 1 and Factor 2 have the strongest correlation (.710 at the .01 level). Factor 2 and
Factor 5 have the lowest correlation (.024). In addition to being a weak correlation, it is
not significant.
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Table 10
Factor Correlations
FACTOR2P

FACTOR3P

FACTOR4P

FACTOR5P

,710(**)

.561(**)

,192(*)

.174

.000

.000

.036

.056

122

119

121

119

121

.710(**)

1

.484(**)

.104

.024

.000

.240

.783

FACTOR1P
FACTOR IP

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)

1

N
FACTOR2P

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

N
FACTOR3P

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)

119

134

130

130

130

.561(**)

,484(**)

1

,203(*)

.127

.000

.000

.021

.151

121

130

133

128

130

. 192(*)

.104

.203(*)

1

.371(**)

.036

.240

.021

119

130

128

132

130

.174

.024

.127

,371(**)

1

.056

.783

.151

.000

121

130

130

130

N
FACTOR4P

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

FACTOR5P

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

.000

136

Note: ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table 11, below, sorts the twenty-seven questions in the order in which they
loaded into each of the five factors which surfaced from the analysis. Using .450 or -.450
(or those rounded up to) as the cutoff to determine which questions were loaded into each
factor these associated questions are noted below by their load score in bold type under
each factor. According to one factor analysis expert (Kline, 1994) loadings of a .600 or
greater are to be considered as higher and those with a .300 to be moderate, with a
negative or positive sign having no effect on this consideration. Therefore a cutoff with a
rounded .450 captures those with above moderate scores thus aiming for loaded questions
that have a higher than average relationship to each other in the loading to help find a
clarity of definition of the factor itself.
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Table 11
Factor Descriptors and Standardized Loadings
Survey Question #

Factor 1
Personal
Protections

Factor 2
Program
Controls

Factor 3
Administrative
Restraint

Factor 4
Specified
Academic
Issues

Factor 5
Restrictive
Contract
Stipulations

Enhances the professional status o f the faculty by its very presence on
a campus

.722

.295

-.159

.128

.194

Enhances the practice o f shared governance on a campus

.768

.105

.192

.000

.073

Effectively protects the faculty’s interests in the post-tenure review
process

.751

.150

.273

.002

.056

Protects the faculty’s ability to effectively influence who w ill be hired
as a faculty member

.507

.400

.181

.336

.029

Is effective in protecting faculty rights during promotion and tenure
decisions

.727

.162

.210

.279

-.110

Preserves the ability o f the faculty to determine the relative w eight o f
teaching, scholarship, and service in promotion and tenure decisions

.551

.339

.224

.307

-.144

-.486

.137

.358

-.235

.450

Protects a faculty member’s professional autonomy

.622

.404

.305

-.018

.016

Protects the control that I have over my scholarship/creative efforts

.625

.467

.114

.236

.004

Protects my ability to manage my classroom and give grades in the
manner I feel is best

.638

.365

.095

.319

-.124

Primarily addresses issues unrelated to the faculty’s professional
issues

N
NO
>
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Table 11 (cont.)
Is ill equipped to address issues pertaining to my professional
responsibilities o f teaching, scholarship and service

-.475

-.287

-.327

-.198

.425

Protects my ability to determine what instructional practices I w ill use
in my classroom

.447

.351

.383

.310

-.067

Satisfactorily protects my intellectual property rights from the claim
o f the institution to ownership o f them

.478

.417

.108

.310

.288

Effectively protects my academic freedom

.679

.361

.222

.178

.034

Adds greater importance to my voice as a faculty member when
speaking on matters relating to institutional performance

.608

.301

.373

.055

.118

Is effective in supporting the ability o f the faculty to determine the
curriculum

.282

.777

.014

.085

.074

Restrains my institution from restructuring academic programs
without adequate consultation or the cooperation o f the faculty

.307

.484

.335

-.132

.044

Contains adequate provisions to protect faculty determination o f how
new learning technologies w ill be implemented

.161

.533

.469

.180

.026

Effectively protects the faculty’s ability to establish degree
requirements

.270

.806

.111

.166

-.102

Our collective bargaining agreement effectively protects the faculty’s
ability to establish degree requirements

.321

.793

.130

.079

.051

Insures that the administration w ill not have too much power over the
governance o f m y institution

.310

-.035

.761

-.066

.157

SO

U>
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Table 11 (cont.)
Effectively controls the ability o f the administration to unilaterally
change the requirements o f my position

.396

.083

.700

.072

-.064

There are adequate provisions in the collective bargaining agreement
to protect faculty determination o f how new learning technologies w ill
be implemented.

.039

.467

.658

.060

.008

-.135

-.056

.079

-.795

.262

Should include matter related to the curriculum, and be an appropriate
sub ject o f collective bargaining

.181

.149

.088

.809

.277

Is not effective in protecting the faculty’s ability to establish the
requirements o f a degree

.065

-.376

-.009

-.118

.759

Facilitates the hiring o f the best faculty through the use o f monetary
incentives

.334

.226

.134

.245

.605

Should not address the establishment o f degree requirements

Note: Extraction Method: Principal Component A nalysis
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization
Rotation converged in 8 interations.

VO

95

As Royce expressed it (1963; Kline 1994, p. 5.) a factor is a “construct
operationally defined by its factor loadings,” or defined by Kline (1994, p. 5.),
“essentially a factor is a dimension or construct which is a condensed statement of the
relationships between a set of variables” [but] “obviously factor loadings must be
defined.” To do this, the questions from the survey, as they loaded under each of the five
factors, were examined for their commonalities of themes and further compared with the
professional concerns used to create the survey questions themselves. Because these
professional concerns were derived if om the literature review thus derived ultimately
from research processes, they provide the external criteria that Kline (1994) indicated as a
necessary framework upon which to define factors.
Thus taking the questions’ loadings as bolded above in Table 11 under each
factor, and examining them in a thematic sense to see what they have in common, five
themes arise with each accompanying set of questions. These are:
Factor 1: ‘Personal Protections for the Faculty Member’
(with three sub-themes of classroom work, personal security,
and personal power and status).

M = 3.43

Factor 2: ‘Program Controls’

M = 3.17

Factor 3: ‘Organizational Restraints’

M = 3.25

Factor 4: ‘Specified Academic Issues’

M = 3.02

Factor 5: ‘Restrictive Contract Stipulations’

M = 2.65

These Factor headings appear in Table 11 with their loading. The means for each
factor’s question set are found in Appendix D. However, for discussion purposes, the
mean for each factor is noted above.
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The definition for each factor is based on an examination of the questions. Factor
1, called “Personal Protections for the Faculty Member,” which explains 23.946% of the
variance in the responses (see Table 9 above). The factor encompasses those questions
which relate to faculty members’ ability to control what goes on in their classrooms, as
their domain, protections over their personal professional work and stature, and controls
to keep in check threats to their personal professional security such as their autonomy and
their research, scholarship and service requirements.
The fourth Factor, ‘Specified Academic Issues’ (M = 3.02), explaining 8.317% of
the responses’ variance, speaks to asking the faculty what should be in the contract. The
questions that loaded are asked the respondents to contemplate what should be in the
contract such as measures to secure the faculty’s primary role in setting degree
requirements and controls, but not to set the curriculum specifically, and to insure the
faculty’s supremacy in deciding their structures and strictures, but not to put the actual
requirements in the contracts. So it speaks to the rights of the faculty to be in charge of
these overall matters but does not seek to have them by specific bargaining point issues,
that it the very specifics of the degree requirements etc., rather than the control to set
them.
This new factor subsumes all of Professional Concern F (the right to exercise
academic freedom) and three-quarters of Professional Concern A (determines who will
join the faculty), Professional Concern E (determines the tri-part principal components of
the work of professors teaching, scholarship, and service requirements), and Professional
Concern G (exercise reasonable governance). This new factor cuts across all the original
professional concerns with the notable exception of Professional Concern B (determines
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curriculum). It is interesting that the entire Professional Concern on academic freedom
clustered in the factor analysis. These items must reflect the literature on and practice in
higher education.
Why the concern for curriculum does not load as a personal protection is
unknown. This is especially true in light of the fact that Professional Concern E contains
teaching as one of its components. It is possible then faculty perceive teaching as
separate from the curriculum.
This factor (1) contains the question with the highest mean (3.92) for the 27 items
on the survey, Question 5. This question, (Collective bargaining agreement is effective in
protecting faculty rights during promotion and tenure decisions.), in many ways captures
the essence of this factor of personal protections. The promotion and tenure decision is
critical to professors. The responding faculty perceived that the union through collective
bargaining protects their rights when it comes to the critical employment decisions of
gaining tenure and winning promotion.
The next three highest means broaden the areas to be protected. The next highest
mean (3.88) is Question 2 which focuses on the collective bargaining agreement
enhancing the practice of shared governance. The third highest mean (3.86) concerns
protecting the post-tenure review process (Question 3). And, the fourth highest mean
(3.86) asks whether the collective bargaining agreement protects the faculty member’s
academic freedom. Taken together, these four items illustrate that the respondents
perceive that the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) protects their essential
employment relationship between the individual and the institution, the person’s
academic freedom rights which for many form the core of their work, and the faculty
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member’s power relationship with the organization (shared governance). These are the
highest means of all of the 27 items. And, they are the areas that the respondents
perceive receive the greatest protection from the collective bargaining process. Their
ability to work (promotion and tenure decisions), the core of their work (academic
freedom), and their relationship with the university (shared governance) are protected and
are enhanced by the essential work of the union in their perception.
Two items have a mean lower than the neutral. The first of the two items is
Question 9 (M= 2.62), which states that collective bargaining agreements primarily
address issues unrelated to professional issues. The responding faculty tend to disagree
with that statement. Their disagreement can be inferred as stating that the CBA does
address professional issues. The second item is Question 20 (M= 2.72), which posits
that the CBA is ill equipped to address issues pertaining to professional responsibilities.
Once again, the respondents tend to disagree with this statement.
Factor 1 has the highest mean of the five factors. It also has the largest number of
items loading on to the factor. The respondents believe that personal protection is
therefore a major professional concern and their collective bargaining agreement supports
their concern. This first and largest factor appears to turn inward on the professors’
personal concerns and not outward on the organization or students. Therefore the CBA
protects several of the main concerns of the faculty respondents which appear to focus on
those of providing personal protections.
Factor 2, “Program Controls,” comprises five questions related to collective
bargaining agreements providing controls over the programs that are most within the
faculty’s sphere of influence. Degree requirements, curriculum, learning technology, and
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academic programs comprise the focal points of this factor. The responding faculty
perceive that the CBA protects their ability to establish degree requirements and to
determine the curriculum that reflects those requirements. This factor primarily
incorporates two of the Professional Concerns, B (determine curriculum) and D (set
requirements for granting a degree). The one item that does not fit within the two
Professional Concerns of degree (B) and curriculum (D) is Question 14 (protecting the
implementation of new learning technology). While four of the five items are
programmatic Question 14 protects how rather than what. Some caution regarding the fit
of Question 14 in the factor on controlling the program is thus advised.
It is also worth noting that three of the five questions that comprise this factor (2)
had large neutral responses. Question 14 (39.70%), Question 23 (45.40%), and Question
29 (40.40%) have neutral responses that approach or exceed 40 percent of the responses.
Two of the questions (#23 and #29) concern the effectiveness of the CBA in protecting
the faculty’s ability to establish degree. The respondents either are ambivalent about the
issue or they lack knowledge about the efficacy of the CBA in protecting the faculty’s
ability to establish degree requirements.
As noted above, Factor 1 and Factor 2 have a strong, significant correlation.
These two factors give faculty protection over their work, protects their security so they
can conduct their work, and protects their power and status (Factor 1) as well as
protecting specific aspects of their work such as determining degree requirements and the
curriculum. As the score on one of these factors goes up the other corresponds similarly.
These two factors can be seen as the core of professional activities that the CBA can
protect. They tend to work closely together.
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Factor 3, “Organizational Restraints” has three items that define it. The mean
(3.25) is the second highest mean. All three of the items restrain the decision making of
administrators. This factor does not enable professors to do anything rather it inhibits
administration from acting in a manner that erodes faculty power. This brake on
administrator action supports the basic principle of collective bargaining that unilateral
decision-making on the part of management is replaced with bilateral decision making on
mandatory and permissive subjects of bargaining. These items restrain administrations in
general (Question 18), control administrations’ ability to change the work of the
professor (Question 19), and restrain administrations from interfering with a professor’s
decision of how best to implement new learning technologies (Question 27). However, it
must be noted that the mean for Question 27 is just below the neutral (M= 2.94) meaning
that the respondents are not sure that the CBA provides adequate protection in this area.
It must also be stated that this question had an unusually high number of neutral
responses (42.55%). The respondents may be conflicted, ambivalent, or had no
knowledge about how this specific question is addressed in the CBA.
The issue of protecting the faculty’s ability to determine how to implement new
learning technology (Questions 27) has a large neutral response (42.55%). As noted
above, Question 14 in Factor 2 also has a high neutral response (39.70%). Together, both
questions indicate that the respondents do not have a good handle on how the CBA
impacts new instructional technologies. This is similar to the finding in Factor 1
regarding the ability of the CBA to protect the faculty’s control over establishing degree
requirements. Both issues had large neutral responses.
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Factor 4, “Specific Academic Issues” is notable for what the CBA cannot and
should not do. This factor has a mean just above the neutral (3.02) and accounts for
8.317 percent of the variance. It has two questions. The first, Question 15, asks whether
the CBA should address the establishment of degree requirements. The mean for the
question is 3.48 and 52.48 percent agreed or strongly agreed that the CBA should not
address the establishment of degree requirements. The respondents apparently believe
that the CBA should protect their prerogative to establish degree requirements but that it
should not be a subject of bargaining. Their viewpoint is consistent. The faculty
respondents want the CBA to protect their ability to decide but not to proscribe the
outcome. Since bargaining involves give and take, degree requirements could become a
chip to be bargained in trade for some other valued item. Thus, these professors do not
want their professional decision making to be moved to the bargaining table. In some
ways, this can be characterized as the faculty wanting their right to determine degree
requirements to be protected by the bargaining process but not usurped by that process.
The second question in Factor 4, Question 16 (matters related to curriculum are an
appropriate subject of collective bargaining), had a mean score of 2.56. Less than a
quarter of the respondents (22.70%) agreed or strongly agreed with the statement.
Similar to Question 15, the faculty carved out areas of their professional practice,
establishment of degree requirements and curriculum, and they question whether they are
appropriate for the bargaining table. Once again, the faculty respondents may perceive
that the CBA should protect their professional prerogatives and not usurp them, at least
on these specific academic issues.
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Last of all, Factor 5, “Restrictive Contract Stipulations,” consists of two
questions. The mean (2.65) is the only mean of the five factors that is below neutral.
Question 10 has the lowest mean for all 27 questions (2.39). Only 15.62 percent of the
respondents agreed or strongly agreed that the CBA facilitates the hiring of the best
faculty through monetary incentives. Collective bargaining is restricted to three large
categories, wages, benefits, and terms and conditions of employment. As seen from the
discussion of the other factors, the respondents overall are supportive of the role that
collective bargaining plays in supporting and protecting their professional decision
making. However, the faculty respondents do not perceive that collective bargaining is a
vehicle for attracting the best faculty. Is it because the CBA cannot address the issue or
is it because bargaining energy is not focused on the topic and is reserved for those
faculty already hired?
The second question, Question 7 (the CBA is not effective in protecting the
faculty’s ability to establish the requirements of the degree) has a mean of 2.91 with 61
percent of the respondents strongly disagreeing or disagreeing with the statement. In
other words, they believe that the contract does protect their ability to establish the
requirements of a degree. The response to this negatively worded question is consistent
with the views of the faculty responding that the contract does protect their ability
(Question 23 and Question 29).
This factor (5) does not have a unifying thread other than both question that
loaded into it have a mean score less than 3.00. Question 7 may fit best with Factor 1 and
Question 10 may fit best with Factor 4 where other questions reveal limitations on
bargaining. Consequently, this factor must be approached with skepticism.
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It is noteworthy that, on the whole, faculty members in this study found that the
CBA protected the exercise of their professional duties. The collective bargaining
agreement was supportive and not a hindrance to professional activity. While the
responses were consistently positive about the role of the CBA, respondents did find that
there are limits to the reach of the CBA. The respondents did not want support to turn
into usurpation. It is also worth noting that while the support for the CBA was consistent,
there were no means over 4.0. A comparison of the questions comprising the seven
professional concerns with the new order of questions in each factor shows that the
concerns did not have a close match to the factors. All the questions are accounted for in
the loading of the factors, but now they group together quite differently. The original
seven professional concerns collapsed into five factors. These concerns focused on the
specific activities of professors. The factors brought many of the specific activities
together into Factor 1 and Factor 2. A change in focus from the concerns to the factors
was the emergence of a factor on restraints (3) and a factor on limitations (4). The last
factor (5) does not conceptually hold together, as its two questions fit within the construct
of two other factors
Variances Explained by Rank. Disciplines and the Unions Membership of the Faculty
and the Factors.
This section discusses the results of ANOVA’s by each factor, rank, discipline
(department) and union membership of the respondents.
[Note in order to recognize the capacity for experiment-wide or error in the
ANOVAs, the LSD (least-significant difference) was used in ANOVAs as illustrated
below. While this does not guarantee that there is no error it recognizes its possibility.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

104
This test may be on the liberal side of the possible sets of test available to test for the
experiment-wide error rate but this is offset in terms of the advantage it provides by the
statistical power that it possesses which is needed to make the analyses feasible given the
sample size].
The ANOVA conducted with Factor 1 (‘Personal Protections for the Faculty
Member’), and the rank, disciplines, and union memberships of the respondents to that
question set, resulted in a finding that only differing union memberships provided any
significant differences between the groups at the .05 level. Table 12 below illustrates
these results. In this table the differences shown were between those ‘not members’ of a
union, and those within the three major unions of AAUP, AFT, and NEA. Union
members perceive that the CBA provides protection for faculty members as they exercise
their professional discretion to a greater degree than non-union members. The mean for
both groups, union and non-union, are above the neutral so they agree that there is a
positive effect but they disagree on how strongly the CBA protects. There is no
difference between members in the different unions. Therefore, union membership either
provides a common lens through affiliation or those faculty members who chose to join a
union are predisposed to the positive impact of the union. Two distinct groups emerge in
this analysis based on whether they are members or non-members. The other two
demographic factors are undifferentiated as to response.
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Table 12
Factor 1 and Union Membership

(I) union

(J) union

Mean
Difference (I-J)

Std. Error

Sig.

95% Confidence Interval
Lower
Bound

is n

N ot a

AFT

-10.9583(*)

2.90064

.000

-16.7393

-5.1774

A A UP

- 1 2 .9 8 3 3 0

2.92689

.000

-18.8166

-7.1500

NEA

-11.9583(*)

2.90064

.000

-17.7393

-6.1774

-7.9167

4.28453

.069

-16.4557

.6224

1 0 .9 5 8 3 0
-2.0250

2.90064

.000

5.1774

16.7393

3.0417

2.17768
2.14226
3.81219

.355
.642
.428

-6.3651
-5.2695
-4.5560

2.3151
3.2695
10.6393

Member

Other
AFT

N ot a Member
AAUP
NEA
Other

AAUP

N ot a Member

Other

-

1.0000

1 2 .9 8 3 3 0

2.92689

.000

7.1500

18.8166

AFT

2.0250

2.17768

.355

-2.3151

6.3651

NEA

1.0250

2.17768

.639

-3.3151

5.3651

5.0667

.190
.000
.642

-2.5709
6.1774
-3.2695

12.7042

1.0000

3.83220
2.90064
2.14226

A A UP

-1.0250

2.17768

.639

-5.3651

3.3151

Other

4.0417

3.81219

.293

-3.5560

11.6393

N ot a Member

7.9167

4.28453

.069

-.6224

16.4557

-3.0417
-5.0667
-4.0417

3.81219
3.83220
3.81219

.428
.190
.293

-10.6393
-12.7042
-11.6393

4.5560
2.5709
3.5560

Other
NEA

Upper Bound

N ot a Member
AFT

AFT
A A UP
N EA

1 1 .9 5 8 3 0

17.7393
5.2695

Note: Based on observed means.
* The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.

With regard to Factor 2’s (‘Program Controls’) ANOVAs by rank, disciplines and
union memberships, there were no statistical difference among the ranks of the
respondents but there were within the disciplines and once again with the union
memberships. Table 13 shows that there are differences in the responses based on the
disciplines of the respondents, where those in ‘other’ are statistically different from those
in the liberal arts, or science and engineering, but not business and economics.
Significant differences exist between faculty members in “other” disciplines and faculty
in the fine arts and faculty in science and engineering. There are no other significant
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differences between disciplines. Because we do not know the composition of “other,” it
is difficult to understand what this difference means, and its small percentage of two
percent make any meaning questionable. What we have learned from this ANOVA in
Table 13 is that there is no significant difference between the liberal and fine arts faculty,
the science and engineering faculty, and the business and economics faculty. These three
faculty groups comprise the lion’s share of faculty positions in most institutions of higher
education. The unknown reasons for the differences are worth exploring.
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Table 13
Factor 2 and Disciplines
(I) dept
(disciplines)

(J) dept
(disciplines)

Mean
Difference
(I-J)

Std. Error

Sig.

95% Confidence Interval
Lower
Bound

LSD

liberal and
fine arts

science and
engineering
business and
econom ics

.6382

.72653

.382

-.8061

2.0825

-1.6240

1.25443

.199

-4.1178

.8697

-6.1695(*)

2.74628

.027

-11.6289

-.7101

-.6382

.72653

.382

-2.0825

.8061

-2.2622

1.26763

.078

-4.7822

.2577

-6.8077(*)

2.75233

.015

-12.2791

-1.3362

1.6240

1.25443

.199

-.8697

4.1178

2.2622

1.26763

.078

-.2577

4.7822

-4.5455

2.93617

.125

-10.3824

1.2915

liberal and fine
arts

6.1695(*)

2.74628

.027

.7101

11.6289

science and
engineering

6.8077(*)

2.75233

.015

1.3362

12.2791

4.5455

2.93617

.125

-1.2915

10.3824

other
science and
engineering

liberal and fine
arts
business and
econom ics
other

business and
econom ics

liberal and fine
arts
science and
engineering
other

Other

Upper
Bound

business and
econom ics

Note: Based on observed means.
* The mean difference is significant at the .05 level

The other significant difference by demographic variables that showed a
significant difference is by union membership as displayed in Table 14. Interestingly, the
significant difference emerged only between faculty members designating their discipline
as other and members of the AAUP. Similar to the significant difference for Factor 2,
the difference is between non-members and members of the union, the AAUP. Why
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AAUP members are different from non-members over the other two unions is unknown.
Why there is a differentiation from other unions is unknown.
Table 14
Factor 2 and Unions

LSD

Mean Difference
(I-J)

(I) union

(J) union

Not a Member

AFT
AAUP

-3.7677(*)
-3.9278(*)

1.31590
1.32492

.005
.004

Lower Bound
-6.3836
-6.5617

NEA

-3.6010(*)

1.31590

.008

-6.2169

-.9851

-2.4026

1.84676

.197

-6.0738

1.2686

3.7677(*)

1.31590

.005

1.1518

6.3836

-.1601
.1667
1.3651

.91344
.90029
1.57781

.861
.854
.389

-1.9760
-1.6231
-1.7715

1.6557
1.9564
4.5017

3.9278(*)

1.32492

.004

1.2939

6.5617

Other
AFT

Not a Member
AAUP
NEA
Other

AAUP

Not a Member

Other

Sig.

95% Confidence Interval
Upper Bound
-1.1518
-1.2939

AFT

.1601

.91344

.861

-1.6557

1.9760

NEA

.3268

.91344

.721

-1.4891

2.1427

1.5252
3.6010(*)
-.1667

1.58534
1.31590
.90029

.339
.008
.854

-1.6264
.9851
-1.9564

4.6768
6.2169
1.6231

Other
NEA

Std. Error

Not a Member
AFT
AAUP

-.3268

.91344

.721

-2.1427

1.4891

Other

1.1984

1.57781

.450

-1.9382

4.3350

2.4026

1.84676

.197

-1.2686

6.0738

-1.3651
-1.5252
-1.1984

1.57781
1.58534
1.57781

.389
.339
.450

-4.5017
-4.6768
-4.3350

1.7715
1.6264
1.9382

Not a Member
AFT
AAUP
NEA

Note: Based on observed means.
* The mean difference is significant at the .05 level

The results of ANOVAs for Factor 3 (‘Organizational Restraints’) by rank,
discipline, and union membership resulted in similar results to Factor 2. Rank showed no
variances but there were significant differences found within the disciplines, and within
union membership, as was the case with Factor 2. Factor 3’s variances by discipline were
found between business and economics, and science and engineering, as groups as shown
in Table 15. And with union membership, this outcome is different from Factor 1 but
similar to Factor 2 with difference is only between AAUP and ‘not a member’ (Table 16).
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Table 15
Factor 3 and Disciplines

(I) disciplines

(J) disciplines

Mean
Differenc
e(I-J)

Std.
Error

Sig.

95% Confidence
Interval
Lower
Bound

LSD

liberal and fine arts

science and
engineering

business and
economics

science and
engineering
business and
econom ics
other
liberal and fine arts
business and
econom ics
other
liberal and fine arts
science and
engineering
other

other

liberal and fine arts
science and
engineering
business and
economics

Upper
Bound

.1063

.49172

.829

-.8717

1.0843

-1.5853

.84013

.063

-3.2563

.0857

-.7368

1.51113

.627

-3.7424

2.2687

-.1063

.49172

.829

-1.0843

.8717

_

1.6916(*)
-.8431

.84809

.049

-3.3784

-.0048

1.51557

.579

-3.8575

2.1713

1.5853

.84013

.063

-.0857

3.2563

1.6916(*)

.84809

.049

.0048

3.3784

.8485

1.66162

.611

-2.4564

4.1534

.7368

1.51113

.627

-2.2687

3.7424

.8431

1.51557

.579

-2.1713

3.8575

-.8485

1.66162

.611

-4.1534

2.4564

Note: Based on observed means.
* The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.
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Table 16
Factor 3 and Union Membership

(I) union

(J) union

Mean
Difference
(I-J)

Std. Error

Sig.

95% Confidence Interval
Lower
Bound

LSD

N ot a
Member

AFT
AAUP

AFT

.069

-3.2822

.1253

-1.8137(*)

.85659

.037

-3.5175

-.1100

-1.3810

.85339

.109

-3.0783

.3164

-.6667

1.21328

.584

-3.0798

1.7465

1.5784

.85659

.069

-.1253

3.2822

-.2353
.1975
.9118

.61873
.61429
1.05884

.705
.749
.392

-1.4659
-1.0243
-1.1942

.9953
1.4193
3.0177

1.8137(*)

.85659

.037

.1100

3.5175

.2353

.61873

.705

-.9953

1.4659

.4328

.61429

.483

-.7890

1.6546

1.1471

1.05884

.282

-.9589

3.2530

1.3810

.85339

.109

-.3164

3.0783

N ot a
Member
AAUP

N ot a
Member
AFT
Other

Other

.85659

Other

N EA
N EA

-1.5784

NEA

N EA
Other
A A UP

Upper
Bound

N ot a
Member
AFT

-.1975

.61429

.749

-1.4193

1.0243

A A UP

-.4328

.61429

.483

-1.6546

.7890

Other

.7143

1.05625

.501

-1.3866

2.8151

.6667

1.21328

.584

-1.7465

3.0798

-.9118
-1.1471
-.7143

1.05884
1.05884
1.05625

.392
.282
.501

-3.0177
-3.2530
-2.8151

1.1942
.9589
1.3866

N ot a
Member
AFT
A A UP
N EA

Note: Based on observed means.
* The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.

For the first three factors, a significant difference has emerged between “not a
member” and AAUP membership. There appears to be some unknown unifying factor or
factors that distinguish AAUP from non-union members along the lines of personal
protection, program control, and restraints on the organization. It appears that AAUP
members perceive the CBA as playing a more efficacious role than non-members. While
there is some difference between AFT and NEA from AAUP members, the difference is
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not significant. A possible explanation for the consistent significant difference only
existing for AAUP members and not the other union members (NEA and AFT) is that the
AAUP has its roots in and focuses on higher education and its unique work conditions in
which professional activity is practiced. Whereas the NEA and the AFT have their roots
in the public schools and start with a construct of professional activities that is different
in the public schools than in higher education.
For Factor 4 (“Specified Academic Issues”), the only variance found pertained to
the disciplines. There was no difference according to union membership. Why the trend
of difference between AAUP and non-union members is unknown. However, this factor
clusters around specific issues that may not fit well into a CBA. Table 17 illustrates that
in this question set, the significant differences are between the disciplines of ‘other’ and
those with liberal arts and science and engineering compared with those in other
disciplines, but not business and economics. This is the same difference found for
Factor 2 (see Table 13) for disciplines. Consequently, because “other” as a category of
disciplines constitutes only 2.1% of the respondents, this significant difference should be
approached with extreme caution.
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Table 17
Factor 4 and Disciplines

(I) disciplines

(J) disciplines

Mean
Difference
(I-J)

Std.
Error

95% Confidence
Interval

Sig.

Lower
Bound
LSD

liberal and fine
arts

science and
engineering

business and
econom ics

science and
engineering
business and
economics
other

.1768

.20892

.400

-.2388

.5923

-.5116

.35499

.153

-1.2176

.1945

-1.9661 (*)

.77717

.013

-3.5119

-.4203

-.1768

.20892

.400

-.5923

.2388

-.6883

.36064

.060

-1.4056

.0290

-2.1429(*)

.77977

.007

-3.6938

-.5919

.5116

.35499

.153

-.1945

1.2176

.6883

.36064

.060

-.0290

1.4056

liberal and fine arts
business and
economics
other
liberal and fine arts
science and
engineering
other

other

liberal and fine arts
science and
engineering
business and
economics

Upper
Bound

-1.4545

.83091

.084

-3.1072

.1981

1 .9 6 6 1 (0

.77717

.013

.4203

3.5119

2 .1 4 2 9 (0

.77977

.007

.5919

3.6938

1.4545

.83091

.084

-.1981

3.1072

Note: Based on observed means.
* The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.

An ANOVA for Factor 5 (Restrictive Contract Stipulations), and rank, the
disciplines and union membership shows that there were significant differences for
disciplines and union membership. There were no significant differences for rank. The
significant difference by discipline, once again, was for “other” and science and
engineering as shown in Table 18. But the low percentage, 2.1 percent of the “other” as
was the case for Factor 4 (Table 17), may also render this Factor 5 Finding once again
one to be cautiously approached, Once again, the significant difference by union
membership surfaced between AAUP and AFT members (Table 19). However, as noted
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above, since the structural integrity of this factor is suspect, extreme caution must be
exercised in ascribing meaning to these findings.
Table 18
Factor 5 and Disciplines
S
Mean
Difference
(I) disciplines

(I-J)

(J) disciplines

i
Std.
Error

95% Confidence
Interval

g

Lower
Bound
LS
D

liberal and fine
arts

science and
engineering

business and
econom ics

science and
engineering
business and
econom ics
other

.2356

.29476

.426

-.3504

.8217

.1002

.50631

.844

-.9065

1.1068

-1.6271

.91243

.078

-3.4413

.1870

-.2356

.29476

.426

-.8217

.3504

-.1355

.51251

.792

-1.1545

.8835

-1.8627(*)

.91588

.045

-3.6838

-.0417

-.1002

.50631

.844

-1.1068

.9065

.1355

.51251

.792

-.8835

1.1545

.089

-3.7238

.2692

.078

-.1870

3.4413

liberal and fine arts
business and
econom ics
other
liberal and fine arts
science and
engineering
other

other

1.6271

1.0041
4
.91243

1.8627(*)

.91588

.045

.0417

3.6838

1.7273

1.0041
4

.089

-.2692

3.7238

-1.7273

liberal and fine arts
science and
engineering
business and
econom ics

Upper
Bound

Note: Based on observed means.
* The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.
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Table 19
Factor 5 and Union Membership
Mean
Difference
(I) union

(J) union

(I-J)

Std.
Error

Sig.

95% Confidence Interval
Lower
Bound

LS
D

Not a Member

AFT
A A UP
NEA
Other

AFT

Other

.216

-.3714

-.1282

.50482

.800

-1.1319

.8755

.2412

.49705

.629

-.7471

1.2294
1.8846

1.6198

.3718

.76088

.626

-1.1410

.50073

.216

-1.6198

.3714

-,7524(*)
-.3830
-.2524

.37407
.36351
.68120

.047
.295
.712

-1.4961
-1.1058
-1.6068

-.0086
.3398

1.1020

.1282

.50482

.800

-.8755

1.1319

AFT

.7524(*)

.37407

.047

.0086

1.4961

NEA

.3694

.36913

.320

-.3646

1.1033

Other
N ot a Member
AFT

.5000
-.2412
.3830

.68421
.49705
.36351

.467
.629
.295

-.8604
-1.2294
-.3398

1.8604
.7471
1.1058

A A UP

-.3694

.36913

.320

-1.1033

.3646

Other

.1306

.67850

.848

-1.2184

1.4797

NEA
Other

NEA

.50073

-.6242

N ot a Member
A A UP

AAUP

.6242

Upper
Bound

N ot a Member

N ot a Member

-.3718

.76088

.626

-1.8846

1.1410

AFT

.2524
-.5000
-.1306

.68120
.68421
.67850

.712
.467
.848

-1.1020

1.6068
.8604
1.2184

A A UP
NEA

-1.8604
-1.4797

Note: Based on observed means.

In summary, ANOVAs conducted for rank, disciplines, and union membership
show that there is no difference for the five factors by rank. There were, however,
differences found for three of the four factors between non-union respondents and AAUP
members. These two groups ascribe different values to the role of the CBA and the
exercise of professional prerogatives. However, a difference by union membership
versus non-union membership is not as consistently different. Why the difference centers
around AAUP membership is unknown.
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Research Question #2: Do faculty perceive that collective bargaining in general is
important to their sense of professionalism?
The three survey questions below listed with their survey responses in Table 20
were used to explore the second research question above.
As indicated in Table 20, Question 26 is a negatively worded item, and it appears
that the respondents clearly disagree with it, (46.1% strongly disagree, 31.9% disagree),
therefore believing that academic freedom is an appropriate subject of collective
bargaining. For Question 28 there was a strong response with 40.4% agreeing, and 42.6%
strongly agreeing, that the administration would have too much power over the
governance of their institution without their collective bargaining agreement being in
place. On Question 30 (with 73.8% who agreed or strongly agreed) the respondents
perceived that their collective bargaining agreement is important to their sense of
professionalism and not in conflict with it. Their collective bargaining agreement should
deal with academic freedom concerns and serve as a counterbalancing influence to the
power the administration might have over matters related to their professional concerns.
It also appears that they prefer to work at an institution with a collective bargaining
agreement rather than one that does not. The faculty perceive that collective bargaining
in general is important to their work. Two of the questions (28 and 30) had means above
4.00. If Question 26’s negative approach was reversed, it would approach the 4.0 mean.
As noted above, no mans for the previous 27 questions were above 4.0. Those 27
questions were more specific regarding the professional activities of the faculty than the
broad statements found in Question 28 and 30. The overall perception is one of strong
support for the role the CBA plays in the work lives of the respondents.
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Table 20
Research Question 2

Questions

M=
(s.d.)

Question 26.
Academ ic freedom is not an
appropriate subject o f
collective bargaining.

1.96
1.2150
7

Question 28.
Without a collective
bargaining agreement the
administration would have
too much power over the
governance o f my institution.
Question 30.
If given a choice, I would
rather work at an institution
that has a collective
bargaining agreement than
one that does not.

%
Srongly
Disagree
1

%
Disagree
2

%
Neutral
3

%
Agree
4

%
Strongly
Agree
5

%
Missing

46.1

31.9

6.4

7.1

7.1

1.4

1.4

4.3

10.6

40.4

42.6

0.7

2.8

5.7

17

29

44

0.7

4.19
0.8968
1

4.07
1.0501
3

For Question 26, the ANOVA resulted in no significant differences by rank,
disciplines, or union membership of the respondents.
For Question 28, however, a significant difference was found for “not a member’,
and a member of AAUP, AFT and NEA membership as shown in Table 21. This
difference between membership and non-membership is consistent with the findings with
Factors 1, 2, 3, and 5. The other significant difference is between ‘Other and AFT.’ It is
unknown why though there is this difference.
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Table 21
Question 28 and Union Membership

Mean
(J) Union
Difference
AFT
-.1019*
LSD
AAUP
-.7868*
NEA
-.8586
Other
-.3297
AFT
N ot a Member
1.1019*
AAUP
.3151
NEA
.2432
Other
.7722
N ot a Member
.7868*
A A UP
AFT
-.3151
NEA
-.0718
Other
.4571
N
ot
a
Member
.8586*
NEA
-.2432
AFT
AAUP
.0718
Other
.5290
Other
N ot a Member
.3297
AFT
-.7722*
-.4571
A A UP
NEA
-.5290
Note: Based on observed means.
*The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.
(I) Union
N ot a Member

Std.
Error
.27802
.28008
.27802
.40426
.27802
.20333
.20048
.35542
.28008
.20333
.20333
.35703
.27802
.20048
.20333
.35542
.40426
.35542
.35703
.35542

Sig.
.000
.006
.003
.417
.000
.125
.228
.032
.006
.125
.725
.204
.003
.228
.725
.140
.417
.032
.204
.140

95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound
Upper Bound
-1.6542
-.5495
-1.3432
-.2304
-1.4110
-.3063
-1.1328
.4735
1.6542
.5495
.7190
-.0889
-.1551
.6415
.0661
1.4783
.2304
1.3432
-.7190
.0889
.3321
-.4758
-.2522
1.1664
1.4110
.3063
-.6415
.1551
-.3321
.4758
1.2351
-.1771
1.1328
-.4735
-.0661
-1.4783
-1.2664
.2522
.1771
-1.2351

For Question 30, again there were no significant variances in the ANOVAs based
on rank, or the disciplines of the respondents. However, as noted below in Table 22,
there was a significant difference among the three main unions, AAUP, AFT, and NEA,
and with the category of ‘other’ or ‘not a member.’ This is also consistent with the
findings of Factors 1, 2, 3, and 5.
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Table 22
Question 30 and Union Membership

Mean
(J) Union
Difference
AFT
-1.5551*
LSD
AAUP
-1.5543*
NEA
-1.3659*
Other
-.5265
AFT
N ot a Member
1.5551*
AAUP
.0008
NEA
.1892
Other
.10386*
N ot a Member
1.5543*
A A UP
AFT
-.0008
NEA
.1884
Other
1.0378*
N ot a Member
NEA
1.3659*
AFT
-.1892
AAUP
-.1884
Other
.8494
Other
N ot a Member
.5165
AFT
-1.0386*
AAUP
-1.0378*
NEA
-.8494*
Note: Based on observed means.
*The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.
(I) Union
N ot a Member

Std.
Error
.28837
.29166
.28837
.41931
.28837
.21249
.20795
.36865
.29166
.21249
.21249
.37123
.28837
.20795
.21249
.36865
.42931
.36865
.37123
.36865

Sig.
.000
.000
.000
.221
.000
.997
.365
.006
.000
.997
.378
.006
.000
.365
.378
.024
.221
.006
.006
024

95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound
Upper Bound
-2.1281
-.9821
-.2.2338
-.9748
-1.9389
-.7929
-1.3496
.3167
.9821
2.1281
-.4214
.4230
-.2240
.6024
.3061
1.7711
.9748
2.1338
-.4230
.4214
-.2338
.6106
.3002
1.7754
.7929
1.9839
-.6024
.2240
-.6106
.2338
.1169
1.5819
-.3167
1.3496
-1.7711
-.3061
-1.7754
-.3002
-1.5819
-.1169

Research Question #3: Do the collective bargaining agreements support professional
autonomy?
The Contracts: A Review by Professional Concerns: The second method of
gathering data for this study, in addition to the faculty survey, involved the review of the
related faculty contracts in effect in the calendar year 2000 and in some cases through fall
2001, which existed among the four year public higher education institutions in New
England. In concert with the survey, the contract review involved an analysis of the
twelve contracts that covered the respondent groups. The contract review analyzed the
language in the twelve contracts in terms of the seven professional concerns.
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However, a brief note about what is not to be discussed is important as a prelude
to the contract review. In crafting this review no attempt has been made to speculate on
whether or not something in practice at a campus or campuses did or did not take place
because it is or is not specified in a contract. As Rhoades (1998) pointed out in his
contract study, “there are informal conditions, processes and power structures that formal
agreements neither fully define nor constrain. Not everything is in a contract. Just
because something is not formalized in a contract does not mean it does not exist” (p. 13).
Therefore this review dealt strictly with the contracts’ articles/clauses and their specific
language in the reviewed contracts. Additionally, the review also did not attempt to look
at the influence of past practice provisions in the contracts and how they may pertain to
the actual workings of the institutions as they relate to the three factors and thus the
professional concerns of the faculty.
One further note on the review of the contracts; no attempt was made to speculate
on the particular state laws and statutes that might preclude the mention or coverage of
certain provisions in the contracts themselves.
Professional Concern A. The Ability of the Faculty to Effectively Influence Who Will
Join and Continue on the Faculty.
Notes on Faculty Appointments. Eleven of the twelve reviewed contracts
(excluding of the University of Connecticut System contract), dealt with the ability of the
faculty to determine who would join the faculty. Several contracts also contained clauses
on the setting o f salaries for some types of new tenure-track hires (Connecticut State
College System, University of New Hampshire), the process for and amount of merit
increases, (University of Massachusetts Boston/Amherst and the University of
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Connecticut), and the continuing professional development needs for their peers
(Massachusetts State Colleges, Connecticut State University System). For example, the
Connecticut State University System faculty contract stipulated that:
The parties [Connecticut State University American Association of University
Professors and the Board of Trustees of the Connecticut State University System]
recognize that scholars have a particular responsibility to exercise their expertise
in a particular field or activity and to judge the work of their colleagues. In the
exercise of such expertise it is implicit that responsibility exists for both adverse
and favorable judgments. In the area of appointments, reappointments, decisions
not to reappoint, promotions the granting of tenure, and dismissal the exercise of
faculty judgment through faculty personnel committees is essential to the pursuit
and fulfillment of the goal of academic excellence (Article 4.10).
In addition to the ‘who’ that is involved in the process in the contract of the
University of Rhode Island, included were specific articles that detailed the full
procedures to be followed with faculty appointments, from announcing the vacancy, to
the type of appointment form that would be used, to how to notify the successful
candidate of his/her appointment, as well as sending a copy of the appointment letter to
the faculty union representative. For example:
Article 11.1. All members of a department at the rank of instructor or above shall
be informed of vacancies and new positions within the departments by the
department chairpersons.
Article 11.2. Unless circumstances prohibit, a department meeting shall be held to
determine the basic specifications of each position to be filled, including
academic credentials and experience in teaching and research.”
Article 11.4. When candidates are brought to the campus, department members
shall be informed and arrangements shall be made for the candidate to meet with
as many department members as possible.
Article 11.5. The chairperson shall seek the opinions of all those members of
his/her department who have full-time regular and continuing university
appointments on their choice of candidates before his/her final recommendation
of appointment is submitted to the Dean of the college. The chairperson’s report
shall include a report of the comments of those members of the department who
were consulted.
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Article 11.9. If the appointment is approved by the Dean of the college, he/she
shall recommend the appointment of the candidate to the Provost who, if he/she
approves, makes a recommendation to the President. If the President approves,
he/she will appoint the faculty member.
In the above article for the University of Rhode Island there was no mention of a
procedural recourse to the faculty if the Dean, Provost, or President, disapproved the
recommended prospective faculty member for appointment at any approval step along the
way.
The Article within the contract of Rhode Island College (RIC) covering the
appointment of new faculty was also very detailed. Article VII., A. 7.1, stated that:
New faculty shall be recommended initially by the department chairperson after
consultation with the department advisory committee or the whole department.
[And] The final decision on appointment of any new faculty member shall be
made by the President upon the recommendation of the Vice President for
Academic Affairs after reviewing the recommendation of the appropriate dean
and the department chairperson (Article VII.7.1 &2).
As was the case with the URI contract, the RIC contract also did not state the recourse to
the faculty if the President rejected the recommendation.
The University of Massachusetts at Lowell, had among its clauses on
appointments language with the requirement that the appointed faculty member live in
Massachusetts, (Article VII A.l), and declared the faculty ranks assigned by type of
education and experience, and the subject areas where these requirements can be waived
such as no doctorate being required for assistant professor posts in accountancy,
computer science and the health professions (Article VII. A. 2. a. b. & c.).
Notes on Faculty Promotion and Tenure, and Termination and Removal
Protections. Each of the twelve contracts contained language on the promotion and
tenure process. The University of Connecticut’s contract references the presence of the
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procedure as laid out in separate by-laws and procedures, which were established prior to
bargaining. These procedures remained in place after the contract was ratified.
In the Massachusetts State Colleges’ agreement, the promotion and tenure process
stipulates the role of the faculty member to be promoted or considered for tenure, the
chairperson, the Committee on Promotions, the Committee on Tenure, the President, and
the Board of Trustees Article VIII. E. 3- 7 and, F through I.). For example, the tenure
process begins with the department chair. The article reads:
A person shall not be eligible for tenure unless he/she shall have
been recommended therefor[e] by the Department Chair, or by the
Director, Library, Library Chair (Worcester State College) or Library
Program Area, as may be appropriate, and or the Committee on
Tenure (Article VIII. J.3.).
An example of contract language that incorporates promotion with evaluation is
found in the Connecticut State University System’s collective bargaining agreement in
Article 4.11.1. It reads:
There shall be only one (1) evaluation procedure leading to recommendations
regarding promotion, tenure and renewal of full-time members as follows: in
accordance with procedures as developed by the Senate and approved by the
President in an expeditious manner, evaluations of teaching members shall be
conducted by the Department Evaluation Committee (DPEC) of which the
Department Chairperson may be a member, ex-officio, and by the Universitywide Promotion and Tenure Committee.
The DPEC’s composition included tenured members of the departments, and the
University-wide Promotion and Tenure Committee specified in terms of numbers and
exact composition by the campus senate and approved by the President, contained only
tenured associate and full professors, with no more than two from any given department
serving at the same time (Connecticut State University System, Articles 4.11.4 &13).
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There was no mention of a grievance procedure for the candidate, but the
President may override the decision of the Promotion and Tenure Committee. If the
decision was to deny tenure against the Committee’s decision, the President must provide
a written explanation. If the President supported tenure in the face of a Committee denial
he/she must also provide the Committee with an explanation, and “the President’s
explanation shall be held in confidence by the Committee subject to applicable statutes”
(Connecticut State University System, Article 4.11.14).
Article 9 of the University of Maine System contract illustrates an example of a
contract that was straightforward in its approach to the promotion and tenure decision and
the involvement of faculty in it and also included a time line. For example:
The department, division, or other appropriate chairperson, or director or dean
shall inform the appropriate peer committee that a unit member has applied or is
eligible for tenure, continuing contract or promotion” (University of Maine
System, Article 9.C.l).
The level of faculty involvement in the removal, retrenchment, or termination of
fellow members, and thus bargaining unit faculty, varied slightly varied among the
reviewed contracts. All twelve of them had sections specifically labeled “Retrenchment”
or “Reduction Due to Financial Exigency” or used similar terms such as “Lay-offs due to
Program Elimination,” etc. They had in common an expressed desire by the unit
members to be completely informed as to why the need for the faculty reductions,
(especially if it was related to a declared financial exigency by an administration), the
need to seek alternatives to the reductions in force, the procedures to use when following
a retrenchment course, and the conditions on the treatment of those laid-off.
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The reviewed contracts also had in common, among the sections on terminations
and dismissals, strong outlines of the due process involved, and the involvement of
faculty boards of peers in the instance of dismissals of tenured faculty.
As an exemplar of the type of retrenchment or financial exigency article found in
the twelve contracts in terms of specificity, the University of Massachusetts at Lowell’s
contract is worthy of note for it is meticulous in its detail regarding the retrenchment, as
well as the removal of non-tenured faculty and the termination of tenured faculty
appointments.
With regard to retrenchment, its Article XIII encapsulated the various procedures
and paths to be taken in the event that precipitous and projected drops in enrollments, an
extreme loss of financial resources, or a major change in a state’s educational mandates
or via a “bona fide financial exigency” were deemed an unquestionable need to reduce
the institution’s faculty. This Agreement declared that “the Chancellor or his designee
first shall meet to discuss with the MSP [the faculty union] the University’s plan for a
systematic retrenchment of Unit members” as the first priority of the Administration if a
financial exigency was declared (University of Massachusetts at Lowell, Article XIII.
A.6). In addition, another section of the Article sought to provide alternatives to
retrenchment such as the reassignment of faculty. The Article prescribed a path to follow
when reducing the faculty employment numbers with a list of the order of reductions
starting with part-time faculty then on to non-tenured faculty with tenured faculty being
laid off last. Issues related to the provision of services for the laid-off faculty, as well as
procedures for recall to employment for them were also stipulated (Article. XIII. B.
through I.).
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In contrast, the contract of the University of New Hampshire on this point of
retrenchment concentrated on the need to retain the positions of tenured faculty over
non-tenured, and stated the necessity to consider alternatives to lay-offs due to
“programmatic displacement” (UNH, Article 14.4, p. 18). This Article created a Joint
Committee to review alternatives to terminations with planned programmatic
retrenchments (Ibid). It further allowed the union to file a grievance action to the level of
the Board of Trustees over any planned terminations of unit member faculty if they were
based on a program elimination recommendation made by the University President, but
such an action stopped at the Board and was not open to arbitration.
In the area of termination and dismissal articles (not based on retrenchments or
program eliminations), the reviewed contracts varied more among each other in content
than they had in the area of retrenchment. However, all had some content associated with
policies related to termination and/or dismissal.
The contracts for the most part use “termination” or “non-renewal” in the case of
full-time non-tenured faculty members, while “dismissal” was the nomenclature for
removal of a tenured faculty member for “just cause” and through “due process.”
One exception to this set of distinctions is found in the contract (Article 16) of the
University of Maine System that used “termination, suspension, and discipline” as
terminology equally among tenured, non-tenured unit members, and non-tenure track
positions (lecturers, and those on continuing contract). While differing standards and
timelines existed for a non-tenured, or a tenured faculty member, or a non-tenure track
member, the treatment of the faculty member was less distinct based on tenure status that
the other contracts reviewed, with the exemption of Keene State’s contract which had no
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specific language on the subject for any of the faculty types. Keene State’s contract
under Article III, A. Management Rights stated:
The right to direct employees; to determine qualifications, promotion and
tenure criteria, hiring criteria, standards for work, curriculum; to grant
sabbatical and other leaves, and to hire promote and transfer assign, retain
employees in positions, to award reappointments; and to suspend, demote
discharge or take disciplinary actions against an employee for just cause
(Article, III. A.).
The language on terminations, etc., in the RIC contract, and the URI contract
were quite similar with both relying on the American Association of University
Professors (AAUP) statement on tenure and dismissal:
...A member of the [teaching, research, or extension [URI’s language]
faculty who has been granted tenure may not be dismissed except as
provided in the following statement on tenure formulated by the joint
committees from [RIC] for [URI] the Association of American Universities
[RIC ] Colleges [URI] Association of American University Professors....
Termination for cause of a continuous appointment, or the dismissal for
cause of a teacher previous to the expiration of a term appointment should,
if possible, be considered by both a faculty committee and the governing
board of the institution. In all cases where the facts are in dispute, the
accused teacher should be informed in writing of the charge against him/her
and should have the opportunity to be heard in his/her own defense by all
bodies that pass judgment on his/her case. He/she should be permitted to
have an adviser of his/her own choosing who may act as counsel. There
should be a full stenographic record of the hearing to the parties concerned.
In the hearing of charges of incompetence, the testimony should include that
of teachers and other scholars, either from his/her own or other institutions.
Teachers on continuous appointment who are dismissed for reasons not
involving moral turpitude should receive their salaries for at least a year
from the date of notification of dismissal whether or not they are continued
in their duties at the institution” (RIC Contract, Article VIII. E. 8.24; URI
Contract, Article, XVIII.2).
While the URI article ended with reference to the dismissal of tenured faculty
with a short paragraph articulating that the “University of Rhode Island accepts the above
statement as its basic policy governing dismissal under tenure” and added that URI
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considered it to also cover “members of the extension and research faculty,” the RIC
contract further stipulated additional procedures and conditions (URI Contract, Article,
XVIII.2; RIC Contract, Article VIII. E. 8.24). RIC’s contract also defined the timeline
for procedures and refers an affected faculty member to the policy in the contract on
grievance in Article XII (RIC Contract, Article VIII. E. 8.24).
The contract section for the University of Massachusetts’ (for the Amherst and
Boston campuses) on the dismissal of tenured faculty was very extensive. It included a
separate clause for the removal of “principal investigators” (Article XVIII). None of the
other contracts had such a clause.
The Massachusetts State Colleges’ contract, the longest contract of those
reviewed (owing in part to the variety of institutions represented, which included the
Massachusetts Maritime Academy), defined “just cause.” It consisted of one of five
things: “substantial and manifest neglect of professional duty; demonstrated
incompetence in the performance of duties assigned pursuant to the provisions of this
Agreement; dishonesty in research; conviction of a felony; or misrepresentation of
academic credentials” (Article IX. E. 1. through 6.).
Discussion of Interrelated Professional Concerns: Linked and Rooted in the Contracts’
Language
Professional Concern B: The ability of the faculty to determine the curriculum.
Professional Concern C: The ability of the faculty to determine what instructional
practices/delivery systems will be used their classrooms.
Professional Concern D: The ability of the faculty to set the requirements for granting of
a degree.
Professional Concern E: The ability of the faculty to determines their teaching,
scholarship, and service requirements.
The level and depth of language in the contracts that specifically pertained to the
involvement of the faculty in curricular development and direction was more limited in
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scope and content than some of the other professional concerns. However, many of the
contracts had related language in regard to the other related professional concerns about
instructional practices, (and technology in the classroom), degree requirements, and the
related concern of how faculty determined their teaching, scholarship, and service
requirements. Because these issues were so intertwined in the contracts they are treated
collectively in the following discussion.
Notes on Curricular Development. If the concept of curricular development and
direction has some related activities embedded in faculty dictums about workload and
academic responsibilities, then there were more references to it in the reviewed contracts
than if workload was not considered. Therefore, it was treated as one of the areas related
to the professional concerns relative to faculty control over their own workloads as well
as their curriculum concerns. Also it should be noted that in reviewing the contracts
some references to curricular matters were found in articles related to academic freedom,
the prerogatives of management, and the realm of boards of trustees, not under the
faculty’s work specifically.
The contract of the University of New Hampshire under Article 5, Management
Rights, placed the responsibility for curricular matters and the standards for degrees in
the realm of the Board of Trustees and as delegated to the University System and to the
University itself. Its Article 5.1 stated:
All the rights and responsibilities of the USNH Board of Trustees which have
not been specifically provided for in this Agreement or limited by law, shall
be retained in the sole discretion of the USNH Board of Trustees or as
delegated to the University System and to the University including the
academic governance structure. Except as modified by the Agreement such
rights and responsibilities shall include but shall not be limited to ... [referring
specifically to curricular matters it went on in Article 5.1.4 to state]: In
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accordance with the academic governance structure, the right to determine the
curriculum, programs, and degrees to be offered... (University of New
Hampshire, Article 5.1 and 5.1.4.).
The contract of the Connecticut State University System was specific on the topic
of curricular issues and where it placed the seat for their responsibility. The contract,
within the context of its article on academic freedom and professional responsibilities
(Article 4), declared in a sub-article, 4.2.2.1, that: “All members when teaching shall
have professional freedom to conduct their courses proven that the subject matter is that
which has been specified by the University and the appropriate Department.”
The University of Massachusetts at Dartmouth’s contract language on curricular
matters was extensive. The language specifically stated: “The individual faculty
member shall have the sole responsibility to determine course content and texts, limited
only by course descriptions approved by the appropriate curriculum committee”
(UMASS Dartmouth, Article III A. 3, 2001, p. 9).
The contract of the Massachusetts State College Association (MSCA) contained
the most specific language with regard to curricular matters of the contracts reviewed.
While that of UMASS Dartmouth was detailed in its framework for the curriculum
committees and their compositions and charges, this contract of the MSCA was even
more content rich in that area. (Please note that the explicit contract dates of the MSCA
contract were for July 1995 through June 30 1998, but as of 2000-2001 the year of this
contract review period, no new contract had been signed by the aforementioned parties.
They continued to work under the same contract with only an updated letter of agreement
extending its terms for the specific years of 1999 and 2000).
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In this contract’s Article VI, H. Establishment of Departmental Committees, there
was a stated description of the composition of a committee for each academic
department, that included its departmental chair along with members chosen by the usual
“departmental procedures” and also included two students registered as majors in it or as
minors, if it did not offer the subject matter as a major. It was the charge of this
committee “to review and make recommendations concerning the undergraduate
curriculum” [and] “review the long-range educational objectives of the department as
those may relate to its academic curriculum and to the goals and objectives of the
college” (Agreement Between the Higher Education Coordinating Council and the
Massachusetts State College Association, July 1, 1995-June 30, 1998, Article VI. H.I.,
p. 72).
The contract provided a detailed framework for the assignment of contact hours
and semester hours of credit instruction for every mode of instruction from shop
instruction to clinical work, to studio institution and critiques on artistic works. It also
defined the number of contact hours a faculty member would be assigned and credited for
when involved with teaching graduate courses, working in a specific counseling center or
facility, and/or with field work supervision or cooperative education involvement (Ibid.,
pg. 203-204).
Notes on Workload. The two contracts reviewed from the state of New
Hampshire, Keene State College and the University of New Hampshire, were not lengthy
on the subject of workload. Keene State’s contract stipulated that it was part of
management’s rights to “direct employees, to determine qualifications, promotion and
tenure criteria, hiring criteria, standards for work, curriculum; to grant sabbatical and
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other leaves... ” (Article III, A.). Language on workload was contained in a
Memorandum of Agreement that declared, “The parties agree to continue annual sharing
of workload information including but not limited to, overloads, reassigned time,
numbers and percent of courses taught by non-bargaining unit members’ contact hour and
average class size” (Keene State, Memorandum of Understanding Between the USNH
Board of Trustees and the Keene State College Education Associate, #8.). The Keene
State contract had no other provisions that referred to the delivery of courses and/or the
requirements of the awarded degrees.
On the related matter of workload, the contract of the Connecticut State
University System devoted a specific article, (#10) to this concern. Under Article 10, the
contract reviewed the matter of such items as the work year, holidays, instructional load
limits, credit for student teacher supervision, class size, team taught courses, and load
credit for independent study and master’s direction, the scheduling of class times, office
hours and other duties assigned that would replace credit loads such as granted funded .
research, and reassignments to some administrative functions.
Notes on Instructional Practices. One of the elements of the Connecticut State
System contract that marked a distinct notice of the changing delivery of the curriculum
in higher education and instructional practices was the sub-section on distance education.
In this distance education section of the contract, Article 10.15, (which also referred to
other delivery technologies such as all interactive media and computer modeling
programs), the clause spoke of an “incentive” to encourage the use of these
aforementioned new curricular delivery systems. The incentive being that “faculty
preparing the first offering of such as course may receive additional load credit not to
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exceed the total credits for the course for such development” and that “the member shall
receive the normal load credit for teaching the course unless the members and the
appropriate dean expressly agree otherwise for compelling reasons” (UCONN, Article
10.15).
Notes on Degree Requirements. In addition to the specific curriculum decisions
and tangential ones charged to the committees above as depicted in the Massachusetts
State Colleges contract, a separate section in the same Article VII, “Participation in the
Decision-Making Process” entitled, “ Plans for Academic Reorganization,” stipulated
that if there was a
change [in] any academic program, curriculum or structure at any one or
more of the State Colleges, the Board of Trustees, or the Higher Education
Coordinating Council [HECC], as the case may be, shall transmit such plan
or part thereof, to the extent that the same will, if implemented, change any
academic program, curriculum, or structure at any college, through the
President of such College to the All-College Committee [which in turn] shall
refer such plan to any such standing committee or committees within whose
jurisdiction such plan thereof falls... (Agreement Between the Higher
Education Coordinating Council and the Massachusetts State College
Association, July 1, 1995-June 30, 1998, Article VII. F., pp. 95-96).
Changes in the curriculum that might result in adding or discontinuing degree
programs and thus affecting faculty employment were also covered in this contract under
Article XA, “Academic Program Development/No Lay Off.” In this Article, specified
faculty committee involvement in the decision-making process related to the
retrenchment of faculty due to the discontinuation, or cutback, of academic programs was
sharply delineated, and it further prescribed the involvement of the All College
Committee along with the affected programs and departments, and union leadership, and
the President of the College extending then to the Chancellor and the Board of Trustees
(Ibid., Article XA. A-K., pp. 168-179).
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In the contract of the University of Massachusetts at Dartmouth, the approach
taken with regard to degree requirements focused on the Faculty Senate, where as framed
in the contract’s Article V. H., it was ‘the’ body responsible for the policies governing the
admission of students, residency requirements for graduation, and grading and related
academic rules (UMASS Dartmouth, Article III A. 3, 2001).
Notes on the Determination of Teaching. Scholarship and Service Requirements.
The Massachusetts State Colleges contract’s articles as they related to the professional
work of faculty were noted in Article XII of that contract entitled, “Workload,
Scheduling and Course Assignments. In this section the reference to full-time faculty
stated that in addition to the duties of teaching, instructional preparation for it, student
advising and assistance, and continuing scholarship, there was also a recognition of the
following other areas of activity in keeping with a faculty member “as a
professional.. .including the following areas of participation as a professional in public
service; participation and contribution to the improvement and development of the
academic programs or academic services of the College; and the participation in and
contributions to the professional growth and development of the College community”
(Agreement Between the Higher Education Coordinating Council and the Massachusetts
State College Association, July 1, 1995-June 30, 1998, pg. 196).
Of note also was the statement further along in this Article that described that “it
is understood and agreed that the engagement of each full-time faculty member of the
bargaining unit to render professional services to a State College in accordance with the
provisions of this Agreement represents his or her primary professional employment,
[and], it is further understood that no member of the bargaining unit shall engage in any
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other professional activities where to do so constitutes a violation of any provision of
Chapter 268 of the General Laws {State of Massachusetts]” (Ibid., pg. 196).
Professional Concern F. Protections on Academic Freedom for the Faculty Member
This concern is central to the exercise of professional duties within his/her
education. Thus, all of the twelve contracts contained some reference to it although they
varied in their extent and content. The contract of the Vermont State Colleges illustrates
the range of language on this topic. Article 7 states:
(A). Vermont State Colleges shall continue it policy of maintaining and
encouraging full freedom of inquiry teaching and research. Such academic
freedom shall encompass the unconditional freedom of discussion of any
material relevant to any course which a faculty member has been assigned to
teach and, to this end, there shall be no unreasonable restrictions upon
instructional methods.
(B). In a faculty member’s role as citizen, he/she/shall continue to have the
same rights as other citizens, provided that in his/her extramural utterances
he/she shall disclaim any representation on behalf of the Vermont State
Colleges when such representation could reasonably be perceived within the
community where such utterance is made (Agreement Between Vermont State
Colleges and Vermont State Colleges Faculty Federation UPV. AFT. LOCAL
3180. AFL-CIO. Article 7, A. & B., September 1,
1999-August 31, 2003, p. 13).
And to give another example of a contract with similar content, the contract of the
University of New Hampshire in effect for 2000, was equally to the point in its article
concerning academic freedom, Article 2:
(2.1) The Board of Trustees and the AAUP recognize the essential importance of
academic freedom to an institution of higher education and affirm their continuing
commitment to the principles of academic freedom and its protections as provided
in the AAUP Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom.
(2.2) When making public statements, members of the bargaining unit should take
care to avoid the impression that they are representing the University.
(2.3) Members of the bargaining unit will carry out their responsibilities
faithfully and in a manner consistent with the traditions of academic freedom and
professional excellence.
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(2.4) The parties agree that grievances involving alleged violations of this article
that are pursued to arbitration will only be heard by arbitrators who are from an
academic community of higher education. (Collective Bargaining Agreement
USNH Board of Trustees and AAUP-UNH Chapter. July 1. 1998-June 30. 2003.
Article A., p. 108).
Both of the above contract articles literally took their language and its tenor from
the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) 1940 Statement of Principles
on Academic Freedom and Tenure with 1970 Interpretive Comments (AAUP, 1999).
This may well be an example of boilerplate language or an example of a well-settled
concept. The Interpretive Comments read:
a. Teachers are entitled to full freedom in research and in the publication of
the results, subject to the adequate performance of their academic duties; but
research for pecuniary return should be based upon an understanding with the
authorities of the institution.
b. Teachers are entitled to freedom in the classroom in discussing their
subject, but they should be careful not to introduce into their teaching
controversial matter which has no relation to their subject....
c. College and university teachers are citizens, members of a learned
profession, and officers of an educational institution. When they speak or
write as citizens, they should be free from institutional censorship ort
discipline, but their special position in the community imposes special
obligations. As scholars and educational offices they should
remember
that the public may judge their profession and their institution by their
utterances. Hence they should at all times be accurate, should exercise
appropriate restraint, should show respect for the opinions of others, and
should make every effort to indicate that they are not speaking for the
institution (AAUP, pp, 1-2).
In sharp contrast to all of the reviewed contracts, the strongest counterpoint to
extensive language discussed above, the University of Connecticut’s CBA succinctly
covered academic freedom:
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The Board of Trustees recognizes the paramount importance in an institution
of higher education and reaffirms its continuing commitment to the principles
of academic freedom and its protections as described in The University of
Connecticut Laws and By-Laws, (12th edition, revised 1997). This article on
academic freedom is a statement of intent and policy and is not subject to the
Contractual Grievance Procedure (UCONN, 1997, pp. 5-6).
Although the passage was short, it is significant in while academic freedom is
protected, it is not subject to the contractual grievance procedures. It is a stated right, but
not a protected right. Does this make academic freedom a right without a remedy at the
University of Connecticut?
Professional Concern G: The Ability of the Faculty to Exercise Reasonable Shared
Governance
Shared governance means the ability of the faculty to influence decision-making
in general matters relating to the management and planning of the institution, not just
specifically in those areas very distinctly related to the faculty and academic matters. This
section includes a discussion of some of the contract items that specifically point to some
protection for faculty involvement in shared governance. While shared governance may
manifest in various contract sections, this analysis looked for specific language through a
stated article section. A specific article is more indicative of a comprehensive approach
to the topic of shared governance as opposed to inferential or vague language that may
address a specific issue that is only tangentially related to the concept of shared
governance.
Of the twelve contracts, six have references to the faculty’s involvement, via
union leadership notification, in advance of the consideration by the administration of
certain main issues such as budget difficulties and possible financial emergencies, two
contracts had more extensive language very specifically detailing procedures to follow in
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the event of budget difficulties and this program eliminations, and two relied on
interconnected and interlocking committee structures to influence administrative
decisions in matters ranging from support staff utilization to policies for the assignment
of office space (MSCA and UMASS Lowell).
Those contracts that did not contain references to shared governance typically
had clear statements of management rights, and possible consultative rights, for the
union. For example, the University of Rhode Island’s (URI) contract does not contain an
article specific to shared governance with just a reference to the role of the administration
in this regard. In Article II it was stated that “The Association [faculty] recognizes that
the Board [trustees], the Commissioner of Education and the Administration of the
University, have responsibility and authority to manage and direct, on behalf of the
public, all the operations and activities of the University to the full extent authorized by
law” (URI, 2000, pg. 5). A separate article, V, may have left open the idea of
consultation between the officers of the faculty association, and the President of the URI
and/or the State of Rhode Island’s Department of Education but this was to discuss what
might be considered appropriate in deciding the “proper subjects of collective
negotiation” and meeting might also be called for “if matters of mutual concern arise of
an urgent or emergency nature” (URI, p. 6). Yet the contract does not contain language
on shared governance.
An example of nested language regarding shared governance is found in Article
VII of the Massachusetts State Colleges (MASS State). Article VII, “Participation in the
Decision-Making Process,” described a detailed nested structure of committees overseen
by a penultimate, “All-College Committee,” with the responsibility for specific standing
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committees within each of the institutions’ colleges (MASS State, 1995, p. 83). These
committees are to be convened by each college at each MASS State institution for the
following four areas: curriculum, academic policies, student affairs, and long-range
planning. Earlier in this chapter the requirement of the MASS State contract to create
curriculum and academic committees was reviewed under the discussion on the reviewed
contracts and their influence on the curriculum. In this section, it is the work of the
student affairs and the long-range planning committees, and the oversight of the all
college committee, wherein lies the influence of the bargaining agreement to establish a
structure for the exercise of shared governance in a specified way for the institutions and
faculty represented in the contract.
According to Article VII, it is the responsibility of the All College Committee to
“encourage the participation of all members of the bargaining unit, members of the
college administration, members of the student body in the process of decision-making”
(MASS State, p. 81). The purpose also of the All College Committee was to serve as the
agency that would coordinate and implement the participation of the various institutional
constituencies, as the contract stipulated, and the use of the standing committees noted
previously, (for curriculum, academic policies, student affairs, and long-range planning).
The All-College Committee was the starting point for all matters submitted by any party
of the institution, individual or group, and which were then referred by the All-College
Committee to one of the standing committees, or if more appropriate, to a new ad hoc
committee devised by the All-College Committee.
The All-College Committee was created to “resolve any conflicts and difference
in the recommendations of the standing or ad hoc committees prior to passing along said
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recommendations of the ad hoc or standing committees before they were passed on to the
appropriate administrative officer or to an institution’s president” (Ibid).
Without of course guaranteeing that all decisions were made through this
committee structure it can be inferred from this section of the contract that the
expectation was that this was the path to be followed, and if it was not, and a major
decision made at one of the institutions covered by the contract, it could be a subject of
grievance under the terms of the contract by the faculty. Given this situation, the
establishment of the standing committees of student affairs and that of long-range
planning, therefore opened up to a faculty-driven committee decision making process
some areas outside the usual contractual areas that had been described in some of the
other reviewed contracts.
To sum up this section of the review of contract clauses and the professional
concern related to shared governance entries in the contracts, the following is a
restatement of a few points made earlier in this paper about the reality on campuses and
the content of contracts.
The absence of specific language in the contracts should not be interpreted to
mean that there was, is, or cannot be a actual practice of shared governance through such
bodies as faculty senates and other committees, or other faculty representative structures
on the campuses that belong to the faculty contracts reviewed. As has been noted earlier
in this work, past practice, institutional by-laws, state regulations and statutes, and related
edicts, and actual dealings are outside the consideration of this research. Also not
included in this research is how in day-to-day reality, the administration, the faculty,
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students, trustees and other influencing parties, work to influence how a campus is
governed and run in de facto terms.
Concluding Statements of the Contract Review for Research Question #3
This research surveyed a random sample of faculty about their perception of how
their collective bargaining agreement affected their professional concerns. Additionally,
the research included a review of the contracts under which the surveyed faculty actually
worked. A review of the contract revealed that all of the professional concerns developed
from the review of the literature were contained in the contracts. The extensiveness of
the language varied reflecting the context and history of the institution and the issues
brought to the bargaining table. Twelve institutions or systems of higher education
bargained issues pertaining to professional practice. It seems reasonable to posit from the
research that the collective bargaining process is an established venue for faculty to
discuss and pursue their professional concerns.
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CHAPTER 5

DISSERTATION FINAL CHAPTER

The University is a Paradise, Rivers of Knowledge are there, Arts and
Sciences flow from thence. Counsel Tables are Horde conclusive, (as it is
said in the Canticles,) Gardens that are walled in, and they are Fonts signet,
Wells that are sealed up; bottomless depths of unsearchable Counsels there.
John Donne (as cited in Sayers, 1936)

Purpose of this Study
Essentially, this dissertation is an examination of the relationship between the
professional concerns of faculty and collective bargaining. The driving questions
centered on whether unionization was fundamentally compatible with the traditional
definition of a “professional,” as perceived by the faculty surveyed, and what faculty
perceived about their collective bargaining agreements as being agents of hindrance or
facilitation when it came to examining their professional concerns. These concerns were:
•

The ability of the faculty to effectively influence who will join and continue on the
faculty.

• The ability of the faculty to determine the curriculum.
• The ability of the faculty to determine what instructional practices/delivery systems
will be used their classrooms.
• The ability of the faculty to set the requirements for granting of a degree.
• The ability of the faculty to determine their teaching scholarship and service
requirements.
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•

The right of the faculty to exercise their academic freedom.

•

The ability of the faculty to exercise reasonable shared governance, (exercising a
wider role in institutional governance beyond the classroom and the department
level).

Coupled with these professional concerns were also three key research questions that the
study sought to answer. For review these were:
•

Do faculty perceive that collective bargaining facilitates or inhibits their professional
autonomy?

•

Do faculty perceive that collective bargaining in general is important to their sense of
professionalism?

•

Do the collective bargaining agreements support professional autonomy?
To accomplish this work, the study relied on a combination of survey research

and contract analysis. For the survey phase, 650 faculty were drawn from thirteen four
year public institutions within New England and surveyed to ascertain their perceptions
on how their contracts may be affecting their professional concerns, as defined above.
For the contract analysis phase of the research, the associated collective bargaining
contracts of the institutions that employed the surveyed faculty were examined to see if
there was language in the contracts that might facilitate or hinder the professional
concerns of the faculty.
Findings
Research Question #1, (Do faculty perceive that collective bargaining facilitates or
inhibits their professional autonomy?)
Twenty-seven Likert style questions were developed based on the review of the
literature. A review of the questions by their foundational framework, the professional
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concerns of the faculty, (as noted above), and then a factor analysis, resulting in five
factors formed the core of this inquiry, along with ANOVAs seeking the variance with
the factors’ results based on the rank, academic disciplines, and union memberships of
the faculty. The five factors are:
Factor 1: Personal Protections for the Faculty Member
Factor 2: Program Controls
Factor 3: Organizational Restraints
Factor 4: Specified Academic Issues
Factor 5: Restrictive Contract Stipulations
An analysis of Factor 1 (M =3.43) found that the respondents perceived their
collective bargaining agreements as providing them with protections in the areas of the
tenure and promotion review process, the post-tenure review process, a manner of control
over their efforts and scholarly endeavors, added weight to their individual voices in
institutional decision-making, and protected their professional autonomy as well as
helped to secure their right to conduct their teaching according to their own dictums.
Therefore the survey respondents perceived that their collective bargaining agreements
extended these protections to them as individual faculty members and protected their
autonomy as professionals, and protected their academic freedom.
For Factor 2 (M = 3.17) ‘Program Controls,’ the respondents perceived that their
collective bargaining agreements provided controls over the altering of their academic
programs without faculty involvement. The respondents perceive hat their contract
provides protection so that their ability to determine degree requirements are not eroded
by management. The contract is a block to management encroachment, they believe.
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However, there was a large neutral response for three of the five questions for this factor.
Why there is a large neutral response is unknown. It may point to some ambivalence on
the part of the faculty or a lack of knowledge about the contract.
Factor 3 (M = 3.25) responses showed that the faculty perceived the union and
the collective bargaining agreement to be an effective counterbalance to the power of the
institution and its possible thrust, or inclinations, to mandate unilateral change. The data
associated with this Factor 3 denoted a positive perception by the faculty responding that
their union and its bargaining agreement were effective in counterbalancing the power of
the institution to affect unilateral change without faculty involvement.
The analysis for Factor 4 (M = 3.02) has a mean slightly above neutral or the
midpoint. The factor has two questions. The questions raise the interesting point of
whether the respondents want the contract to protect their ability to act (Factor 1) but they
may be concerned about the collective bargaining process replacing their ability to act.
This factor may carve out niches in which faculty believe that the collective action of
bargaining should not be used in place of action taken through normal academic
channels.
Results for Factor 5 (2.65), ‘Restrictive Contract Stipulations’ encompassed two
questions that dealt specifically with two distinct contract issues, the hiring of new
faculty using monetary incentives, and provisions in the contract that protected the
faculty’s ability to establish degree requirements. As they disagreed with the two
questions, the mean is one on that side of the Likert Scale, they disagreed that their
contracts facilitated the hiring of new faculty with monetary incentives, and disagreed
that their contract was not able to protect their right to establish degree requirements.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

145

This factor does not have a conceptual base that binds the two questions. Consequently,
caution is urged when applying this factor to other research questions.
An ANOVA was conducted for each Factor using three key demographic
characteristics of the respondents: their academic rank, their disciplines, and their union
memberships. The results are summarized below.
Academic Rank. No significant differences were found in any of the five factors.
Disciplines. Significant differences by discipline were found with Factors 2, 3, 4,
and 5. For Factor 2, ‘Program Controls,’ there were significant differences ip < .05)
between those in the category o f ‘other’ and those in the liberal arts, and
science/engineering, but not with business /economics. In the situation of Factor 3,
‘Organizational Restraints’ the significant differences ip < .05) were between
science/engineering and business/economics. While Factor 4, ‘Specified Academic
Issues,’ mirrored that of Factor 1 with significant differences (p < .05) between those in
the category of ‘other’ and those in the liberal arts, and science/engineering, but not with
business /economics. Factor 5, ‘Restrictive Contract Stipulations,’ displayed significant
differences (p < .05) between ‘other’ and science/engineering. There is no apparent
theme that links all of the responses. Consequently, these findings are of limited value.
Union Membership: For Factor 1, ‘Protections for the Faculty Members’, the
members of the three main unions, AFT, AAUP and NEA, showed significant differences
ip < .05) with those faculty who by choice were not union members. Factor 2, ‘Program
Controls,’ showed an exact parallel finding, and Factor 3 ‘Organizational Restraints,’
showed only a significant difference ip < .05) between AAUP and those not in a union.
Factor 4 had no significant differences among the union memberships, and Factor 5
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‘Restrictive Contract Stipulations,’ indicated a significant differences (p < .05) between
members of AFT and AAUP. Members in the AAUP differ from non-union respondents;
members of the NEA and AFT differ to a lesser degree from non-union respondents. The
clear, and not unexpected explanation, is that union members differ in perceptions from
those who joined a union. There was no significant difference between the unions except
for Factor 5. But, once again, caution is urged regarding this finding.
Taken together, the analysis of the first research question leads to the finding that
collective bargaining agreements facilitate the exercise of professional autonomy. The
CBA plays a role in protecting faculty professional autonomy. Clearly, the CBA is not an
impediment to professionalism in higher education.
In sum, on the question of whether or not collective bargaining facilitates or
inhibits professional autonomy thus research Question 1, the responses of the faculty to
the survey indicate that not only does it facilitate, in some areas such as exercising
restraint on the administration to change programs, alter the curriculum and support the
voices of the faculty outside the classroom, among some of the faculty respondents it
may be considered vital. There also did not indicate to be any strong perceptions of
conflict among the respondents between their being a member of a profession, and having
their associated professional rights such as their academic freedom protected by a
collective bargaining agreement, a mechanism not usually relied on upon or associated
with the professions.
Research Question, #2 (Do faculty perceive that collective bargaining, in general, is
important to their sense of professionalism?)
Three survey items addressed this question. The results of which indicated that
the respondents believe that academic freedom is an appropriate subject of bargaining,
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that collective bargaining balances the power of administration, and that the respondents
prefer to work under a collective bargaining agreement than to work without one.
Therefore, the faculty respondents perceive that collective bargaining is important to their
professional lives.
However, when these questions are analyzed by demographic variables a more
nuanced view of the responses is revealed. There were no variances found for any of the
questions based on the rank or disciplines of the respondents. However, the responses
for Question 28, (“Without a collective bargaining agreement the administration would
have too much power over the governance of my institution.”) and Question 30, (“If
given a choice, I would rather work at an institution that has a collective bargaining
agreement than that does not.”), vary significantly (p < .05) by union membership. In the
case of Question 28, there were significant differences among those not members of a
union and those in the three unions AFT, AAUP, and NEA. There was also a significant
difference between those in a different union, ‘other’ and AFT. For Question 30, the
significant difference (p < .05) was between, ‘’not a member’ and those in AFT AAUP,
and NEA, but there were no differences between ‘other’ and those not members of a
union. For Question 30, the significant differences were between those ‘not a union
member,’ also those in ‘other’ unions and AFT, AAUP, and NEA. This difference
between union membership and non-membership persists in both research questions.
This clearly indicates that the two groups differ in perceptions. What supports the
difference of perceptions is unknown.
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Non-union members may have a philosophical view about the work of unions that
spurred them to not join and thus to not see the work of a union favorably. Without
further study, we are left with speculation.
Research Questions # 3. (Do the collective bargaining agreements support professional
autonomy?)
This question focused on the contracts and not the survey. The contracts revealed
a range of coverage with regard for the professional concerns of the faculty (as defined
for the purposes of this study), with some contracts providing a spartan approach and
others providing extensive coverage. In one case, what was perceived by the literature as
being a very strong faculty concern, (who will join and continue on the faculty), was
found to a large extent within the contracts reviewed but registered lower in the factor
analysis of the professional concerns among the faculty survey responses; thus leading to
a conclusion that it was less important than the other professional concerns to the faculty.
In contrast, a reading of the contracts alone might result in the opposite conclusion given
the amount of content in all the contracts centering on this aspect of faculty
appointments, and the provision of tenure. This was the clearest disparity between the
level of importance given to a concern by the faculty and the amount of space it occupied
in most of the contracts.
A comparison of the contracts by professional concern and the responses to the
survey questions by the respondents, overall demonstrate that the faculty appear to have a
good awareness of what was in their contact, in the sense that many of the items they felt
strongly about (academic freedom, personal tenure/post-tenure review protections and
due process right etc., and their role in curriculum planning, and work in the classroom)
were actually in their contracts, so they answered apparently from a basically informed
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position. However, how strong their collective bargaining agreement is in application
and how the respondents perceived it to protect their voice in governance, acting as a
control on arbitrary administrative decision-making, may be subject to debate. Most
contracts contained little language and were vague when they did contain any reference
to shared governance.
All the contracts devoted space, some of it quite extensive, to the adding of new
faculty and especially in some instances the use of adjuncts, the how and when to use and
how many can be used. It is interesting that all of the contracts contained language
regarding new faculty. It was a professional concern identified throughout the literature,
but it did not surface as a factor. A reasonable explanation may be that the process for
hiring new faculty is an important concern of unions but it may not be recognized as an
exercise of individual professional autonomy.
Conclusions
Without a doubt, the respondents indicated by their answers to the survey that
they perceived their professional concerns, at least as embodied in the survey, to be more
than adequately addressed by their collective bargaining agreements. They also did not
indicate any real conflict over being members of a union and being a professional. In
addition, the areas of protection they sought to be provided in their contracts, especially
protections for the personal roles and for their roles in the classroom, were actually to be
found in the contracts. To a lesser extent what they sought in their contracts in terms of
protections for a firm faculty role in shared governance or as a counter balance to
administrative powers were less distinct, but in many contracts there was some language
even if only in shell form. But in the perceptions of the faculty, their shared governance
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role and their voice in campus issues would be less secure if the collective bargaining did
not exist at all.
Therefore, does the need then for faculty to have a union, and a collective
bargaining agreement, result in part from a desire to procure a more secure foothold on a
way of traditional professional life that is perceived to be diminishing? Is it a way to
preserve a view of faculty life that current faculty members recall that their advisors and
faculty enjoyed when they were students? Is it then, in fact, this perception of a
professional life linked to an institution, one of the reasons faculty enter into the
academic profession?
Recommendations
As with any study, sometimes the actual result is to end up with more questions to
be explored than ones answered and so further studies, hopefully, can come forward and
add to the developing trail of research.
Some of the issues to be explored might include the following:
• more studies with a larger population could examine the influence of departmental
and college affiliations. The number in this study was not large enough to fully
explore each sub-set.
• additional exploration of the of new tenure-track faculty, with further study after they
have achieved tenure, may also inform further on any attitudinal changes resulting
from being a union member.
• examination if membership in a union as a graduate assistant re-enforces the
perceived need to be a member of a faculty union.
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•

more studies on the interplay of laws and past practices and the contracts intertwined
with further study of faculty perceptions and perhaps behavior.

•

a follow-up study to this in other states to see if the results parallel these (Florida,
California, New York) to examine if there are regional differences.
In addition to the above mentioned follow-up studies as well as others that might

find a source of inspiration in this study, it is hoped that information gained from this
study may assist unions in understanding the impact that their management of the
collective bargaining process might have on a faculty’s professional concerns. It may
also aid faculty in understanding more about the perceptions of their colleagues with
regard to the role collective bargaining plays in influencing specific aspects of their
professional lives and its roles. In addition, administrations could find this information
useful in understanding the collective bargaining process and its impact on faculty and
institutional administration relations.
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APPENDIX B
Survey Document
Faculty Perceptions of the Effects of Collective Bargaining Agreements on Their
Professional Roles: The New England Higher Education Experience
SECTION I.

Please write in, or check, the one most appropriate response for each question.
1. Age : ________
2. Gender:

Female

Male_____

3. Rank:
Instructor

Assistant Professor
Associate Professor___ Professor___
Other, please specify__________

4. Years in Higher Education________
5. Tenured_______ Tenure Track_______ Other, please specify ____________
6. My current academic department affiliation is with the:__________________
7. I am a member of the (check one): AFT
or other, (please specify_________ ).

, AAUP
, NEA
,
I am not a member__________

If yes, how many years?_______________
8. Select the level of your current, primary teaching assignment:
Undergraduate

Graduate

Both ________

9. Approximate size of your institution (number of students):
Less than 50 0 ___ 500-1000___ 1001-3500___ 3501-5500___ 5500-7500_
7501-10,000___
10,001-15,000___ 15,001-20,000__ 20,001-25,000___
25,000-30,000___ more than 30,000___
10. Highest level of degree awarded at your institution:
Bachelors

Masters

Doctorate____
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11. My terminal degree is :_________________________
12. Number of years since obtaining terminal degree: ________________
SECTION II.
Please indicate to what extent you agree with the following statements as each relates to
the opening phrase, “(The, A, or My) Faculty Collective Bargaining Agreement...” by
circling the one most appropriate response to the right of each statement.
ANSWER KEY:
SD= Strongly Disagree D=Disagree

N=Neutral

A=Agree

SA=Strongly Agree

“(The, A, or My) Faculty Collective Bargaining Agreement...,
1. .. .enhances the professional status of the faculty by its very
presence on a campus.

SD

D N A SA

2. .. .enhances the practice of shared governance on a campus.

SD

D N A SA

3. .. .effectively protects the faculty’s interests in the post-tenure
review process.

SD

D N A SA

4. .. .protects the faculty’s ability to effectively influence who
will be hired as a faculty member.

SD

D N A SA

SD

D N A SA

6. .. .preserves the ability of the faculty to determine the relative
weight of teaching, scholarship, and service in promotion
and tenure decisions.

SD

D N A SA

7. .. .is not effective in protecting the faculty’s ability to
establish the requirements of a degree.

SD D N A SA

8. .. .is effective in supporting the ability of the faculty to
determine the curriculum.

SD D N A SA

9. .. .primarily addresses issues unrelated to the faculty’s
professional issues.

SD D N A SA

5. .. .is effective in protecting faculty rights during promotion
and tenure decisions.
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10... .facilitates the hiring of the best faculty through the use
of monetary incentives.

SD D N A SA

11... .restrains my institution from restructuring academic
programs without adequate consultation or the cooperation
of the faculty.

SD D N A SA

12. ...protects a faculty member’s professional autonomy.

SD D N A SA

13. .. .protects the control that I have over my
scholar ship/creative efforts.

SD D N A SA

14. .. .contains adequate provisions to protect faculty
determination of how new learning technologies will be
implemented.

SD D N A SA

15... .should not address the establishment of degree
requirements.

SD D N A SA

16. ...should include matter related to the curriculum, and be an
appropriate subject of collective bargaining.

SD D N A SA

17. .. .protects my ability to manage my classroom and give
grades in the manner I feel is best.

SD D N A SA

18. .. .insures that the administration will not have too much
power over the governance of my institution.

SD D N A SA

19. .. .effectively controls the ability of the administration
to unilaterally change the requirements of my position.

SD D N A SA

20. ...is ill equipped to address issues pertaining to my professorial
responsibilities of teaching, scholarship, and service.
SD D N A SA
21. .. .protects my ability to determine what instructional practices
I will use in my classroom.
SD D N A SA
22. ...satisfactorily protects my intellectual property rights
from the claim of the institution to ownership of them.

SD D N A SA

23. .. .effectively protects the faculty’s ability to establish
degree requirements.

SD D N A SA
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24. ...effectively protects my academic freedom.

SD D N A SA

25. .. .adds greater importance to my voice as a faculty member
when speaking on matters relating to institutional governance

SD D N A SA

SECTION III.
And finally, please signify your level of agreement next to each complete statement
below:
26. Academic freedom is not an appropriate subject of collective
bargaining.

SD D N A SA

27. There are adequate provisions in the collective bargaining
agreement to protect faculty determination of how new learning
technologies will be implemented.

SD D N A SA

28. Without a collective bargaining agreement the administration
would have too much power over the governance of my
institution.

SD D N A SA

29. Our collective bargaining agreement effectively protects the
faculty’s ability to establish degree requirements.

SD D N A SA

30. If given a choice, I would rather work at an institution
that has a collective bargaining agreement than one does not.

SD D N A SA

31. As a professional, I really cannot see myself represented
by a union.

SD D N A SA

Thank you very much for assisting me with this survey. Please return it in the
enclosed, addressed and postage paid envelope, by October 17, 2003 to:
Nancy J. Hamer
University of New Hampshire
Verrette House, 6 Garrison Avenue
Durham NH 03824
603-862-1934
email: nhamer@maple.unh.edu (for contact on questions regarding the survey)
To confirm the submission of your survey, and to be entered in the drawing for one
of two $125.00 AMAZON.COM gift certificates, please also return the enclosed
postage paid postcard by October 17, 2003

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

APPENDIX C
Overview of Survey Response Questions on Section II and III: By Professional Concern
Distribution o f Responses
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree
Neutral
1
2
3

Likert Scale

Agree
4

Strongly
Agree
5

Total

M issing

P rofessional C oncern A: The ability o f the faculty to effectively influence w ho w ill join and continue on the faculty. PO ST D E F E N SE
“(The, A, or M y) Faculty C ollective Bargaining A greem ent...
Question 4
protects the faculty’s ability to effectively influence who w ill be
hired as a faculty member

Frequency
Percent
Mean
(S.D .)

11
7.80
3.1857
1.11617

26
18.40

46
32.60

40
28.40

17
12.10

1
0.70

141
100.00

Question 5
is effective in protecting faculty rights during promotion and
tenure decisions

Frequency
Percent
Mean
(S.D.)

5
3.50
3.9220
1.00762

9
6.40

20
14.20

65
46.10

42
29.80

0
0.00

141
100.00

Question 6
preserves the ability o f the faculty to determine the relative weight
o f teaching, scholarship, and service in promotion and tenure
decisions

Frequency
Percent
Mean
(S.D.)

8
5.70
3.3333
1.81200

30
21.30

38
27.00

37
26.20

28
19.80

0
0.00

141
100.00

Question 10
facilitates the hiring o f the best faculty through the use o f
monetary incentives

Frequency
Percent
Mean
(S.D .)

33
23.40
2.3857
1.09666

48
34.04

37
26.24

16
11.35

6
4.27

1
0.70

141
100.00

M ean f o r P ro fessio n a l Concern A :

3.21
OS
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P rofessional C oncern B: T he ability o f th e faculty to determ ine the curriculum .
Question 8
is effective in supporting the ability o f the faculty to determine
the curriculum

Frequency
Percent
Mean
(S.D .)

9
6.40
3.3050
1.07533

21
14.90

47
33.30

46
32.60

18
12.80

0
0.00

141
100.00

Question 11
restrains my institution from restructuring academic programs
without adequate consultation or the cooperation o f the faculty

Frequency
Percent
Mean
(S-D.)

10
7.10
3.2826
1.19603

33
23.40

24
17.00

50
35.50

21
14.90

3
2.10

141
100.00

Question 16
should include matter related to the curriculum, and be an
appropriate subject o f collective bargaining

Frequency
Percent
Mean
(S-D.)

24
17.00
2.5597
1.15369

51
36.20

27
19.10

24
17.00

8
5.70

7
5.00

141
100.00

3.05

M ean f o r P rofession al C oncern B:

P rofessional C oncern C: The ability o f the faculty to determ ine w hat instructional practices/delivery system s w ill be used in their classroom s.
Question 14
contains adequate provisions to protect faculty determination o f
how new learning technologies w ill be implemented

Frequency
Percent
Mean
(S-D.)

6\5
3.50
3.0815
0.94673

31
22.00

56
39.70

34
24.10

9
6.40

6
4.30

141
100.00

Question 21
protects my ability to determine what instructional practices I will
use in my classroom

Frequency
Percent
Mean
(S.D .)

5
3.55
3.4015
0.99602

22
15.60

37
26.24

59
41.84

14
9.93

4
2.84

141
100.00

ON
00
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Question 27
There are adequate provisions in the collective bargaining
agreement to protect faculty determination o f how new learning
technologies w ill be implemented

Frequency
Percent
Mean
(S-D.)

M ean f o r P rofession al Concern C:

7
4.96
2.9416
0.92169

35
24.82

60
42.55

29
20.57

6
4.26

4
2.84

141
100.00

3.14

P rofessional C oncern D: The ability o f the faculty to set the requirem ents for th e granting o f a degree.
Question 7
is not effective in protecting the faculty’s ability to establish the
requirements o f a degree

Frequency
Percent
Mean
(S.D .)

12
8.50
2.9124
1.07426

38
27.00

48
34.00

28
19.90

11
7.80

4
2.80

141
100.00

Question 15
should not address the establishment o f degree requirements

Frequency
Percent
Mean
(S.D .)

10
7.09
3.4815
1.18354

18
12.77

33
23.40

45
31.91

29
20.57

6
4.26

141
100.00

Question 17
Protects my ability to manage my classroom and give grades in
the manner I feel is best

Frequency
Percent
Mean
(S-D.)

7
5.00
3.4815
1.08633

22
15.60

40
28.40

47
33.30

21
14.90

4
2.80

141
100.00

Question 23
effectively protects the faculty’s ability to establish degree
requirements

Frequency
Percent
Mean
(S.D .)

6
4.30
3.0580
0.91833

28
19.90

64
45.40

32
22.70

8
5.70

3
2.00

141
100.00

Os

vO
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Question 29
Our collective bargaining agreement effectively protects the
faculty’s ability to establish degree requirements

Frequency
Percent
Mean
(S.D.)

M ean f o r P rofession al Concern D :

6
4.30
3.1000
0.99856

32
22.70

57
40.40

32
22.70

13
9.20

0.70

141
100.00

3.19

P rofessional C oncern E: T he ability o f the faculty to determ ine their teaching, scholarshi p and service requirem ents.
Question 3:
effectively protects the faculty’s interests in the post-tenure
review process

Frequency
Percent
Mean
(S-D.)

5
3.50
3.8643
1.02635

10
7.10

24
17,00

61
43.30

40
28.40

1
0.70

141
100.00

Question 9
primarily addresses issues unrelated to the faculty’s professional
issues

Frequency
Percent
Mean
(S.D.)

25
17.70
2.6187
1.14459

46
32.60

31
22.00

31
22.00

6
4.30

1
0.70

141
100.00

Question 19
effectively controls the ability o f the administration to
unilaterally change the requirements o f my position

Frequency
Percent
Mean
(S.D.)

5
3.55
3.5401
1.11813

29
20.57

14
9.93

65
46.90

24
17.02

4.
2.84

141
100.00

Question 20
is ill equipped to address issues pertaining to my professional
responsibilities o f teaching, scholarship, and service

Frequency
Percent
Mean
(S-D.)

14
9.90
2.7174
1.06016

53
37.60

36
25.50

28
19.90

7
5.00

3.
2.10

141
100.00

M ean f o r P ro fessio n a l Concern E

3.19

O

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Appendix C {continued)

P rofessional C oncern F: T he right o f the faculty to exercise their academ ic freedom .
Question 12
protects a faculty member’s professional autonomy

Frequency
Percent
Mean
(S-D.)

7
5.00
3.63641.0
1.05767

11
7.80

31
22.00

57
40.40

26
18.40

9
6.40

141
100.00

Question 13
protects the control that I have over my scholarship /creative
efforts

Frequency
Percent
Mean
(S.D.)

6
4.30
3.4453
1.11091

22
15.60

41
29.10

41
29.10

27
19.10

4
2.80

141
100.00

Question 22
satisfactorily protects my intellectual property rights from the
claim o f the institution to ownership o f them

Frequency
Percent
Mean
(S.D.)

8
5.70
3.1343
0.95611

18
12.77

67
47.50

30
21.27

11
7.80

7
4.96

141
100.00

Question 24
effectively protects my academic freedom

Frequency
Percent
Mean
(S.D.)

3
2.10
3.8633
0.85297

6
4.30

25
17.73

78
55.32

27
19.15

2
1.40

141
100.00

M ean f o r P ro fessio n a l Concern F:

3.52
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P rofessional C oncern G: The ability o f the faculty to exercise reasonable shared governance.
Question 1
enhances the professional status o f the faculty by its very
presence on a campus

Frequency
Percent
Mean
(S.D .)

7
5.00
3.4429
1.18304

27
19.10

35
24.80

39
27.70

32
22.70

1
0.70

141
100.00

Question 2
enhances the practice o f shared governance on a campus

Frequency
Percent
Mean
(S.D.)

4
2.80
3.8794
1.05881

15
10.60

35
14.80

59
41.90

44
31.20

0
0.00

141
100.00

Question 18
insures that the administration w ill not have too much power over
the governance o f my institution

Frequency
Percent
Mean
(S.D.)

10
7.09
3.2701
1.14727

31
21.99

23
16.32

58
41.13

15
10.64

4
2.84

141
100.00

Question 25
adds greater importance to my voice as a faculty member when
speaking on matters relating to institutional governance

Frequency
Percent
Mean
(S.D.)

8
5.70
3.5899
1.10213
3.55

17
12.10

25
17.70

63
44.70

26
18.40

2
1.40

141
100.00

M ean f o r P rofession al C oncern G:
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APPENDIX D
Overview of Survey Response Questions in Factor Order
D istrib u tio n o f R esp o n ses
S tro n g ly
N eu tra
D isa g ree
D isa g re
1
e
1
2
3

L ikert Scale

A g ree

S tro n g ly
A g ree

4

5

M issin g

T otal

"(The, A , or M y) F acu lty C o lle ctiv e B argain in g
A g r e e m e n t...
Factor 1 - " P erson al P r o te c tio n s fo r th e F a cu lty M em b er"
Q u estio n 1
en h a n c es the p ro fessio n a l sta tu s o f the facu lty b y its v ery
p resen ce on ca m p u s

F requ en cy
P ercent
M ean
(S.D.)

7
5.00
3.4429
1.18304

27
19.10

35
24.80

39
27.70

32
22.70

1
0.70

141
100.00

Q u estio n 2
en h a n c es the practice o f sh ared g o v ern a n ce o n a ca m p u s

F requ en cy
P ercent
M ean
(S.D.)

4
2.80
3.8794
1.05881

15
10.60

19
13.50

59
41.90

44
31.20

0
0.00

141
100.00

Q u estio n 3
effec tiv e ly p rotects the fa cu lty 's in terests in the p o st-ten u re
re v ie w p ro cess

F requ en cy
P ercent
M ean
(S.D.)

5
3.50
3.8643
1.02635

10
7.10

24
17.00

61
43.30

40
28.40

1
0.70

141
100.00

Q u estio n 4
p rotects the fa cu lty 's a b ility to effec tiv e ly in flu e n c e w h o
w ill b e h ired as a facu lty m em b er

F requ en cy
P ercent
M ean
(S.D.)

11
7.80
3.1857
1.11617

26
18.40

46
32.60

40
28.40

17
12.10

1
0.70

141
100.00
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Q u estio n 5
is effe c tiv e in p ro tectin g facu lty rights d u rin g p ro m o tio n
a n d ten u re d e c isio n s

F requ en cy
P ercent
M ean
(S.D.)

5
3.50
3.9220
1.00762

9
6.40

20
14.20

65
46.10

42
29.80

0
0.00

141
100.00

Q u estio n 6
p reser v es the ab ility o f th e facu lty to d eterm in e th e relative
w e ig h t o f teach in g, sch o la rsh ip , a n d serv ice in p ro m o tio n
an d ten ure d e c isio n s

F requ en cy
P ercent
M ean
(S.D.)

8
5.70
3.3333
1.81200

30
21.30

38
27.00

37
26.20

28
19.80

0
0.00

141
100.00

Q u estio n 9
prim arily a d d r e sse s iss u e s u n related to the fa cu lty 's
p ro fessio n a l issu e s

F requ en cy
P ercent
M ean
(S.D.)

25
17.70
2.6187
1.14459

46
32.60

31
22.00

31
22.00

6
4.30

2
1.40

141
100.00

Q u e stio n 12
p rotects a fa cu lty m em b er's p ro fessio n a l a u to n o m y

F requ en cy
P ercent
M ean
(S.D.)

7
5.00
3.6364
1.05767

11
7.80

31
22.00

57
40.40

26
18.40

9
6.40

141
100.00

Q u estio n 13
p rotects the con trol that I h a v e o v er m y
sc h o la r sh ip /c r e a tiv e efforts

F requ en cy
P ercent
M ean
(S.D.)

6
4.30
3.4453
1.11091

22
15.60

41
29.10

41
29.10

27
19.10

4
2.80

141
100.00

Q u estio n 17
p rotects m y ab ility to m a n a g e m y cla ssro o m an d g iv e
g ra d es in th e m an n er I fee l is b est

F requ en cy
P ercent
M ean
(S-D.)

7
5.00
3.3869
1.08633

22
25.60

40
28.40

47
33.30

21
14.90

4
2.80

141
100.00

Q u estio n 20
is ill e q u ip p e d to a d d r ess is s u e s p erta in in g to m y
p ro fessio n a l resp o n sib ilities o f teach in g , sch o la rsh ip a n d
service

F requ en cy
P ercent
M ean
(S.D.)

14
9.90
2.7174
1.06016

53
37.60

36
25.50

28
19.90

7
5.00

3
2.10

141
100.00

174
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Q u estio n 21
p rotects m y ab ility to d eterm in e w h a t in stru ctio n a l
p ractices I w ill u se in m y cla ssro o m

F requ en cy
P ercent
M ean
(S.D.)

5
3.55
3.4015
0.99602

22
15.60

37
26.24

59
41.84

14
9.93

4
2.84

141
100.00

Q u estio n 22
satisfactorily p rotects m y in tellectu a l p ro p erty rig h ts from
th e cla im o f the in stitu tio n to o w n e r sh ip o f th e m

F requ en cy
P ercent
M ean
(S.D.)

8
5.70
3.1343
0.95611

18
12.77

67
47.50

30
21.27

11
7.80

7
4.96

141
100.00

Q u estio n 24
effec tiv e ly p rotects m y a ca d em ic freed o m

F requ en cy
P ercent
M ean
(S.D.)

3
2.10
3.8633
0.85297

6
4.30

25
17.73

78
55.32

27
19.15

2
1.40

141
100.00

Q u estio n 25
a d d s greater im p ortan ce to m y v o ic e as a fa cu lty m em b er
w h e n sp e a k in g on m atters relatin g to in stitu tio n a l
govern a n ce
T o ta l M e a n Factor 1

F requ en cy
P ercent
M ean
(S.D.)

8
5.70
3.5899
1.10213
3.43

17
12.10

25
17.70

63
44.70

26
18.40

2
1.40

141
100.00

Q u estio n 8
is effec tiv e in su p p o rtin g the ab ility o f th e fa cu lty to
d eterm in e the cu rricu lu m

F requ en cy
P ercent
M ean
(S.D.)

9
6.40
3.3050
1.07533

21
14.90

47
33.30

46
32.60

18
12.80

0.00

141
100.00

Q u estio n 11
restrain s m y in stitu tio n from restru ctu rin g a ca d em ic
p rogram s w ith o u t a d eq u a te co n su lta tio n o f th e co o p era tio n
o f the facu lty

F requ en cy
P ercent
M ean
(S.D.)

10
7.10
3.2826
1.19603

33
23.40

24
17.00

50
32.50

14
14.90

3
2.10

141
100.00

Factor 2 - "P rogram C on trols"

L /i
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Q u estio n 14
con ta in s a d eq u ate p ro v isio n s to p ro tect facu lty
d eterm in a tio n o f h o w n e w lea rn in g te c h n o lo g ie s w ill b e
im p lem en te d

F requ en cy
P ercent
M ean
(S.D.)

5
3.50
3.0815
0.94673

31
22.00

56
39.70

34
24.10

9
6.40

6
4.30

141
100.00

Q u estio n 23
effec tiv e ly p rotects the fa cu lty 's a b ility to esta b lish d eg re e
req u irem en ts

F requ en cy
P ercent
M ean
(S-D.)

6
4.30
3.0580
0.91833

28
19.90

64
45.40

32
22.70

8
5.70

3
2.00

141
100.00

Q u estio n 29
O ur co llec tiv e b a rg a in in g a g re em en t e ffe c tiv e ly p ro tects the
facu lty's ab ility to esta b lish d eg re e req u irem en ts

F requ en cy
P ercent
M ean
(S.D.)

6
4.30
3.1000
0.99856

32
22.70

57
40.40

32
22.70

13
9.20

1
0.70

141
100.00

3.17

T o ta l M e a n F actor 2
Factor 3 - " O rg a n iza tio n a l R estra in ts
Q u estio n 18
in su res th at the ad m in istration w ill n o t h a v e to o m u ch
p o w e r o v er the g o v er n a n ce o f m y in stitu tio n

F requ en cy
P ercent
M ean
(S.D.)

10
7.09
3.2701
1.4727

31
21.99

23
16.31

58
41.13

15
10.64

4
2.84

141
100.00

Q u estio n 19
effec tiv e ly con trols th e a b ility o f the a d m in istra tio n to
u ltim a tely ch a n g e the req u irem en ts o f m y p o sitio n

F requ en cy
P ercent
M ean
(S.D.)

5
3.55
3.5401
1.11813

29
20.57

14
9.93

65
46.09

24
17.02

4
2.84

141
100.00

Q u estio n 27
T here are a d eq u a te p r o v isio n s in the c o llec tiv e b a rg a in in g
a g reem en t to p ro tect facu lty d eter m in a tio n o f h o w n e w
learn in g te c h n o lo g ie s w ill b e im p le m e n te d

F requ en cy
P ercent
M ean
(S.D.)

7
4.96
2.9416
0.92169

35
24.82

60
42.55

29
20.57

6
4.26

4
2.84

141
100.00

T otal M e a n Factor 3

3.25
ON
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Appendix D (continued)
Factor 4 - " S p e c ifie d A c a d e m ic Issu e s"
Q u estio n 15
sh o u ld n o t a d d r e ss the esta b lish m en t o f d eg re e
req u irem en ts

F requ en cy
P ercent
M ean
(S.D.)

10
7.09
3.4815
1.18354

18
12.77

33
23.40

45
31.91

29
20.57

6
4.26

141
100.00

Q u estio n 16
sh o u ld in c lu d e m atter related to the cu rricu lu m , a n d b e an
ap p rop riate su bject o f co llec tiv e b arg a in in g

F requ en cy
P ercent
M ean
(S.D.)

24
17.00
2.5597
1.15369

51
36.20

27
19.10

24
17.00

8
5.70

7
5.00

141
100.00

T otal M e a n Factor 4
Factor 5 - " R estrictiv e C ontract S tip u la tio n s "

3.02

Q u e stio n 7
is n o t effec tiv e in p ro tectin g the fa cu lty 's a b ility to esta b lish
th e req u irem en ts o f a d eg re e

F requ en cy
P ercent
M ean
(S.D.)

12
8.50
2.9124
1.07426

38
27.00

48
34.00

28
19.90

11
7.80

4
2.80

141
100.00

Q u estio n 10
facilitates th e h irin g o f the b e st facu lty th ro u g h the u se o f
m on etary in ce n tiv e s

F requ en cy
P ercent
M ean
(S.D.)

33
23.40
2.3857
1.09666

48
34.04

37
26.24

16
11.35

6
4.27

1
0.70

141
100.00

T o ta l M e a n F actor 5

2.65

